First and second generation migrant religiosity in Europe by Van der Bracht, Koen


FIRST AND SECOND 
GENERATION MIGRANT 
RELIGIOSITY IN EUROPE
K o e n  Va n  d e r  B r a c h t
Submitted to the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences of Ghent 
University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
Doctor in Sociology
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Bart Van de Putte
Academic year 2014-2015

vContents
CONTENTS V
LIST OF TABLES VII
LIST OF FIGURES IX
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XI
1 INTRODUCTION 1
2 THEORY 11
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 31
4 THE WORST OF BOTH WORLDS? 39
5 GOD BLESS OUR CHILDREN? 55
6 THE ROLE OF THE ETHNIC COMMUNITY 73
7 ETHNIC SCHOOL SEGREGATION 91
8 DIVERGING CONTEXTS 109
9 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 131
REFERENCES 145

vii
List of tables
TABLE 4. 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 48
TABLE 4. 2: CROSS-CLASSIFIED LOGISTIC AND LINEAR MULTILEVEL MODELS 49
TABLE 5. 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 64
TABLE 5. 2: VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION 65
TABLE 5. 3: LOGISTIC MULTILEVEL MODELS OF BEING AFFILIATED 66
TABLE 5. 4: LINEAR MULTILEVEL MODELS OF SUBJECTIVE RELIGIOSITY 67
TABLE 5. 5: LOGISTIC MULTILEVEL MODELS OF PRAYING 68
TABLE 6. 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 82
TABLE 6. 2: CROSS-CLASSIFIED MULTILEVEL MODELS OF SUBJECTIVE RELIGIOS-
ITY 84
TABLE 6. 3: CROSS-CLASSIFIED MULTILEVEL MODELS OF PRAYING 87
TABLE 7. 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 100
TABLE 7. 2: BIVARIATE SCHOOL VARIABLES CORRELATION 101
TABLE 7. 3: CROSS-CLASSIFIED MULTILEVEL MODELS OF RELIGIOUS SALIENCE
 102
TABLE 8. 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 122
TABLE 8. 2: MEAN RELIGIOSITY FOR NATIVES, FIRST AND SECOND GENERATION 
MIGRANTS AND INTERGENERATIONAL DIFFERENCE BY COUNTRY 123
TABLE 8. 3: CROSS-CLASSIFIED MULTILEVEL MODELS OF AFFILIATION 124
TABLE 8. 4: CROSS-CLASSIFIED MULTILEVEL MODELS OF PRAYING 125

ix
List of figures
FIGURE 2. 1: ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 1 26
FIGURE 2. 2: ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 2 27
FIGURE 2. 3: ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 3 28
FIGURE 2. 4: FULL ANALYTICAL MODEL 29
FIGURE 3. 1: DEPENDENT VARIABLES 35
FIGURE 4. 1: ANALYSES STRATEGY 47
FIGURE 7. 1: PREDICTED EFFECT OF ETHNIC SCHOOL COMPOSITION, BY MI-
GRANT BACKGROUND 104
FIGURE 8. 1: ANALYSES STRATEGY 120

xi
Acknowledgements
De afgelopen vier jaar heb ik met veel plezier aan dit doctoraat en ander onderzoek gewerkt. Dit 
plezier heb ik te danken aan een aantal mensen.
In de eerste plaats was er uiteraard Bart, die voor mij de ideale werkomstandigheden creëerde. 
Toegegeven, mijn onderwerp sloot niet perfect aan bij jouw expertise, waardoor de begeleiding 
op inhoudelijk vlak misschien af  en toe wat beperkt was, maar dat werd gecompenseerd door 
een heel goeie persoonlijke en motiverende begeleiding en een grenzeloze vrijheid om mijn 
eigen weg te gaan. Daardoor kon ik heel veel zijprojecten starten die mij enorm interesseerden. 
Hoewel mijn doctoraat op die manier zelf  een zijproject is geworden over de jaren, zorgde 
het er vooral voor dat ik met heel veel plezier kwam werken. Door de grenzeloze vrijheid en 
zelfstandigheid had ik ook de indruk dat er veel wederzijds vertrouwen was. Daarnaast waren 
ook de vele leuke gesprekken over koers, hip-hop en politiek memorabel. Bedankt.
Ook een enorme dank aan Pieter-Paul. PP, ik leerde je kennen als begeleider tijdens het 
werkcollege in de master Sociologie. Je leerde me, zowel tijdens mijn studies als tijdens het 
eerste jaar van mijn doctoraat, alle kneepjes van het vak. Intussen ben je van mentor uitgegroeid 
tot een fantastische collega en vriend. Het is een plezier om met iemand als jou samen te werken 
en ik kijk alvast uit naar de vele samenwerkingen die nog gaan volgen. Bedankt.
Thank you to Prof. Roger Waldinger and the people at the Sociology department of  UCLA. 
Working at UCLA and living in Los Angeles for some time has certainly been an unforgettable 
experience!
Een andere belangrijke factor in het werkplezier is ongetwijfeld de leuke sfeer onder de 
collega’s. Bedankt aan alle collega’s van de Korte Meer 5 en daarbuiten, in het bijzonder de 
bende van Turijn, Yokohama en San Francisco. Bedankt ook aan alle Hedera-collega’s voor de 
interessante presentaties en discussies maar vooral ook de leuke midweken.
Bedankt ook aan het secretariaat van de vakgroep Sociologie, die er voor gezorgd hebben dat 
ik de voorbije vier jaar nooit administratieve kopzorgen heb gehad en die steeds klaar stonden 
voor een leuk gesprek bij een bezoek aan de bibliotheek.
Maar de voornaamste reden waarom ik elke dag met plezier kwam werken zijn ongetwijfeld 
de bureaugenoten. Ik heb altijd genoten van de goeie sfeer in ons bureau. Wendelien, je bent 
ongetwijfeld de persoon met de grootste dichtheid aan decibels per kubieke centimeter. Sarah, ik 
ben blij dat ik het bureau mocht delen met een internationaal fenomeen van uw kaliber. Fanny, 
bureaugenoot van het eerste uur en steun en toeverlaat op het werk. Ik ben blij dat de gesprekken 
xii
tussen ons soms over cross en bier gingen, om alle vrouwelijke gespreksonderwerpen toch een 
beetje te counteren. Bedankt alle drie.
Bedankt aan alle vrienden voor de nodige ontspanning. Ik denk in het bijzonder aan het 
legendarische ‘Robbe Baert’-team en de kaartnamiddagen in de brug, alwaar het ‘Chinees 
poepen’ tot een ware kunst werd verheven. Bedankt ook aan mijn schoonfamilie voor alle steun 
en hulp die jullie ons geven, in het bijzonder Ilse voor het doorsturen van artikels en Geert voor 
het nalezen van teksten tijdens mijn studies.
Dit doctoraat zou er ook niet liggen indien ik niet de onvoorwaardelijke steun genoot van 
mijn moeder, zus en broer. Moeder, hoewel je aanvankelijk vond dat ik te jong was om te gaan 
studeren heb je toch altijd in mij geloofd en was je fier op mijn prestaties. Toen ik nadien te lui 
was om te gaan werken en graag nog wat verder studeerde heb je bij mijn weten niet eens de 
vraag gesteld of  dat wel nodig was of  waarom ik dat deed. Je gaf  me kortom alle kansen om 
mezelf  te ontwikkelen, ook op momenten dat het voor jou zelf  niet altijd makkelijk was. Die 
steun heeft er voor gezorgd dat ik hier nu sta. Bedankt.
Maar vooral bedankt aan Lies en Josse, de twee belangrijkste personen in mijn leven op 
het moment dat ik dit schrijf. Josse, je moet nog vier weken worden, maar de voorbije weken 
waren al de gelukkigste in mijn leven. Ook al heb je maar een beperkt deel van dit doctoraat 
meegemaakt, het feit dat ik het afgewerkt heb terwijl je vaak lag te slapen op mijn buik maakten 
het meteen de tofste momenten van mijn doctoraat. Ik ben benieuwd hoe jij en je eventuele 
broertjes of  zusjes er zullen uitzien tegen het moment dat je dit kan lezen.
Lies, de liefde van mijn leven, bedankt voor alles. Dit is wellicht het moeilijkste deel van 
heel mijn doctoraat: hoe kan ik jou bedanken in enkele zinnen? Het begon allemaal als een 
tienerliefde in het ‘groot college’ in Aalst. Intussen zijn we ruim tien jaar samen, hebben we een 
huis gekocht en zijn we mama en papa geworden. Ik ben enorm dankbaar dat ik dit allemaal met 
jou meegemaakt heb en kijk uit naar nog vele gelukkige jaren. Bedankt, mijn twee lieve schatten!
Koen Van der Bracht
Haaltert, 29/04/2015


11
Introduction
The religiosity of  immigrants has been the center of  growing public attention over the past few years. One of  the most important triggers to this rising attention in Europe has been 
Islamist violence across the globe and possible involvement of  Muslim minority groups in the 
West. Recent attacks on the Canadian parliament and the satirical ‘Charlie Hebdo’ journal in 
Paris by Islamist inspired individuals have once again increased concerns about religious beliefs 
among first and later generation migrants in the Western world. Moreover, recent reports have 
alarmed public opinion about immigrant youth who leave Western countries to join violent 
extremist groups in Syria and Iraq (Public Safety Canada 2014; Pew Research Center 2014). 
These concerns arise amidst a unfriendly climate towards religion and immigration among the 
European population. In 2006, 46% of  individuals in Europe agreed to the statement that the 
role of  religion in society is too important. At the same time, only 40% thought that immigrants 
contribute a lot to the country they live in (Eurobarometer 2006). In 2011, 6% of  all Europeans 
thought that religious extremism is the most important security challenge for their country, while 
this proportion reaches as high as 15% in some Western European countries (Eurobarometer 
2011). It is in any case safe to say that large-scale immigration to Europe has drastically altered 
both the ethnic and religious landscape of  Europe. Therefore, a thorough study of  ethnic 
minority religion in Europe is clearly relevant for public policy.
These public concerns were not mirrored in academic research, however. Academic research 
into ethnic minorities in Europe focused predominantly on socio-economic topics. This resulted 
in limited knowledge of  religiosity among immigrants. In addition, given that most research was 
confined to case studies focusing on specific local immigrant and religious groups, the limited 
knowledge there is, is also somewhat fragmented (Ebaugh 2003). In their literature review on 
immigrant religiosity, Cadge and Ecklund (2007: 360) conclude that this focus on individual 
case studies has resulted in ‘a lack of  systematic analytic comparison and synthesis’. For future 
research, they argue that ‘more research about individuals based on systematic survey data 
is needed to understand how independent variables like demographics, immigration status, 
geographic contexts of  exit and reception, and the presence or absence of  coethnics shape 
immigrants’ religious beliefs’ (Cadge and Ecklund 2007: 372). Helen Ebaugh launched a similar 
plea, calling for ‘discerning patterns of  religious adaptation’ to ‘develop generalizations that 
go beyond endless descriptions of  specific cases and arrive at conclusions that are testable’ 
(Ebaugh 2003: 237-238). The importance of  transcending case studies is even more relevant in 
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Europe, which is characterized by a wide variation in religious contexts. Little is known about 
how migrant religiosity develops in more religious countries such as in Eastern Europe, versus 
relatively less religious countries such as in Western Europe. Therefore, there is a need for more 
sociological research into individual and contextual influences on migrant religiosity.
One of  the main reasons for this gap in the literature was a lack of  systematic survey data 
including questions on religion and containing a substantial number of  immigrant cases (Cadge 
and Ecklund 2007). The availability of  large-scale datasets like the New Immigrant Survey (NIS) 
in the US and the European Social Survey in Europe (ESS) at the beginning of  this millennium 
has altered the possibilities for the types of  large-scale comparable research which can propose 
testable conclusions. Moreover, during the last decade, many of  the national and local surveys 
that collected information on ethnic munities complemented their survey with a section on 
religiosity.
With this dissertation we want to offer a systematic, comparative analysis of  immigrant 
religiosity in Europe. We want to improve upon previous research by testing generalizable 
theories on immigrants from virtually all over the world across more than 25 European countries. 
Our goal is to go beyond previous case studies of  specific immigrant groups in specific contexts. 
Therefore, we want to perform an analysis of  religiosity among a wide variety of  ethnic and 
religious groups in the diverse European context. We look at how immigrants’ religiosity is 
determined by individual characteristics, by characteristics of  the country they migrated from 
and by characteristics of  the country they migrated to.
This dissertation is structured as follows. In the following parts of  this introduction, we will 
first determine the basic concepts of  our dissertation. In Chapter 2, we present a short overview 
of  the current state of  the research and which gaps we want to address in this dissertation. 
We also introduce the main sociological theories which we use to try to fill these gaps in the 
literature and define the research questions. In Chapter 3, we discuss the applied methodology. 
We give an overview of  our research sample and how we have analyzed that sample. Chapters 
4 to 8 entail the empirical analyses. In each of  these chapter we try to formulate answers to the 
proposed research questions. Finally, in Chapter 9, we discuss the general conclusions we derive 
from this dissertation and make recommendations for future research.
Main concepts
What is religion?
Before we are able to analyze how religion differs among immigrants, we need to delineate what 
it constitutes specifically. Although this is the central concept of  this dissertation, it is difficult 
to define. With an increasing diversity in religion across the world, the question remains how 
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a definition can be both sufficiently specific and generic (Blasi 1998). Definitions run the risk 
of  being too specific on the one hand, affecting the analysis and determining conclusions from 
the onset by a too narrow view on the subject, or being too general on the other hand, hardly 
capable of  delineating religious systems of  meaning from any other social system (Dobbelaere 
and Lauwers 1973).
Among theorists of  religiosity, two traditions of  defining religiosity exist: substantive or 
functional definitions. The former defines religion by the meaning of  the contents of  certain 
phenomena, the latter by the function it fulfills for society (Berger 1974). The distinction between 
both definitions goes back to two founding fathers of  sociology Weber, who applied a substantive 
perspective to religion, and Durkheim, who used a functional definition (Davie 2003). According 
to Weber, the crucial aspect of  religion is the ‘sacred’ meaning it has for individuals, which is 
different from the ‘profane’. The former is the realm of  the ‘uncanny’, the ‘otherness’, while the 
latter is the domain of  everyday reality (Berger 1974). Therefore, substantive approaches stress the 
difference between religious ideas, values and beliefs and non-religious ideas, values and beliefs. 
Individuals’ interpretation of  the distinction between the profane and the sacred determines the 
boundary between religious and non-religious phenomena. According to substantive definitions, 
the sociologist of  religion should follow the ‘Verstehen’-idea to understand from within the 
meaning individuals attribute to religion, and how they think religion is different from the rest 
of  society (Swatos, Kivisto and Gustafson 1998).
The functional definition goes back to the work of  Durkheim (1912), who defined religion as 
‘a solidary system of  beliefs and practices related to the sacral, i.e. separate and forbidden things, 
which unites all adherents in a moral community, called a church.’ Although the distinction 
between the sacred and the profane is a substantive element in Durkheim’s definition (Davie 
2003), religion is approached by the function it has for a certain society. In his view, religions 
are moral communities whose collective actions help to unite its members. These social actions 
of  religion are therefore sociologically more important than the contents of  these actions, 
according to functionalist interpretations of  religion. Contrary to substantive approaches, the 
focus in functionalist analyses is devoted to analyzing the function religion has for a society or 
for individuals, rather than analyzing the meaning systems.
One of  the main differences between substantive and functional definitions of  religion is 
the specificity they ascribe to religion. Substantive definitions take a distinction between the 
sacred and the profane as point of  departure: religion only entails those meanings that refer to 
transcendent or metaphysical entities (Berger 1974). These definitions hence stress the difference 
between religious ideas, values and beliefs and non-religious ideas, values and beliefs. Moreover, 
they argue that different types of  beliefs and meaning systems have different outcomes (Davie 
2003). Functional definitions reduce religion to a social system which has a certain function 
for societies, putting religion on a level with other social systems. In the functional approach, 
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more focus is devoted to commonalities between different religions or between religious social 
systems and other social systems within a society. But what makes certain social subsystems 
‘religious’ and others not? Most functional definitions of  religiosity deem social subsystems as 
religious when they have a function of  explaining existential questions and/or alleviate possible 
frustrations deriving from uncertainty and uncontrollable events, through certain beliefs and 
practices (Berger 1974). Yinger (1957: 9), for instance, describes religion as an answer to the 
struggle with ‘ultimate problems of  human life. It is the refusal to capitulate to death, to give up 
in the face of  frustration, to allow hostility to tear apart one’s human associations’. 
Most empirical studies of  religion do not give a formal definition of  religion. The distinction 
between both views has therefore been called an ‘old and sterile debate’ (Chaves 1994: 756). In 
the end, however, the sociologist of  religion has to choose a specific type of  analysis strategy 
to assess the topic he wants to study. The sociologist of  religion needs to decide whether the 
research question entails looking at differences in meaning systems as in the substantive approach, 
or looking at religion as a social system as in the functional approach.
During the mid-twentieth century, the functionalism of  Parsons became the dominant 
paradigm in the sociology of  religion (Beckford 1989; Davie 2003). Since then, religion has often 
been approached by the function it has. One of  the most studied functions is the one Durkheim 
identified, the integrating effect of  religion. Through collective behavior in moral communities, 
religions provide social support, which is for instance associated with positive effects on mental 
and physical health (Ellison and Levin 1998). According to other scholars, religion produces 
conformity to norms and values in society and can therefore reduce delinquency or substance 
use (Stark 1996; Van Tubergen and Poortman 2009). One of  the best examples of  functionalist 
analyses is functional differentiation theory (Norris and Inglehart 2004). According to functional 
differentiation theory, societies in the Western World secularized due to the fact that in 
modernized societies religions and religious institutions lost their function, given that welfare 
states and other social institutions took over the role of  religion. Specialized professionals, and 
organizations devoted to healthcare, education and welfare fulfilled the needs of  individuals 
which were traditionally fulfilled by religious institutions. In this functionalist interpretation, 
religions lost their social function and are hence no longer needed. 
The functionalist view on religion has resulted in a tendency towards research which stresses 
the positive effects religiosity can have on a wide variety of  social topics (Smilde and May 2010). 
This tendency is also present in the literature on migrant religiosity (Foner and Alba 2008). 
Scholars have stressed two dimensions of  benefits for immigrants: psychosocial and socio-
economic. The psychological benefits of  religiosity for immigrants were already a theme in the 
seminal work of  Herberg (1960). One of  the general psychological benefits of  religion is offering 
a stronghold to individuals by answering existential questions. The migration process itself, can 
increase the need for this religious stronghold, however. Migration can thus be a ‘theologizing 
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experience’, as Smith (1978) has argued. The process of  going through long-distance traveling 
and often hard early adaptation to the new host society can be a traumatizing phase in a human 
live. In this case, religion can offer guidance and consolation. Therefore, the process of  migration 
is often approached as a factor which may induce religiosity (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003). Recent 
quantitative studies, however, found that religious participation after migration decreased 
substantially, thus supporting previous qualitative research (Connor 2008, 2009). Religious 
habits are often disrupted due to migration and the availability of  certain denominations in 
the place of  settlement might cause drops in religious behaviors. Nonetheless, most scholars 
agree that the psychosocial benefits associated with religion can help immigrants to adapt to 
the new host society (Hirschman 2004). Through offering existential security and social support, 
religion might give immigrants guidance and support in adapting to the new society (Hagan 
and Ebaugh 2003). Religion has therefore been described as a ‘balm for the soul’ for immigrants 
during the adaptation process to the new host society (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003; Connor 2010b). 
Even among later migrant generations, who did not migrate themselves, religion can serve as a 
more stable identity for ethnic minorities who feel discriminated (Foner and Alba 2008). Indeed, 
the social support people experience through religious communities benefits immigrants’ well-
being and mental health more than other forms of  group involvement (Connor 2010b).
This social aspect of  religion does not only benefit immigrants’ mental well-being, but 
also provides social capital and opportunities for socio-economic mobility (Hirschman 2004). 
Almost all studies of  immigrant religion in the U.S. stress the opportunities they provide for their 
adherents: from offering English classes to providing information about job openings (Foner and 
Alba 2008). Quantitative studies indeed found that religious participation in the U.S. is associated 
with a higher occupational attainment (Connor and Koenig 2013), although the relationship 
seems to be the strongest among non-Protestant immigrants (Connor 2011).
In this dissertation, we follow a functionalist approach to immigrant religion. We study 
differences in religiosity across different groups and in different contexts. The point of  departure 
is that religion has certain functionalities for either individuals or social groups and that several 
aspects might either reinforce or weaken the need for these functions to be fulfilled. Such 
functions could be for instance social integration, identity formation or psychosocial effects. 
We focus on how individual experiences of  religion among ethnic minorities are affected by 
individual characteristics, interactions with other individuals, social groups and social institutions 
and characteristics of  the social context in which immigrants live. This means that we do not 
study religion as a factor contributing to the psychological and social adaptation of  immigrants 
to their new environment, but rather as a consequence of  these adaptation processes.
By choosing this approach, we do not imply that substantive approaches to immigrant religiosity 
are less valuable to the scientific knowledge of  immigrant religiosity. To the contrary, a better 
understanding of  interpretations, meanings and beliefs from the point of  view of  immigrants 
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themselves is needed to fully grasp the everyday lived religious realities of  ethnic minorities. 
Our goal, to provide a comparative analysis of  what makes migrants across host societies and 
from different origin societies more or less religious, calls for a certain level of  generalization. 
We therefore assume that behind every different expression of  religion and different meaning 
system across different denominations, there is a general shared component of  religiosity, or how 
religious people are. We are interested in why some migrants are more religious than others, 
across religious meaning systems. How religions, and differences between the meaning systems 
of  religions, affect behavior is not the main question we try to answer in this dissertation. The 
question at hand is how religiosity varies according to immigrants’ demographics in different 
sending and receiving contexts and among different ethnic communities. Therefore, we opt 
to focus on the general underlying phenomenon of  how religious people are, which is more 
comparable across these different contexts.
Dimensions of religiosity
One thing most definitions of  religion have in common is that these discern different dimensions 
of  religiosity. Durkheim (1912) and Yinger (1957: 9) mention beliefs and practices, while Bellah 
(1964: 358) and Geertz (1966: 4) use more generic designations in terms of  ‘systems of  symbols’. 
For an empirical analysis of  religiosity, the question remains however, how these systems 
of  symbols can be measured and analyzed. Therefore, we need to delineate the constitutive 
dimensions of  religiosity. An illustration of  why researchers distinguish different dimensions in 
religiosity is the research into the waning role of  religion in Western European societies. Several 
studies have found that this decline of  religiosity is apparent in some dimensions of  religiosity, 
but not in all of  them: softer forms of  religiosity, such as religious beliefs, have persisted, while 
harder indicators of  religiosity, such as ritualistic behavior, have declined dramatically (Davie 
1998). Grace Davie (1990) has termed this European pattern ‘believing without belonging’. 
Before examining religion among ethnic minorities we therefore need to distinguish its different 
dimensions.
One of  the first systematic distinctions was presented by Glock (1962). According to Glock, 
religion has five different dimensions: experiential, ritualistic, ideological, intellectual and 
consequential. The experiential dimension entails feelings and emotions, the ritualistic concerns 
religious behavior, the ideological comprises religious beliefs and the intellectual dimension is a 
form of  religious knowledge. The consequential dimension deals with the influence of  religiosity 
on other attitudes, values and behavior and religion is then more an independent variable than 
a dependent. 
Some early criticisms that these dimensions are only underlying characteristics of  one latent 
variable (Clayton and Gladden 1974) were disbanded by empirical studies that confirmed the 
multidimensional nature of  religion (Faulkner and De Jong 1966; King and Hunt 1975; Hall, 
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Meador and Koenig 2008). The specific dimensions of  Glock’s scheme were also criticized. The 
consequential, intellectual and experiential dimension were considered peripheral by some 
scholars, who found that these dimensions are either antecedents or consequences of  religiosity 
and not indicators (Cornwall et al. 1986). Moreover, the original scheme did not specify clear 
differences between personal and institutional modes of  religion (Roof  1979). An alternative 
was therefore formulated by Cornwall and colleagues (1986), who derived their dimensions 
from social psychologists’ distinction between cognition (knowing), affect (feeling) and behavior 
(doing). For each construct respectively, they discern a personal and an institutional variant, 
leading to six different dimensions of  religiosity: (1) traditional orthodoxy, or individual beliefs 
freed from any religious affiliation, (2) particularistic orthodoxy, or affiliation-specific beliefs, (3) 
spiritual commitment, or personal relationships with the transcendental, (4) church commitment, 
or the attachment to the religious community, (5) religious behavior, or personalized religious 
involvement, and (6) religious participation, or involvement in social religious activities. The 
authors propose specific indicators for each dimension, based on aspects of  Mormon churches, 
but adaptable to other denominations or contexts. Most measurements in sociological analyses 
of  religiosity can be attributed to each of  these six dimensions.
In current-day sociological research into religion, it is conventional to focus on three distinct 
categories: (1) religious affiliation, (2) religious commitment and (3) religious behavior (Hall, 
Meador and Koenig 2008; McAndrew and Voas 2011). The first often entails measuring whether 
individuals feel they belong to a certain denomination or religion. The second is measured by 
asking how religious individuals feel themselves or how important they think religion is. The 
third is often divided between personal and social practices, which often entails a distinction 
between praying and religious service attendance.
The specific measurement of  these dimensions of  religiosity, however, has been predominantly 
oriented towards Judeo-Christian specific measurements. The sociology of  religion has focused 
primarily on the Western World in general and Christian religion in particular (Poulson and 
Campbell 2010; Cadge, Levitt and Smilde 2010), leading to specific interpretations of  each 
dimension in terms of  its measurement (Faulkner and De Jong 1966). Religious beliefs have 
often been measured by asking beliefs in a God or heaven, common concepts in Judeo-Christian 
denominations, but not necessarily in other, for instance polytheistic religious forms. The same 
applies to religious behavior which has often been measured by asking individuals’ service 
attendance. Not all religious forms have the same prescriptions concerning the frequency of  
ritualistic behavior, however, or might have other or more important rituals. Measuring the 
frequency of  religious service attendance, for instance, has been shown to be less reliable for 
Muslim women, for whom service attendance is less common than men (Meuleman and Billiet 
2011). This question of  dimensionality and measurement of  religiosity is clearly more crucial 
when the population at study consists of  immigrants from virtually all over the world.
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In this dissertation, we focus on the three most frequently studied dimensions of  religion: 
(1) religious affiliation, (2) personal religious commitment and (3) religious behavior. We 
analyze religious affiliation by assessing whether individuals consider themselves belonging to a 
certain denomination. Personal religious commitment is analyzed by looking at how religious 
individuals feel themselves. Religious behavior, finally, is examined by assessing the frequency 
of  praying outside of  institutional arrangements. By using these dimensions, we traverse the 
whole spectrum of  dimensions of  religiosity and examine organizational religiosity, personal 
beliefs and religious practices, while assuring the comparability for immigrants from across the 
globe, thus exhibiting a wide diversity in religiosity. We return to the specific measurement of  
religiosity in Chapter 3, when we discuss the data we use and the methodology we apply.
Migrants
As with religion, migration and migrants are terms which are used daily, from formal public 
policy documents to colloquial conversations. Therefore, their meaning seems quite self-
explanatory. As social scientists, however, we need to be aware of  how these terms include and 
exclude certain people and phenomena.
Migration means the process of  settling oneself  in another area than where one was previously 
settled. This can entail both short-distance and long-distance movement. The difference in 
forms of  migration are often determined by the crossing of  certain boundaries. Rural-urban 
migration, for instance, is the crossing of  the boundary between rural and urban areas. Although 
migration within countries or over relatively short distances are probably more numerous, the 
most common interpretation of  migration is international migration. Migration is hence the 
movement across national borders. Therefore, we define a migrant as a person who has crossed 
national borders and settles in a country different from the one in which he or she was born. This 
migrant status is often tracked over successive generations, by measuring the youngest parental 
generation in which migrants occur. Second generation migrants are thus individuals who are 
not migrants themselves, hence born in the country where they live, but who have at least 
one parent born abroad. Third generation migrants have at least one grandparent born abroad, 
while their parents and they themselves were born in the country where they live. Scholars often 
refer to the group of  people originating from migration, i.e. all migrants and their offspring 
across different generations, as ethnic minorities. Although ethnicity and ethnic minorities do 
not have a strict definition and also entail groups who did not migrate to the country they live 
in, we use the term to describe the group of  people who originate from migration, up until the 
third generation.
Delineating ethnicity by national origins neglects ethnic differences, in terms of  for instance 
language and culture, within national origin groups. Therefore, we make abstraction of  
these internal differences within groups and focus on differences in religiosity across national 
9I N T R O D U C T I O N
origin groups. Another exclusion by focusing on migrants is that of  internal migrants, i.e. all 
those individuals who moved within national borders. Sociologically, however, some internal 
migration flows might in some cases be comparable or even more drastic than international 
migration flows. More importantly, international migration is a political process of  nation-state 
building (Zolberg 1999). National borders and border-crossing state regulations determine who 
is considered a migrant and who not. Nation states regulate who may enter and leave the country, 
how long each individual can stay and whether they become full members of  the nation state 
through citizenship acquisition. Determining who can become a member of  society and who 
not is a form of  nation-state and national community building politics (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 
2004). International migrants are for nationals the ‘alien other’, by living within the territory 
of  the nation-state but not belonging to the national community. Some theorists have argued 
that sociologists of  migration have largely ignored these nationalistic processes, leading to what 
they call methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002). Migration research has 
taken the nation-state as unit of  analysis, therefore focusing predominantly on international 
migration, neglecting internal migration flows, and often limiting research to studying how 
migrants differ from nation-state nationals. By measuring these differences, social scientists 
also maintain discourses excluding migrants from the rest of  society. With each study into the 
differences between ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority possible cultural or socio-economic 
discrepancies get underlined and sometimes confirmed (Schinkel 2013). In this respect, some 
aspects of  migrants, such as migrant religiosity, have been approached as ‘anomalies’, deviating 
from those of  the rest of  society. Moreover, by extending sociological research to later migrant 
generations, being a migrant becomes a hereditary social trait. Discourses such as these not 
only describe but also shape realities. Therefore, the sociology of  migrant integration should be 
aware of  its research strategies and discourses and how this might influence the wider image of  
ethnic minorities in society.
In this dissertation we also focus on international migration, thus excluding internal migration 
processes. Although we do recognize the importance of  studying religiosity aong internal 
migrants, this is not the subject of  this dissertation. Moreover, for this dissertation international 
migration is an interesting topic since national borders in some cases also coincide with 
religious borders. Historically, religion in Europe has been organized nationally with regulation 
if  not sponsorship by national governments. A substantial number of  European countries are 
furthermore historically characterized by a quasi-monopoly of  one denomination. Therefore, 
crossing national borders also often entails settling in a different religious environment. At the 
same time, there are considerable differences within countries as well, on which we focus in 
Chapter 5. Hence, we believe that looking at migrants coming from a wide variety of  national 
contexts and migrating to different European countries is an interesting sociological topic.

11
2
Theory
In this chapter, we discuss the relevant theories which guided the empirical analyses in our dissertation. First, we give a short overview of  previous sociological research into migrant 
religiosity in Europe. We discuss the remaining questions in the literature, which we want to 
address in this dissertation. Second, we discuss the specific theories which can guide us towards 
answering the different research questions. For each theory, we discuss the aim of  applying the 
theory to migrant religiosity and how this contributes to the current debate in the research 
literature. From these theories we derive specific research questions which we will address in 
each chapter of  the empirical part of  the dissertation.
Academic research into migrant religiosity in Europe developed only recently. Although 
research into immigration and migrant integration has been common since the take-off  of  
large-scale immigration in Western Europe, that research has predominantly focused on socio-
economic topics. Immigration into Europe often initiated due to economic reasons in guest 
worker programs. At a later stage, migration persisted due to the global economic crisis in the 
seventies of  the twentieth century and due to family formation or family reunion of  already 
settled immigrants. Therefore, academic research in Europe initially focused on analyzing 
the socio-economic attainment (Van Tubergen, Maas and Flap 2004) of  ethnic minorities and 
demographic processes (Beck-Gernsheim 2007). In the U.S., however, research into migrant 
religiosity developed earlier. Although the U.S. had a longer tradition of  being an immigrant 
society, immigration following the 1965 Immigration Act raised the religious diversity in the 
U.S. to a new level (Hirschman 2004). As already mentioned, the American sociological study 
of  religion has been dominated by a functionalist approach, stressing the benefits religion can 
offer to immigrants in the U.S. Hirschman (2004) has summarized these benefits of  religion for 
immigrants in the U.S. as a source of  refuge, respectability and resources. Hence, the American 
literature on migrant religiosity has been dominated by a positive view on the effect of  religiosity 
on the adaptation to and integration into American society (Foner and Alba 2008). Recently, 
more attention has been devoted to large scale survey research into determinants of  immigrant 
religiosity in the U.S. (Connor 2010c; Alanezi 2008).
The European tradition differs somewhat from the American. First of  all, only a small number 
of  case studies were conducted from the nineties of  the last century onwards (Lesthaeghe and 
Neels 2000), the main trigger for systematic academic research in Europe was probably public 
concern for the religious fervor of  Muslim immigrants living in Western Europe after the 
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terrorist attacks on September 11 in 2001. Therefore, a substantial number of  studies addressed 
religiosity among Muslim immigrants in Europe. These studies show that Muslim immigrants 
are relatively religious compared to the general European population, mostly because they 
originate from rural areas of  less developed countries and because residential segregation and 
endogamy maintain religious commitment (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). When confronted with 
hostility towards their ethnic or religious identity, religiosity among Muslims tends to increase 
further (Connor 2010; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012). Some studies among Muslim minorities in 
Western Europe have also examined how religion evolves from immigrants to later generations, 
showing remarkable intergenerational stability (Roy 2004; Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013).
Unfortunately, the current state of  the literature on ethnic minority religiosity in Europe has 
mostly been limited to a focus on Muslim immigrants and has hence neglected other denominations. 
Scholars have focused on the relatively stable pattern of  religiosity among Muslims, both within 
and across generations (Maliepaard, Gijsberts and Lubbers 2012; Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013), 
and on factors contributing to the maintaining of  this relatively high level of  religiosity, such as 
segregation and endogamy (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). This focus on Muslims and small scale 
case studies of  ethnic minorities in Europe has led to a too specific theoretical development. 
First, concerning theories from the sociology of  religion, recent theoretical developments have 
gone unnoticed in the sociology of  ethnic minority religion. Second, the study of  religiosity 
among ethnic minorities in Europe has mostly been restricted to the first generation. Although 
an intergenerational perspective is common among socio-economic studies of  ethnic minorities’ 
lives, this approach is virtually absent from the research into ethnic minority religion. Third, it is 
unclear whether the findings among Muslims are generalizable across different denominations 
and whether findings in specific contexts are generalizable to other contexts. The effects of  for 
instance segregation might play out differently for Christian ethnic minorities, or other religious 
minorities. Next to these individual associations, the findings were often based on case studies 
in specific context, thus neglecting the influence the context can have on these relations. Studies 
have shown, however, that the context where Muslims and ethnic minorities live might be crucial 
for their religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012). Migrants who live in a 
host society where natives are more religious tend to be more religious themselves. Moreover, 
among Muslims, the accommodation of  Islam affects the secularization process among second 
generation migrants. Therefore, the academic knowledge on migrant religiosity in Europe is at 
the moment relatively underdeveloped.
In the current these, we formulate three overarching research objectives. First, we want to 
study ethnic minority religion in Europe across religious groups by applying recent theories 
from the sociology of  religion which explain global differences in religiosity. Second, we intend 
to examine how ethnic minorities adapt their religious lives to the environment to which they 
migrate and how religiosity develops among later generations who are confronted with the 
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religiosity of  their first generation parents and that of  the host society. Previous research has 
so far neglected intergenerational process, although the focus on intergenerational differences 
has a prominent place in the sociology of  socio-economic topics among immigrants. Hence, we 
will secondly assess differences in religiosity according to migrant generations. Furthermore, 
it is unclear whether findings from previous studies among Muslims are generalizable among 
other ethnic minorities as well. Therefore, we will thirdly test the role ethnic segregation plays 
for ethnic minority religiosity in Europe. Such a study should at the same time take into account 
the contextual setting in which religious lives are negotiated. Therefore, we believe that research 
should address three crucial gaps in the research literature.
First of  all, previous research into migrant religiosity has mostly tested theories on religiosity 
which have been subject to criticism over the past decades. The sociology of  religion has debated 
for over a century on different theories which explain why people are religious, especially in 
the light of  declining levels of  religiosity in Western Europe. Successively, secularization 
theory and religious market theory have been dominant paradigms in tackling these questions 
and successively, these have been brought down by empirical evidence against the theories. 
Nonetheless, most studies have focused on one of  these theories to explain differences in 
migrant religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006; Alanezi and Sherkat 2008). Moreover, secularization 
theory and religious market theory have been applied at different analytical levels. Secularization 
theory has been applied to the origin countries of  immigrants, as a way of  explaining how being 
born in an environment with a specific level of  modernization might influence religiosity, while 
religious market theory has often been applied to the destination country, as a way of  explaining 
how religious pluralism affects religiosity. Therefore, research into migrant religiosity could be 
improved by testing more recently developed theories.
Second, although a handful of  studies have examined how religiosity evolves from the first 
to the second generation among Muslims, little is known about how religion evolves from the 
first to the second generation in general, across different contexts. In general, the sociology 
of  migrant integration has a clear intergenerational perspective: although scholars argue over 
the exact process and different terms such as assimilation, integration and acculturation, most 
scholars agree that these processes develop over successive generations (Alba and Nee 1997). 
Therefore, most studies on socio-economic attainment and integration among ethnic minorities 
are framed within an intergenerational view on migrant adaptation. This is not the case for the 
literature on migrant religiosity, however. Indeed, in their review of  the literature on migrant 
religiosity, Cadge and Ecklund (2007) indicate that there is few systematic survey research into 
religiosity among second generation migrants. There are only a handful of  studies that have 
examined intergenerational differences in religiosity among ethnic minorities (Alanezi and 
Sherkat 2008; Diehl and Koenig 2009; Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts 2010). In Europe, these 
studies have focused on Muslims and show mixed results: a stagnation in religiosity is observed 
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in Germany, while religiosity among the second generation is lower than among the first in 
the Netherlands. In the US, on the other hand, religiosity increases across generations. Given 
these mixed results across diverging contexts, the research on migrant religiosity is clearly in 
need of  a coherent intergenerational perspective which can explain evolutions in religiosity over 
successive migrant generations across diverging contexts.
Third, little is known about how ethnic segregation might affect religiosity among immigrants. 
Only a handful of  studies have examined the effect of  ethnic segregation on migrant religiosity. 
These have predominantly focused on ethnic residential segregation, however and report mixed 
effects: although an influence of  residential segregation has been reported for Muslims (Voas 
and Fleischmann 2012), while no differences according to segregation have been found among 
other groups (Van Tubergen 2006). Less is known about the role of  ethnic segregation in other 
life domains, however. One such important domain is school ethnic segregation. There are two 
important reasons for studying the impact of  ethnic school segregation on ethnic minorities’ 
religiosity. First of  all, ethnic school segregation in Europe is widespread, and previous research 
has documented the effects this has on a wide range of  aspects for both ethnic minorities and 
the ethnic majority (Agirdag, Van Houtte and Van Avermaet 2011). One of  these effects it has 
is limiting interethnic contact. As adolescents spend a substantial part of  their waking hours in 
school, schools have been demonstrated to have an impact upon a wide range of  ideas, values 
and beliefs including pupils’ religiosity (Regnerus, Smith and Smith 2004; Barrett et al. 2007). 
Moreover, due to the smaller scale, interactions within schools might be less voluntary than within 
residential settings. School segregation might therefore be more determinative of  interethnic 
contact than residential segregation. Second, social psychologists agree that adolescence is a 
pivotal life phase for the formation of  religiosity (King and Boyatzis 2004; Norris and Inglehart 
2004). As individuals age, they tend to become more independent from the ideas, values and 
beliefs of  their parents (Min, Silverstein and Lendon 2012). Therefore, a better understanding of  
how religiosity develops among ethnic minorities during adolescence and an assessment of  the 
role of  ethnic school segregation is needed.
With this dissertation, we want to offer some insights which might contribute to filling these 
three gaps in the literature. In short, we first want to apply a recent theory which explains global 
differences in religiosity to migrants living in different European countries and originating 
from countries across the globe. Second, we want to study how religion differs across migrant 
generations in different contexts by applying theories which explain how the context influences 
individuals ideas, values and beliefs. Third, we assess the development of  religiosity among 
adolescents and the influence of  the school context in terms of  the ethnic school composition.
The three topics are tackled in five empirical studies. In these studies, we were guided by 
three important sociological theories. First of  all, we start with insecurity theory (Norris and 
Inglehart 2004). This is the most recent successful theory which explains differences in religiosity 
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across different contexts. Second, we discuss Durkheim’s social integration theory (1897). This 
theory explains how values, ideas and beliefs differ according to interactions individuals have 
with others and with certain social groups. This theory has been applied successfully to previous 
studies among first generation migrants (Van Tubergen 2006) and this might explain diverging 
intergenerational differences in different contexts. Third, structural opportunities theory (Blau 
1977) explains the probability of  interaction with certain individuals and social groups, which 
might explain the influence of  school segregation on ethnic minorities’ religiosity. In what follows, 
we discuss each of  these theories and argue how they can help us in progressing knowledge on 
migrant religiosity in Europe.
Insecurity theory
Since the early days of  sociology, scholars have struggled with the question ‘why are people 
religious?’. Over the twentieth century in Europe, this question became more and more 
inverted to ‘why are people not religious?’. Two main theories have been proposed, tested and 
subsequently deprecated due to a discrepancy between predictions and results. Both theories 
compared levels of  religiosity across countries due to contextual factors. The first attempt 
at formulating an answer was secularization theory. The theory predicted that increasing 
modernization lead to increasingly secularized nations. Weber (1946) famously called this process 
the ‘disenchantment’ of  the world. According to Weber, modernization led to an increasing 
influence of  science and bureaucracy on society. Intellectualization and rationalization replaced 
the functions of  religiosity, by offering calculable solutions for incalculable circumstances. Weber 
saw in this process also an evolutionary model of  societies, comparing the modernized world 
of  Europe to those of  ‘the savage’. Among the latter, rationalization does not fulfill the same 
functions in society, thus creating a place for religion. Closely related, functional differentiation 
theory argued that in industrialized societies other social institutions fulfill needs which were 
traditionally fulfilled by religion and religious institutions. A considerable body of  literature 
emerged over the previous century examining these theories, which predict a negative relation 
between economic development and religiosity. 
The last decades, however, this first line of  research has been subject to scrutiny and subsequent 
criticism. One of  the major flaws in the theory was the inability to explain the relatively high 
levels of  religiosity in the United States. The United States, among the most modernized and 
economically advanced societies over the previous century, is characterized by a vital religious 
field. Levels of  religious affiliation and religious service attendance are anomalously high 
when compared to similar industrialized countries. At the same time, secularization theory 
was also unable to predict religious revival movements across the globe. The emergence of  
New Age spirituality in Western Europe and evangelical revivals in Latin America contradict 
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the hypothesized effects of  increasing modernity on religion (Berger 1999). Other scholars 
argued that secularization in Europe cannot be reduced to lower religiosity as such: religious 
beliefs persisted in Western Europe, but the influence of  religious institutions and the religious 
participation in service attendance declined drastically (Dobbelaere 1981). Stark (1999) concluded 
that secularization theory should be buried, given that decades and even centuries of  empirical 
research did not corroborate the theory, in a paper he polemically entitled ‘Secularization, R.I.P.’.
A second attempt to explain global differences in religiosity came from religious market 
theory, a combination of  rational choice theory and economic market theory. This theory 
originated specifically from the comparison between the United States and Europe. The theory 
states that religious pluralism can play a decisive role in shaping levels of  religiosity through 
a supply and demand economic market mechanism (Iannaccone 1991). In this framework, 
religious demand by individuals is considered constant, while the supply differs according to 
competition in the religious market to attract individual adherents. The more religious pluralism 
in a society, the more competition between different denominations. According to economic 
theories, this should lead to more efforts into creating a better religious product. The antipode 
is a society with a religious monopoly by one single denomination. In that case, there is no 
competition to convince individuals to adhere to that denomination and participate actively 
in religious rituals. Scholars examining these theories thus evaluate possible links between the 
presence of  different competing denominations in a society and levels of  religiosity. Despite its 
original popularity (Sherkat and Ellison 1999), critics argued that this theory performed less well 
in explaining why religion is still relatively popular in Southern Europe, despite the Catholic 
monopoly (Verweij, Ester and Nauta 1997). A review of  the literature on religious pluralism 
and religious participation concluded that the results were contradictory and that the religious 
market pluralism theory is not supported by empirical evidence (Chaves and Gorski 2001). 
Moreover, the mathematical relationship between the most often applied measure of  religious 
pluralism and religious participation has been questioned, thus undermining virtually the whole 
body of  empirical studies which tested the theory (Voas, Crockett and Olson 2002). Therefore, 
religious pluralism theory was another fruitless attempt to explain cross-national differences in 
religious fervor.
Both theories are now generally considered obsolete. Recently, however, insecurity theory 
has offered a new explanation of  global differences in religiosity. Norris and Inglehart (2004) 
presented insecurity as a refashioned form of  secularization theory by focusing again on a 
functionalist interpretation of  religion as a relief  for insecurity in individuals’ lives. They 
disagree with the idea of  the religious market pluralism theory that demand is constant but 
suggest that religion might differ in different contexts according to the relative security these 
contexts offer. Their conceptualization of  insecurity deviates from the simplistic modernization 
scheme of  classical secularization theory. Modernization, industrialization and rationalization 
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do not lead automatically to higher levels of  existential security. Although industrialization and 
modernization has progressed in some countries over the last few decades, socio-economic 
inequality has persisted, which means that often only a relatively small group of  elites reap 
the rewards in terms of  economic benefits. In these countries, insecurities are higher for lower 
socio-economic classes, but also for the elite, who see the risks of  poverty in their own country 
and fear attacks on their wealth and power by those less well-off. Moreover, in some countries 
governments have invested more in social security systems, thus reducing existential risks for 
individuals. In other words, the link between modernization and religion is according to Norris 
and Inglehart only apparent insofar as modernization increases existential securities for its’ 
inhabitants or not. They test their theory on data from the World Values Survey by assessing the 
influence of  economic inequality and human development measures and find support for their 
theory. Further analyses corroborate their thesis, both at the national (Fairbrother 2013) and 
individual level (Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 2011).
As already indicated, previous research has mainly tested the two theories which are now 
generally considered dated (Van Tubergen 2006; Alanezi and Sherkat 2008). The recently 
developed insecurity theory has not been tested among migrants. Studying the influence of  
insecurity among immigrants is important in several respects. Immigrants have lived in different 
contexts, thus experiencing different levels of  insecurity. Previous studies have indeed indicated 
that first generation migrants’ religiosity is dependent upon both the context of  origin and the 
context of  destination (Van Tubergen 2006). Moreover, insecurity theory stresses the importance 
of  insecurities experienced through childhood. Therefore, studying insecurity theory among 
first generation migrants not only contributes to a better knowledge of  religiosity among 
immigrants, it can also offer a better test of  insecurity theory in itself. As the context of  insecurity 
in childhood differs from that in adulthood, since it is per definition associated with on the one 
hand the country of  origin and on the other hand the country of  destination, we can assess 
whether insecurities during childhood are indeed more important than those during adulthood. 
Therefore, our first objective is to test this insecurity hypothesis among first generation migrants 
to contribute to both the development of  insecurity theory and the knowledge on migrant 
religiosity.
Social integration theory
Social integration and religion
Apart from applying theories which explain contextual differences in religiosity, scholars of  
migrant religiosity have also wondered whether ethnic minorities integrate religiously like 
they do socio-economically. Therefore, they have wondered whether ethnic minorities conform 
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to levels of  religiosity in the host society. These scholars have often applied social integration 
theory. This theory predicts the dissemination of  ideas, values and beliefs among social groups, 
can offer such an explanation. Among migrants, social integration theory can predict how levels 
of  religiosity in the host society might influence levels of  religiosity among ethnic minorities.
The theory on social integration dates back to Durkheim (1897), who thought that social 
integration had the function of  binding people together into social groups. This binding together 
in certain social groups helped societies to strive for a common goal. According to Durkheim, 
individuals who were less integrated in social groups risked losing to see the common goal 
societies have, thus succumbing to egoistic suicide. At the other side of  the spectrum, individuals 
could be integrated too well into social groups as well, making them at risk of  perceiving 
oneself  as a burden to society, thus succumbing to altruistic suicide. Social integration is hence a 
continuum, whereby Durkheim saw an equilibrium somewhere between too little and too much 
social integration. Individuals integrate into all kinds of  social groups, for instance families and 
voluntary organizations.
The driving force behind social integration is interaction with other individuals. Durkheim 
provides the example of  how religious groups promote social integration. Religion fosters social 
integration by performing collective rituals in moral communities of  like-minded individuals. 
The more people interact with each other, the more they will share the same ideas, values and 
beliefs. This means that certain ideas, values and beliefs will be shared more in certain groups 
which are better integrated socially. The theory therefore predicts that a single individual will 
share more values, ideas and beliefs with a random member of  the nuclear family than with a 
random inhabitant of  the same municipality. Durkheim also signaled the effects of  social change 
on social integration. Modernity, population growth and social change cause interactions to 
become more numerous and complex. Traditional bonds of  family and religion are bound to 
loosen in modernity, according to the classic author.
Although his study has been subject to major criticisms, most critiques focus on empirical 
flaws in the book, while the basic theory of  social integration theory has remained generally 
intact (Pescosolido and Georgianna 1989). Even in more recent periods, social integration in 
religious groups and families is associated with lower suicide rates (Stack 2000; Van Tubergen, te 
Grotenhuis and Ultee 2005). Moreover, social integration theory has been applied to a multitude 
of  research subjects, by looking at how integration in social groups affects individuals attitudes, 
beliefs and behavior. Over the years, scholars also examined how social integration affects 
religious affiliation, behavior and beliefs (Welch and Baltzell 1984; Need and de Graaf  1996; 
Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2002). Being integrated in less religious groups and having less 
religious spouses is associated with lower levels of  religiosity. Therefore, the religiosity of  the 
social group in which individuals are integrated has an influence on their own level of  religiosity.
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These applications of  social integration theory in the sociology of  religion have spurred 
the use of  the theory in the literature on migrant religiosity as well. In this respect, the ethnic 
community and the host society are considered two different social groups, with two different 
religious environments. The degree of  social integration into the specific social group determines 
to what extent migrants share their religiosity with that of  the ethnic community and/or the 
host society. Indeed, Van Tubergen (2006) demonstrated that ethnic minorities tend to be more 
religious in contexts where natives themselves are more religious as well. This means that there 
occurs a process of  conforming to the religious environment of  the host society among ethnic 
minorities. Social integration theory therefore provides an explanation of  why some ethnic 
minority groups tend to be more religious in one society compared to another group with 
the same ethnic background in a different host society (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012). Given 
the diverging levels of  religiosity in Europe, our study can offer an interesting test of  social 
integration theory by examining whether religiosity among ethnic minority differs according to 
the religious environment of  the host society. 
Social integration and the second generation
For filling in the second gap we identified in the literature, the intergenerational difference in 
religiosity among ethnic minorities, social integration theory could explain why previous studies 
found different results in diverging contexts. As already indicated, most scholars agree that 
processes of  immigrant adaptation span different generations. One of  the decisive factors which 
discerns later generations from the first generation is that the primary socialization occurs in the 
host society (Bisin and Verdier 2000). The primary socialization of  second and later generation 
migrants results in a better mastery of  the host society language, higher educational attainment 
and patterns of  social mobility (Rumbaut 2004). These characteristics are also associated with 
a higher social integration: primary socialization in the destination country is associated with 
more ethnic majority friendships (Chiswick and Miller 2001; Martinovic, Van Tubergen and 
Maas 2009). We can thus expect that second generation migrants have more contact with ethnic 
majority individuals. Social integration theory predicts that they will therefore be influenced 
more by ideas, values and beliefs among natives than first generation migrants.
In essence, social integration theory of  religiosity among immigrants predicts that migrants 
will adopt the religiosity of  the society in which they settle. A better social integration will 
lead ethnic minorities to take over the dominant religious pattern of  the host society in which 
they live. Second generation migrants will adopt the religiosity of  the host society more than 
first generation migrants. Previous research has shown that this is the case for political and 
ethical ideas: second generation migrants conform more to the ideas of  natives than first 
generation migrants (Maxwell 2010; Van der Bracht and Van de Putte 2014). The idea of  an 
intergenerational conforming has been proposed by Stark (1997). Stark conducted a study of  
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religiosity among three generations of  German ethnic minorities to the U.S. Although this was 
initially an attempt to find support for the religious market theory by testing what would happen 
if  secularized ethnic minority groups get exposed to a vital religious market, Stark demonstrated 
that later generations resembled the religiosity of  the rest of  American society. Although the 
first generation was far less religious, by the third generation the German minorities had levels 
of  religiosity comparable to that of  other Americans. This finding could be an indication of  the 
intergenerational conforming to religiosity in the host society, due to social integration. Testing 
this hypothesis in Europe can offer interesting insights into the intergenerational conforming 
however, given the range of  levels in religiosity across different European countries.
Social integration and exclusion
This process of  intergenerational integration into the host society is not a deterministic linear 
process, however. Scholars have criticized the classical assimilation paradigm for this proposition. 
Classical assimilation theory predicted a gradual disappearance of  differences between ethnic 
minorities and the ethnic majority across subsequent generations (Gordon 1964). Although this 
may be true for some groups, studies showed that subsequent migrant generations not always 
assimilate in an increasing fashion into socio-economically better positions. Therefore, some 
scholars have proposed adaptations to the theory, which take into account that not all groups 
progress socio-economically over generations. One of  these adaptations has been for instance 
segmented assimilation theory, which describes three different patterns: classical assimilation, 
assimilation into the underclass leading to permanent poverty and rapid economic advancement 
combined with a preservation of  the ethnic community’s values and solidarity (Portes and Zhou 
1993). Although the segmented assimilation theory has been subject to some criticisms (Zhou 
1997), most scholars now agree that assimilation or acculturation in a new society is not a linear 
process across subsequent generations. Later generations can actually identify more with the 
own ethnic group and dissociate themselves from the ethnic majority. Therefore, we should 
take into account that second generation migrants not always adopt the religious pattern of  the 
society in which they live.
One of  these situations can occur when ethnic minorities perceive discrimination and exclusion. 
In this case, the ethnic identity is often reinforced. This process is called ‘reactive ethnicity’ 
(Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Perceived threat and discrimination function as mechanisms which 
accentuate group differences, thus increasing awareness of  ethnic identity boundaries between 
‘us’ and ‘them’ (Gans 1979). Therefore, more hostile environments towards ethnic minorities 
increase the identification with the own ethnic group. Previous studies have indeed shown 
that perceived ethnic discrimination is associated with increased ethnic minority identification 
(Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). This process of  reactive ethnicity works differently for different 
subgroups, however. Better educated ethnic minorities often have less favorable attitudes of  the 
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ethnic majority. This is contrary to what intergroup contact theory would predict. According 
to this theory, individuals who have more contact with out-group members have less prejudice 
about the out-group (Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Ethnic minorities who have 
spent more time in the educational system would therefore have more favorable attitudes towards 
the ethnic majority. The contradiction between intergroup contact theory and the finding that 
better educated individuals have less favorable attitudes toward the ethnic majority is the so-
called integration paradox: the more people are integrated in a certain society, the more aware 
and sensitive they become of  their acceptance in that society (ten Teije, Coenders and Verkuyten 
2013). Higher educated ethnic minorities have higher expectations regarding their job status 
and can compare more to their better educated ethnic majority counterparts. Therefore, they 
experience more relative deprivation, perceive more personal discrimination and feel that the 
host society is in need of  change with regards to opportunities for ethnic minority groups (van 
Doorn, Scheepers and Dagevos 2013; de Vroome, Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014). This effect of  
relative deprivation is even higher among second generation migrants: higher educated second 
generation migrants do not identify with the host country more than their lower educated 
counterparts (Tolsma, Lubbers and Gijsberts 2012). These results reveal that interethnic contact 
does not automatically mean positive contact and that social integration and interaction with 
natives can have counterintuitive effects.
Processes similar to reactive ethnicity have been observed when it comes to religiosity, especially 
among second generation Muslim immigrants in Europe. Contrary to the US, Islam is in Europe 
often considered a barrier to integration (Foner and Alba 2008). Due to historical reasons, public 
opinion has a less favorable view on religious identities in the public sphere (Meer and Modood 
2009). Moreover, since the terrorist attacks of  September 11 2001, negative depictions of  Islam 
have dominated the public media (Bail 2012). Therefore, Islam is often adopted as a form of  
oppositional identity among Muslim minorities in Europe (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). In 
analogy to reactive ethnicity, this process has been termed ‘reactive religiosity’. Among second 
generation Muslim minorities, this reactive adoption of  religiosity can often take a particular 
direction. Second generation migrants in Europe often feel in-between ethnic groups: not fully 
accepted in the host society and not fully accepted in the origin society either (Foner and Alba 
2008). Therefore, they identify with Islam, although often a specific form of  Islam. Given the 
ethnic connotations of  Islamic practices and mosques in European countries, second generation 
Muslims predominantly identify with a globalized Islam, i.e. detached from the local ethnic 
and cultural forms of  the so-called ‘family Islam’ of  their parents (Foner and Alba 2008; Voas 
and Fleischmann 2012). Second generation Muslims therefore often identify with a culture-less 
global form of  Islam, and often reject certain cultural traditions as non-Islamic (Cesari 2002). 
Therefore, perceived hostility towards the ethnic and religious identity often reinforce each 
other in stimulating religiosity among second generation Muslims.
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Therefore, an intergenerational perspective on migrant religiosity should take into account 
how the religiosity of  the receiving society influences first and second generation migrants’ 
religiosity through social integration. At the same time, the complex interaction between social 
integration and perceived hostility should be taken into account. So far, research testing the 
effects of  perceived threat has focused predominantly on Muslims in some Western European 
countries (Foner and Alba 2008; Cesari 2010; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). It is unclear whether 
perceived discrimination has the same effect across different ethnic minority groups and in 
diverging contexts.
Social integration and the ethnic community
According to social integration theory, second generation migrants will therefore conform more 
to levels of  religiosity among natives in the host society than their first generation counterparts. 
This means that the theory predicts that they be somewhere on a continuum between origin 
country religiosity and host country religiosity. This means that we should not limit our study 
to examining the influences of  host society religiosity, but we should also take into account 
how ethnic communities transfer their religiosity to later generations. Social integration into the 
own ethnic community might in this way lead to cultural preservation among later generations. 
Within each social system, there is a certain tendency towards cultural preservation. If  cultures 
do not transfer traits within and across generations, then they will disappear over time (Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman 1981). If, on the other hand, cultures are replicated exactly, than there is no 
room for adaptation to changing circumstances, causing cultures to be out of  touch with the 
context in which they live (Boyd and Richerson 1985). Therefore, social systems have to find 
an equilibrium between cultural preservation and cultural adaptation. Scholars who study the 
social transmission of  cultural traits distinguish three different forms (Berry and Georgas 2008). 
First, there is vertical transmission, i.e. the influence of  parents. Second, there is horizontal 
transmission, i.e. the influence of  peers. Third, there is oblique transmission, i.e. the influence 
of  other individuals and social institutions.
In an immigration context, later generations often experience diverging values from on the 
one hand the culture of  the country of  origin and on the other hand that of  the destination 
country (Bisin and Verdier 2000; Vedder et al. 2009). Therefore, the cultural traits within the 
own ethnic community might stand in contrast to the cultural traits in the host society. Social 
integration theory predicts that individuals will share the ideas, values and beliefs of  a certain 
social group more the more they interact with that group. Therefore, the religiosity of  second 
generation migrants will be influenced more by ethnic community religiosity the more they 
interact with the ethnic community. Moreover, social psychologists stress the importance of  
the quality of  the interaction for the successful transmission of  cultural traits. The vertical 
transmission of  values is more successful among families with a better paternal relationship 
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(Taris, Semin and Bok 1998). Moreover, parental styles and the educational resources of  parents 
also increase the successful transmission of  cultural traits (Schönpflug 2001; Bisin and Verdier 
2000).
The higher level of  intra-ethnic contact within ethnic communities has been proposed as 
an explanation of  the relatively high levels of  religiosity among Muslims in Europe (Voas and 
Fleischman 2012; Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts 2012). This type of  research, however, has 
primarily been conducted from the point of  view of  the host society by looking how ethnic 
segregation shields minorities from the influence of  the host society (Van Tubergen 2006; 
Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013). Less is known about which individuals are more susceptible to 
being influenced by the ethnic community. More interactions with the ethnic community, with a 
better relationship quality and with co-ethnics with higher resources might lead ethnic minorities 
to be more influenced by the ethnic community. Therefore, research should take into account 
the influence of  ethnic community interactions as well, next to the influence of  the host society.
Combining these different aspects of  social integration theory, our second objective is to 
focus on (1) the influence of  the host society religiosity on migrant religiosity, (2) the influence 
of  host society religiosity on intergenerational differences in religiosity, (3) the influence of  
ethnic community religiosity on later generation migrants’ religiosity and (4) the role exclusion 
of  ethnic minorities plays in increasing or decreasing the influence of  either the host society or 
the ethnic community.
Structural opportunities theory
Filling in the third major gap in the research literature entails looking at how smaller structural 
settings affect the dissemination of  values, ideas and beliefs. Therefore, we look at how ethnic 
school compositions can affect religiosity among ethnic minority adolescents. These ethnic 
school compositions affect adolescents’ opportunities for having intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic 
interactions. If  no out-group members are present, individuals are not likely to interact with out-
group members. If  only out-group members are present, individuals are not likely to interact 
with in-group members. Therefore, opportunities to interact with others might be decisive 
in influencing the social integration of  individuals in certain groups. Structural opportunities 
theory (Blau 1977) explains how group distributions might affect opportunities for in- or out-
group contact.
The structural theory of  opportunities has been developed most thoroughly by Blau (1977). 
According to Blau, heterogeneity in a society determines the opportunities to interact with 
others across social groups. He assumes that people prefer in-group associations over out-group 
associations in the first place and prefer associating with out-group member over not associating 
at all. Therefore, group sizes and proportions determine the probability of  intergroup relations. 
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Members of  smaller groups are more likely to associate with members of  larger groups than 
vice versa. When translated to ethnic groups, this means that ethnic minority group members 
have higher probabilities of  interacting with the ethnic majority. At the same time, larger ethnic 
minority groups will have a lower propensity to interact with the ethnic majority than members 
of  very small ethnic minority groups. This almost self-explanatory relation between group-size 
and interactions is the most commonly applied part of  Blau’s structural opportunities theory. 
Blau also discussed how these differences in interaction relate to heterogeneity and inequality 
in a given society. More importantly, structural opportunities theory predicts that interactions 
are less likely when there are strong correlations between structural parameters. If, for instance, 
socio-economic status and ethnicity are strongly correlated, intergroup interactions become 
less likely, because the in-group preferences to associate both in terms of  ethnicity and socio-
economic status reinforce one another (Blau 1977). Therefore, correlated structural parameters 
increase the propensity to interact within the in-group.
Structural opportunities theory is among ethnic minorities often applied in studies on 
segregation in different domains. Ethnic segregation is the separation of  humans based on 
ethnicity. It can occur in a wide variety of  life domains, such as school segregation, whereby 
different ethnic groups attend different schools, and residential segregation, whereby different 
ethnic groups live in different parts of  a city or in different cities within a country. Previous 
research has indicated that ethnic segregation in schools ( Joyner and Kao 2000; Van Houtte and 
Stevens 2009) and residential ethnic segregation (Vervoort, Flap and Dagevos 2010) is indeed 
associated with intergroup interactions and social integration of  individuals.
Concerning ethnic minority religion, previous research has applied structural opportunities 
theory by looking at how segregation affects rates of  religiosity. The idea is that encapsulated 
ethnic communities shield its members off  from interactions with the ethnic majority (Voas 
and Fleischmann 2012). Previous research indeed found that residential segregation is associated 
with higher rates of  religious participation among Muslims (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). In 
other contexts, however, the role of  ethnic segregation and concentration for ethnic minority 
religiosity has not been examined. Through ethnic concentration in schools, ethnic minorities 
might have fewer interactions with ethnic majority pupils than in the case of  evenly distributed 
ethnic groups in schools (Van Houtte and Stevens 2009). Adolescents spend a large proportion of  
their waking hours in schools, meaning that ethnic school concentration can have an important 
impact upon their interaction with ethnic majority pupils. Having ethnic majority friendships can 
for instance foster identification with the host society for ethnic minority pupils in ethnic minority 
dominated schools (Agirdag, Van Houtte and Van Avermaet 2011). This means that structural 
opportunities indeed affect the social integration of  ethnic minorities and their interactions with 
ethnic majority pupils, which in turn affects the influence of  host societies’ values and beliefs on 
ethnic minority pupils. Therefore, it can be expected that ethnic concentration in schools might 
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affect ethnic minority pupils’ religiosity during adolescence. Given the important role adolescence 
plays in forming ethnic minorities’ religiosity, it can be interesting to see whether the influence 
of  the host society religiosity already occurs in schools or whether school segregation shields 
ethnic minorities form host society influences. Therefore, our third objective is to examine the 
influence of  ethnic school segregation on ethnic minority adolescents’ religiosity.
Research questions
With this dissertation we want to answer three main research questions. First of  all, we want to 
know whether the insecurities first generation migrants experience influence their religiosity. We 
look at how childhood insecurities, experienced in the country of  origin differ from insecurities 
experienced in the destination country, at the individual and the contextual level. We address 
this research question in Chapter 4 by applying Norris and Inglehart’s insecurity theory (2004).
Second, we want to examine how the religiosity of  social groups in a society influences 
first and second generation migrants’ religiosity. We look at how the religiosity of  the host 
society influences migrant religiosity and whether this can explain intergenerational differences 
in religiosity. We look at how different religious contexts lead to diverging intergenerational 
differences in religiosity among ethnic minorities. Moreover, we examine how the religiosity 
of  immigrants’ ethnic communities influence their religiosity by looking at how interactions 
within and outside the ethnic community affect the transmission of  religiosity within the 
ethnic community. We also assess whether exclusion of  ethnic minorities might lead to a higher 
influence of  either host society religiosity or ethnic community religiosity. This research question 
is tackled in Chapters 5-8 by applying Durkheim’s social integration theory (1897).
Third, we look at how ethnic school segregation affects religiosity among adolescent ethnic 
minorities. Due to limiting interactions with natives, ethnic school segregation might promote 
the transfer of  religiosity to later generations. We try to formulate an answer to this research 
question by applying Blau’s structural opportunities theory in Chapter 7 (1977).
Our approach also implies discerning different analytical levels. For the first research question, 
we assess how certain national contexts provide more insecurities for immigrants. Migrants 
can be influenced by insecurities experienced while growing up in the origin country and after 
arrival in the destination country. Next to insecurities belonging to the context, migrants can 
also experience insecurity based on personal aspects. For this research question we therefore 
focus both on the macro level, in terms of  how national contexts influence religiosity, as well 
as the micro level, in terms of  how individual aspects influence religiosity. Figure 2.1 shows the 
different analytical levels and main independent variables for research question one.
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Figure 2. 1: Analytical model for research question 1
For the second research question, we focus on how the religious context influences first and 
second generation migrants. The religious context can be conceptualized at both the macro and 
the meso level. At the macro level, we focus how the national religious context of  the destination 
country affects religiosity among immigrants. At the meso level, we examine the influence of  
the religiosity of  the ethnic community. At the micro or individual level, we study how migrant 
generation, exclusion and interactions with the ethnic community influence religiosity. Figure 
2.2 displays the analytical levels and the corresponding independent variables associated with 
research question two.
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Figure 2. 2: Analytical model for research question 2
For the third research question, we examine how the ethnic school composition contributes to 
ethnic minority adolescents’ religiosity. Therefore, we focus on impacts of  the meso level, in this 
case schools. At the micro level, we assess how this influence of  the meso level differs according 
to migrant generation. Figure 2.3 shows the analytical levels with the main independent variables 
for research question three.
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Figure 2. 3: Analytical model for research question 3
The full analytical model is presented in figure 2.4. It shows the different analytical levels and 
the main independent variables. For each variable, the figure in brackets refers to the chapter in 
which that variable has been studied.
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Figure 2. 4: Full analytical model
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Data and methodology
To answer these specific research questions, we used quantitative methods on large-scale survey data which allow us to perform comparative research across different countries. We chose 
to use European data given the wide variety in religiosity across European countries. Previous 
research has shown that Western Europe has witnessed periods of  widespread secularization, 
leading to vast proportions of  religiously unaffiliated individuals (Davie 1990). At the same time, 
religion has been stable or even rising in some Southern and Eastern European countries (Pérez-
Nievas and Cordero 2010). Therefore, data comprising a wide range of  European countries are 
particularly suited to assess how religiosity among ethnic minorities is affected by the religious 
context. 
Since we want to go further than focusing on specific subgroups, the comparative approach 
urges us to study comparable measures of  religiosity. Therefore, as already indicated, we define 
religiosity as a general underlying component across cultures and contexts. Therefore, we 
analyze measures which grasp religious affiliation, commitment and behavior, stripped from 
the cultural expressions attached by each religious denomination. The goal of  these choices of  
data and dependent variables allow us to grasp how different ethnic minority groups adapt their 
religious lives to different contextual settings. Analyses of  specific ethnic or religious subgroups, 
or denomination-specific religious expressions are not the main questions we try to answer in 
this dissertation. In this chapter, we subsequently discuss the data we use, the operationalization 
of  the variables and the analysis strategy.
Data
European Social Survey
The main dataset which we use in this dissertation is the European Social Survey (ESS). We use 
this data in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 8. The ESS is a two-yearly cross-sectional social survey which 
has collected data in over thirty European countries from 2002 onwards. Currently, six waves of  
data are publicly available, combining information on 291,686 individuals in 32 countries. The 
questionnaires are developed by a consortium of  European universities and contain questions 
concerning attitudes towards social and political issues, beliefs and behavior patterns. Each 
questionnaire contains both a core module, which is repeated each wave, and two rotating 
modules, which tackle additional topics that are not included in the core questionnaire. For each 
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wave, the questionnaire is centrally administered and subsequently translated by the national 
ESS teams. In each country, the respondents were selected using strict probability samples of  the 
resident population, regardless of  nationality, living in private households. The data were then 
gathered by registering the answers to the questionnaire in face-to-face interviews. Response 
rates of  up to 70% are pursued, but the obtained response rates range from 33.5% in Switzerland 
(ESS-1; 2002) to 81.4% in Bulgaria (ESS-5; 2010). For each country, specific design weights are 
available to correct for differences in selection probability.
Using this dataset for research into migrant religiosity has three distinctive benefits. Firstly, 
the ESS has a relatively detailed measurement of  individual’s religiosity. Respondents were asked 
whether they belong to a certain religious denomination at present, whether they used to belong 
to a certain denomination in the past, which denomination they adhered to at both points in time, 
how religious they feel themselves, how often they pray apart from at religious services and how 
often they attend religious services except for at special occasions such as weddings and funerals. 
These questions have been included in all waves and are comparable to similar questions in other 
large-scale cross-national surveys, such as the World Values Survey/European Values Survey. 
These questions enable us to focus on the different dimensions of  religiosity which we want 
to study: (1) religious affiliation, (2) personal religious commitment and (3) religious behavior. 
Second, in the ESS, the resident population is sampled, regardless of  nationality. This means that 
this dataset is particularly suited to examine ethnic minorities originating from migration, given 
that these often do not have the nationality of  the country in which they live. Third, given the 
sampling strategy of  sampling individuals-within-countries, the ESS is also particularly suited for 
assessing the influence of  diverging contexts. In each wave of  the ESS, individuals are registered 
as belonging to a given resident country, as well as to a given sub-national region. These regions 
comprise sub-national divisions by the statistical office of  the European Union, the so-called 
Nomenclature of  Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). Therefore, data are not only-collected 
at the individual-within-country level, but also at the individual-within-region-within-country 
level. The ESS is hence also particularly suited for comparing the influence of  the contexts 
between and within countries.
There are some limitations to the dataset as well. First of  all, the dataset is a general social 
survey, not intended towards ethnic minorities. Therefore, ethnic minorities are not oversampled, 
but only have a selection probability proportional to their group size. This means that, compared 
to datasets directed towards ethnic minorities, the amount of  ethnic minorities in the data is 
rather limited. Second, the national ESS teams are instructed to provide a questionnaire in each 
language which is spoken by at least 5% of  the population. This means that ethnic minorities 
from relatively small minority groups have to sit through the interview in one of  the main 
languages of  the country they live in. Again, this is a limitation compared to surveys which are 
designed towards sampling ethnic minorities. However, given that mastery of  the host society 
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official language is probably related to social integration into host society groups, this means 
that we test the effect of  intergenerational differences due to social integration conservatively.
Racism and discrimination in secondary schools
To assess religiosity among adolescent ethnic minorities and the influence of  ethnic school 
segregation thereupon, we use data from Racism and Discrimination in Secondary Schools 
(RaDiSS) (D’hondt et al. 2015). RaDiSS is a survey of  Flemish (i.e. the northern, Dutch-speaking, 
part of  Belgium) secondary school pupils conducted during the year 2011-2012 among 4,322 
third-grade students (i.e. Grade 9 in U.S. school system terms) from 55 secondary schools. 
Respondents were selected through multistage sampling. First, four large multi-cultural Flemish 
districts have been selected: Antwerp, Ghent, Hasselt and Sint-Niklaas. Second, within these 
districts all secondary schools were listed, from which 104 schools were selected, according to 
urbanization levels of  the school neighborhoods and the ethnic composition of  the schools. 
Given that secondary schools in Flanders are often asked to partake in academic research, schools 
often apply the principle of  ‘first come, first served’. This leads to considerable non-response at 
the school level of  47%, retaining 55 secondary schools from the original 104 sampled. Non-
response at the school level was not selective on the ethnic composition of  schools. The ethnic 
composition of  the participating schools ranges from 4.2% to 100% ethnic minority pupils. In each 
school, all third-grade students present were asked to complete a written questionnaire. Given 
that all students present at school were eligible for sampling, this means that non-response at the 
individual level is only related to absenteeism at school due to, for instance, illness. This results in 
a response rate of  92.5% at the individual-within-schools level. Given the selection mechanism, 
this non-response is only selective insofar the absence of  students is selective, for instance due 
to students ill health. Among the present third-grade students, the written questionnaires were 
administered in presence of  a researcher and one or more teachers.
The main advantage of  using this dataset is that, due to the ethnic school composition of  
the sample, it is particularly suitable to examine religiosity among ethnic minority adolescents 
and the influence of  ethnic school composition thereupon. One of  the disadvantages is that 
the questionnaire was only distributed in Dutch, which could again constitute a problem for 
ethnic minority students. The questionnaire has been thoroughly tested to ensure intelligibility, 
however, and the presence of  a researcher and one or more school teachers enabled the students 
to ask questions or extra information regarding the questionnaire.
General Social Survey
In Chapter 8, we compare intergenerational differences in Europe to the same differences in the 
US or Canada. Therefore, we selected data for the US and Canada as well. For the US, we use data 
from the General Social Survey (GSS). Like the ESS, the GSS is a survey among a representative 
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sample of  the resident population in the US, which receive a questionnaire containing both core 
questions and rotating questions which can occur in one or more of  the different GSS waves. The 
GSS has been conducted from 1972 onwards, yearly from 1972 until 1991 and bi-annual from 1994 
onwards. Written questionnaires were gathered during personal face-to-face interviews until 
2000. From 2002, data were collected using computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). At 
the moment of  writing, data up until 2012 are available. Response rates are relatively stable over 
time around the 70%-point. Design weights are available to correct for sampling bias.
As this is a general social survey conducted among a probability sample of  the resident, this 
dataset is subject to the same limitations as the ESS. From 2006 onwards, however, the GSS also 
has a Spanish version to enable the sampling of  non-English speaking households. 98% of  the 
adult US household population is English speaking, and Spanish is the main language among 60-
65% of  the remaining non-English speaking households. Therefore, the GSS is relatively suitable 
as a data source to study religiosity among first and second generation migrants.
Ethnic Diversity Survey
For Canada, we use the Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS), a survey conducted in 2002 which 
oversampled ethnic minorities in Canada. Based on the 2001 census, all residents of  15 and older 
were selected as eligible for sampling, according to their answers on the ethnicity questions. The 
sampling design targeted two main groups: a non-Canadian, non-British or non-French ethnic 
group on the one hand and a comparable reference group of  individuals with a Canadian ethnic 
background. Strata were further defined based on the migrant generation status of  the census 
respondents. The questionnaires were available in English, French, Mandarin, Cantonese, Italian, 
Punjabi, Portuguese, Vietnamese and Spanish. The data collection took place using computer-
assisted telephone interviews (CATI). From a total sample of  57,242 individuals, 42,476 individuals 
participated in the data collection, resulting in a response rate of  74.0%. Weights are provided to 
extrapolate results to the general adult population in Canada.
The EDS has the advantage of  being a survey directly targeted at ethnic minorities, with 
questionnaires in specific minority languages. Therefore, this survey is aptly designed to examine 
religiosity among immigrants. This also means that the same limitations which do apply to the 
ESS and GSS, do not apply, or to a lesser extent to the EDS. This may result in a higher proportion 
of  ethnic minorities who have a lower social integration in the EDS as compared to the other 
surveys. We will correct for the possible bias this may cause in the results by controlling for the 
questionnaire language in the analysis. In this way, we taken into account that individuals who 
conducted the survey in a non-official language, i.e. not in English or French in the EDS and 
not in English in the GSS, might have a lower social integration and are hence less influenced by 
contextual religiosity.
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Operationalization of dependent variables
As already indicated, we assess three dimensions of  religiosity: (1) religious affiliation, (2) 
religious commitment and (3) religious behavior. For each dimension, we operationalize at least 
one indicator. Figure 3.1 gives an overview of  the different indicators. For each dimension we 
show the corresponding indicators with the number of  the chapter in which it is used between 
brackets.
Figure 3. 1: Dependent variables
Religious affiliation
Religious affiliation is an indicator of  organizational forms of  religiosity. Individuals were asked 
whether they consider themselves to belonging to a particular religious denomination, and if  
so, which one. This leads to a dichotomous variable which indicates whether individuals feel 
affiliated to a certain religious denomination or not. This variable has been calculated from 
the ESS, GSS and EDS. We examine this indicator of  affiliation to religious organizations in 
Chapters 5 and 8.
Religious commitment
Subjective religiosity is a metric indicator of  how religious individuals feel themselves. Respondents 
were asked how religious they feel themselves, regardless from their religious affiliation, on an 
11-point scale ranging from ‘Not at all religious’ (0) to ‘Very religious’ (10). A higher score on this 
variable means that individuals feel more religious. We calculated this variable from the ESS and 
examine this indicator of  religiosity in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of  this dissertation.
Religious salience is a metric indicator of  the importance individuals attribute to religiosity. In 
RaDiSS, adolescents were asked ‘How important is religion to you?’ Answers to this question 
were recorded on a 5-point Likert-scale, ranging from ‘Not at all important’ (1) to ‘Very 
important’ (5). A higher score means that individuals attribute more importance to religiosity. 
This indicator is examined in Chapter 7 of  this dissertation.
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Religious behavior
Frequency of  praying is an indicator of  how often individuals pray. Respondents were asked how 
often they pray, apart from at religious services. In the ESS, responses were recorded on a 7-point 
scale ranging from ‘Every day’ (1) to ‘Never’ (7). A higher score thus means less frequent praying. 
This indicator is used as a metric indicator in Chapter 6 of  this dissertation. In Chapters 4-6 and 
8 we use a dichotomous variant, by recoding the 7-point scale to a variable which indicates 
whether respondents pray at least once a week or more often. In Chapter 8, we add the frequency 
of  praying indicator from the GSS and EDS questionnaire as well.
Although religious service attendance has been widely used in previous research, the 
measurement of  the service attendance indicator in the ESS might not be a valid indicator of  
religiosity. According to Meuleman and Billiet (2011), the measurement of  religious service 
attendance is inequivalent due to the fact that the indicator does not function for Muslim 
women, for whom service attendance is less common. Given that we focus on ethnic minorities 
in Europe, a substantial part of  which are Muslim, we decided not to include this dependent 
variable in the analyses.
Methods
Given the research question and the sampling strategy, our approach asks for a specific 
quantitative methodology. First of  all, some of  the research questions relate to the influence of  
the context. Basically, we need a quantitative method which allows us to grasp how individuals 
in different environments have different levels of  religiosity. Moreover, we want to know which 
characteristics of  that environment are related to these different levels of  religiosity. Second, 
the multistage sampling procedure applied in all datasets requires that we take into account the 
clustering of  individuals within certain contexts. This is a direct consequence of  social integration 
in contexts: the more people have interactions with each other, the more they share ideas, values 
and beliefs. Therefore, we need to take into account that individuals’ ideas, values and beliefs 
could be more similar within contexts than across contexts.
Multilevel modelling is a quantitative method which has been designed specifically to solve 
these problems. With this method, variation in religiosity can be decomposed into an individual 
component and a contextual component. In this way, the outcome variable, religiosity, is 
a product of  the mean level of  religiosity in individuals’ contexts and their own individual 
deviation from that contextual mean. This decomposition addresses the two problems which we 
identified earlier. First of  all, by decomposing differences between individuals into an individual 
and a contextual level, we can calculate how similar individuals within contexts actually are 
and how important contextual factors are in explaining religiosity among individuals. Moreover, 
the decomposition of  the variance allows us to introduce characteristics at the respective levels 
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and infer the effects to the population at each level. The alternative, single level regression or 
contextual level regression, would entail respectively overestimating the number of  contexts by 
considering these contexts an individual characteristic or neglecting individual differences by 
reducing them to differences between the contextual means. Therefore, multilevel models allow 
for an inference of  characteristics from the sample to the appropriate level of  the population. 
In the RaDiSS-data for instance, this means that we can infer the effect of  school characteristics 
such as school size from the sampled schools to the population of  secondary schools in Flanders 
and pupils’ characteristics from the sampled pupils to the population of  secondary school pupils 
in Flanders. Multilevel models thus enable us to correctly estimate and infer the effects of  
individual and contextual characteristics simultaneously on migrant religiosity.
Second, with classical regression techniques, the similarity of  individuals who share the same 
context is disregarded. This means that classical single-level regression is not only problematic for 
contextual characteristics but also for individual characteristics. In classical regression analysis, 
the belief  we have that an effect we found in the sample does also apply to the population could 
be biased due to individuals being more similar within certain contexts. The belief  scholars have 
in the inference to the population could be inflated because there is less individual variance if  
the contextual similarity is neglected. In the sample, the similarity is not due to the effect of  the 
characteristic one wants to infer, but due to the sampling strategy. In the ESS-data for instance, 
our belief  in the effect of  discrimination on religiosity in a classical regression could be false 
due to discrimination being very similar within countries, which is neglected. Multilevel models 
enable us to correct for the effect of  clustering on the belief  we have in individual and contextual 
characteristics to infer our results to the population.
We test our research questions by applying multilevel models to the data sources we use. 
Multilevel models were specifically designed to answer these kinds of  research questions: 
how do individuals differ in diverging contexts or how does the context influence individuals. 
Moreover, we can examine whether individual-level characteristics have different effects in 
different contexts and how characteristics of  the individual and the context combined influence 
migrants religiosity. Therefore, multilevel models could be considered a core technique for 
answering research questions in sociology. To solve the first problem, assessing the influence 
of  the context, the scholar needs to identify the theoretically important contexts which group 
people and which may influence them. This need is strengthened by the second problem, the 
relationship between the similarity of  individuals and inference, which means that neglecting 
each form of  clustering might lead to biased inferences. This means that it is important to take 
into account all forms of  clustering in the data. Therefore, where possible we try to identify all 
relevant contexts for the questions at hand.
The basic multilevel model is a two-level model, in which observational units, for instance 
individuals, are clustered, or nested, within aggregated groups, for instance schools. This model 
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can be extended by adding more levels. In the case more than two levels, we can discern two 
different forms of  multilevel models: hierarchical and non-hierarchical. The former means for 
three level models that all lowest level unit, for instance pupils, who belong to one higher level 
unit, for instance a class, belong to only one highest level unit, for instance a school. In most 
school systems, all individuals in one class attend the same school, as classes and students are 
generally not dispersed over schools. A non-hierarchical three-level model is when not all lowest 
level units, for instance migrants, from one higher level unit, for instance origin countries, are 
not nested in the same group in the other higher level, for instance destination countries. When 
using the ESS, all migrants from for instance Turkey do not live together in the same destination 
country. The other way round, not all migrants in for instance Germany come from only one 
origin country. This example of  a non-hierarchical model is a specific case of  multilevel models, 
i.e. cross-classified multilevel models. Contrary to hierarchical models, where levels are always 
subdivisions of  higher levels, levels in cross-classified models can be juxtaposed: lower level units 
belong to two or more higher level units which are not vertically related, but rather horizontally 
equal. Other non-hierarchical models exist, such as for instance multiple membership models, 
but these are not relevant for answering the research questions at hand. 
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The worst of both worlds?
Origin and destination effects on migrant religiosity
Van der Bracht, K., Van de Putte, B. & Van de Velde, S.
Ethnic and racial studies, Vol. 37, No. 6, p. 998-1019.
Insecurity theory states that religiosity is predominantly affected by insecuri-
ties experienced during childhood, instead of present insecurities. The empirical 
research of these aspects, however, has been hampered by the difficulty to dis-
entangle past and present contextual effects. In this respect, first generation 
migrants offer an interesting case study which allows us to discern (1) contextual 
effects experienced during childhood, i.e. associated with the origin country, (2) 
contextual effects experienced during later life, i.e. associated with the destina-
tion country and (3) individual effects experienced during later life in the des-
tination country. We test hypotheses using the European Social Survey (ESS) in 
cross-classified multilevel analyses on 5,900 individuals within on the one hand 
25 destination countries and on the other 146 origin countries. While insecurity 
theory offers interesting prospects of explaining origin country variance, the 
applicability of insecurity theory to migrants at the individual and destination 
level is questioned by the results.
Introduction
In Europe, public discourse has been influenced by the presupposition that migrant religiosity is an obstacle to integration, a feeling which is incited by Islamophobia and fear of  radicalization 
of  Muslim immigrants. Hence, the religiosity of  European immigrants has been of  considerable 
interest to both scholars and policy makers. While the most attention has been devoted to 
studying Muslim migrants (Diehl and Koenig 2009; Fleischmann and Phalet 2011), the last 
decade has seen an increase in large-scale cross-national studies comprising all ethnic groups 
and religions (Van Tubergen 2006; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011; Van der Bracht, Van de 
Putte and Verhaeghe 2013).
The available cross-national research, however, has some weaknesses. Cross-national 
variation in migrant religiosity has mostly been studied at the destination-side. However, only 
accounting for the destination in religiosity of  migrants neglects the important variance in 
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religiosity in origin countries, although large differences in cross-national religiosity throughout 
the world have been long established. Furthermore, qualitative research has brought the notion 
of  religious transnationalism to the limelight (Levitt 1998; Van der Veer 2002). Levitt (1998: 76) 
argues “that to understand some immigrants’ religious lives, we must understand them in their 
countries of  origin, countries of  destination, and the continuous, reciprocal interaction between 
the two”. Notwithstanding this call to attention of  studying migrant religiosity in a transnational 
frame, only one seminal study, by Van Tubergen (2006), addresses both origin and destination 
context. It demonstrates that religiosity in first generation migrants is substantially influenced 
by both the country of  birth and the country where they’ve migrated to. However, the article 
lacked a theoretical framework comparing the effects of  origin and destination. Moreover, It 
explained migrant religiosity as a consequence of  the degree of  modernization in the country 
of  origin, making it a late remnant of  classical secularization theory (Weber 1946 [1920]; Berger 
1967). Furthermore, the data only comprised eight destination countries, hence it was limited in 
variation between destination countries.
Studies tackling the contextual impact on migrant religiosity in Europe, have relied most often 
on social integration theory (Durkheim 1986 [1897]) and religious market theory (Iannaccone 
1991). While social integration theory has been applied successfully at the contextual level, 
demonstrating that migrant religiosity is influenced by levels of  religiosity in the host society 
(Van Tubergen 2006; Van der Bracht et al. 2013), results for religious market theory have been 
mixed and indeed, the relation between religious diversity and levels of  religiosity has been 
questioned (Chaves and Gorski 2001; Voas, Crockett and Olson 2002). When fully accounting 
for destination and origin effects, however, the research is in need of  a theoretical framework to 
explain variation in both origin and destination countries, and while social integration theory 
seems plausible for destination countries, it is less so for origin countries. Approaching variation 
in migrant religiosity as a consequence of  general levels of  religiosity in the country of  origin 
doesn’t explain why certain origin countries are more religious than others in the first place. 
Cross-national studies of  migrant religiosity would benefit greatly from a theoretical framework 
to apply at different levels.
We believe that insecurity theory (Norris and Inglehart 2004) is perfectly suited for this role. 
The theory states that the more insecure people feel, the more they will become religious. 
People who are confronted with anxieties from insecure living conditions look for a supernatural 
explanation to attenuate their anxieties. Although the authors acknowledge the influence of  
current insecurities, they stress the importance of  insecurities experienced during childhood: 
the need for predictability stemming from religion is first and foremost a consequence of  
anxieties faced during the formative period. The further development of  the theory at the 
contextual level has been hampered, however, by the empirical problem of  untangling past and 
present contextual insecurities for people of  different ages living in the same country. When 
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first generation migrants are concerned, however, we have the possibility to discern different 
contexts, associated with different points in time: (1) insecurities experienced during childhood 
in the origin country and (2) insecurities experienced after migrating to the destination country. 
In the current study, we aim to examine to what extent migrant religiosity is associated with 
characteristics of  the destination country, as well as the origin country, using the theoretical 
framework of  insecurity theory. We make use of  the European Social Survey (ESS) and analyze 
two dimensions of  religiosity: subjective religiosity and frequency of  praying. The data allow 
us to fully account for origin, destination and individual influences. We apply cross-classified 
multilevel analyses to migrants coming from 146 origin countries and living in 25 destination 
countries.
Theory and hypotheses
According to Vail (1999) insecurity contains three aspects: (1) a sense or state of  precariousness (2) 
a feeling of  hopelessness and (3) a feeling of  uncertainty about the future. The author identifies 
different forms of  insecurity: social, economic, personal and political insecurity. Social insecurity 
is a lack of  minimum protection offered by the state for people whose personal security can be 
threatened, for instance due to economic inequality or a low human development. Economic 
insecurity can occur for instance due to job or financial insecurity. Personal insecurity is a lack of  
minimal conditions of  a dignified life, for instance having a bad health or feeling unsafe in one’s 
neighborhood. Political insecurity, finally, is a lack of  civil liberties and democratic rights, for 
instance due to discrimination. Social insecurity, in the meaning of  general levels of  insecurity 
within countries, is considered here as a contextual aspect of  insecurity, offered by origin and 
destination countries, and economic, personal and political insecurity are considered aspects of  
individual differences in insecurities.
Migrants in general have one insecurity in common: the migration process itself  and the 
unknown future in a to them hitherto new environment. For some of  them, the motivation to 
migrate to another country may even be spurred by feeling insecure in the origin country. Next 
to this general cause we examine the contextual insecurities due to economic inequality and 
human development and the individual insecurities due to job insecurity, financial insecurity, 
having bad health, feeling unsafe in one’s neighborhood and discrimination. These are 
associated with different points in time: (1) contextual insecurities exposed to during childhood 
in the origin country, (2) contextual insecurities exposed to after childhood in the destination 
country and (3) individual insecurities exposed to after childhood in the destination country. We 
follow this chronology and start with the childhood contextual causes and later life contextual 
causes, followed by individual causes of  insecurity. Although these effects may apply to second 
generation migrants as well, through the socialization by their first generation parents, first 
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generation migrants are have lived in two different contexts, origin and destination, associated 
with two different points in time, childhood and later life. Therefore, we limit our analysis to 
first generation migrants.
Explaining cross-origin and cross-destination variation in 
migrant religiosity
The focus on childhood insecurities in insecurity theory is based upon the assessment that 
changes in security take a generation to take effect: although increases in security in some 
countries have emerged, religiosity has been quite stable, except for the younger generations 
(Norris and Inglehart 2004). Surprisingly, Van Tubergen (2006) found that there was indeed 
more variation between origin than destination countries in affiliation to religions but that the 
opposite was true for service attendance. However, it seems that this variation was largely due 
to survey effects, and the cross-national reliability of  the measure of  service attendance can be 
a problem (Meuleman and Billiet 2011). Therefore, we hypothesize that at the contextual level 
migrants are predominantly influenced by insecurities experienced in the origin country. We 
therefore propose our first hypothesis: migrants’ religiosity is determined more by the context of  
origin than by the context of  destination (H1).
Which social insecurities affect migrant religiosity in both contexts? Nations differ in the 
security they offer to their inhabitants. Looking at the overall economic development and degree 
of  modernization of  countries, like classical secularization theory did, does not fully capture 
individual conditions and insecurities related to these conditions. Socioeconomic inequalities 
can remain substantial, regardless of  mean national level of  development. While a number of  
developing countries gained economic wealth from oil revenues over the past decades, living 
conditions for the whole population didn’t always develop accordingly. Economic inequality, can 
be approached as indicating to what extent well-off  and less well-off  people live together in one 
country. This creates insecurities as a consequence of  relative deprivation: lower classes evaluate 
their conditions as more insecure, compared to those of  higher classes. However, economic 
inequality may also create insecurities for the well-off: “even the affluent professional classes 
living in secure, gated communities (…) cannot insulate themselves and their families entirely 
from the risks of  crime, the threat of  violence and the problems of  political instability endemic in 
society” (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 71). Although the influence of  inequality has been attested 
for natives (Ruiter and Van Tubergen 2009), it seems that destination level inequality does not 
lead to higher religiosity for migrants (Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). We confront the 
effect of  origin level inequality with destination level inequality and therefore hypothesize that 
migrants coming from countries with higher inequality are more religious (H2a), migrants who live in 
countries with higher inequality are more religious (H2b) and the influence on migrant religiosity of  
inequality in the origin countries is greater than the influence in the destination countries (H2c).
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Next to the influence of  economic inequality, there are considerable differences in the extent 
to which countries mitigate insecurity for their inhabitants, by the availability of  decent health 
care and education for instance. Norris and Inglehart (2004) demonstrated that the human 
development is an important predictor of  cross-national differences in religious behavior. 
Although human development has shown to have an effect on depression (Cifuentes et al. 2008), 
life satisfaction (Bonini 2008) and general wellbeing (Veenhoven 2005), the effects on religiosity 
have not been studied so far. We test the influence of  the human development of  both the 
countries of  destination and of  origin, but expect a larger impact of  the development in the 
origin countries and therefore hypothesize that: migrants coming from countries with lower human 
development are more religious (H3a), migrants who live in countries with lower human development are 
more religious (H3b) and the effect of  human development on migrant religiosity in the origin countries is 
greater than the effect of  human development in the destination countries (H3c).
Explaining individual variation in migrant religiosity
At the individual level we subsequently examine economic insecurity, as indicated by job 
insecurity and financial household insecurity, personal insecurity, as indicated by migrants’ health 
and their feelings of  unsafety in the neighborhood, and finally political insecurity, as indicated by 
perceived discrimination. We discuss the effects of  each of  these aspects and subsequently derive 
a general individual hypothesis.
Economic insecurity has been one of  the originally posited, and best documented, sources 
of  insecurities affecting religiosity, although the effect on migrant religiosity is far from clear 
(Norris and Inglehart 2004; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). Job insecurity, the fear of  
losing one’s job, has negative consequences for the mental health of  employees (Sverke, Hellgren 
and Näswall 2002). Employment status has a similar effect on feelings of  security, attenuating 
anxieties about an unpredictable future as a consequence of  having a stable job and income, thus 
lowering the need for an alternative, e.g. religious form of  reassurance. Indeed, having a stable 
employment, for instance a full-time job with an unlimited contract, lowers natives’ religiosity 
(Ruiter and Van Tubergen 2009; Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 2011). Given that migrants in 
Europe differ in their integration into the labor market (Van Tubergen, Maas and Flap 2004), 
economic insecurity as a consequence of  the employment status becomes more salient for them. 
Over and above this job insecurity, there is also the aspect of  financial insecurity: the ability to 
manage financially is an important factor in feeling secure and creating predictability. Previous 
research indicated that lower income is associated with a lower mental health (Belle 1990) and 
that migrants have a lower income compared to native peers throughout the whole of  Europe 
(Albertinelli et al. 2011).
Apart from these economic insecurities, personal insecurities affect people’s anxieties as 
well. Having a bad physical health can be approached as inciting existential anxieties, thus 
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increasing religiosity (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Studies have already shown that suffering 
from health problems increases religiosity in natives in Europe (Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 
2011). Less is known about European immigrants’ health in general, but immigrants do exhibit 
higher mortality rates for several conditions (Mladovsky 2007). Another source of  personal 
insecurity can be a feeling of  unsafety: an individual’s perception of  the risk, or estimate of  
personal vulnerability, of  being involved or becoming victim of  an aggression (Roché 1996; 
Zani, Cicognani and Albanesi 2001). This feeling of  unsafety is, however, not necessarily related 
to actual victimization and indeed, research has shown that there is no direct association with 
crime rates (Perkins and Taylor 1996). Feelings of  unsafety are rather mediated by integration in 
the community and especially informal ties within the community have shown to be important 
in buffering fear (Ross and Jang 2000). Although both natives and migrants are equally prone to 
suffer from anxieties for victimization, we assume that feelings of  unsafety form another source 
of  insecurities for migrants who are being confronted with a neighborhood which is different 
from the one they grew up in, while less-integrated migrants are even more susceptible to this 
kind of  anxieties.
Next to these general effects of  insecurity, migrants experience political insecurities specific 
to their migrant status, for instance discrimination. Discrimination is a main determinant of  
acculturative stress, which occurs when adaptation to the new environment does not run 
smoothly (Berry 1970; Berry et al. 2006). These adaptation problems might lead to insecurities 
about the future in their new environment. Studies have indeed shown increased religiosity 
for migrants confronted with discrimination (Fleischmann 2010; Van der Bracht et al. 2013). 
Therefore, we hypothesize in our fourth and last hypothesis that migrants who find themselves 
in a vulnerable economic, personal and political position in their destination country are more 
religious and therefore we hypothesize that migrants who have a less stable employment status, are 
unable to cope financially, have a bad health, feel unsafe in their neighborhood and feel discriminated are 
more religious (H4).
Data and variables
The European Social Survey is a two-yearly cross-sectional survey, which includes over 30 
countries. The questionnaire is designed and organized centrally and is subsequently translated 
to the official languages of  the participating countries. Response rates vary between countries 
and waves but in general a response rate of  70% is pursued per country and wave.  We use 
data from waves 2-4 (2004-2008) and include the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
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Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Some countries which are generally not considered as 
part of  geographical Europe, e.g. Israel, have been excluded from the analysis.
The population contains all residents of  15 years or older, regardless nationality. This dataset 
is therefore particularly suited for research on European migrants. We’ve included only first 
generation migrants, meaning respondents being born abroad whose parents are both born 
abroad too and who arrived in the country where the questionnaire is being taken at age 15 or 
older.  This selection, and the listwise deletion resulted in an eventual unweighted dataset of  
5,900 cases.
A second advantage of  using the data we’ve selected is the fact that we are able to discern 
different relevant contexts. The origin of  migrants is determined by the country of  birth and the 
destination by the country where the survey is being taken.
A disadvantage of  the dataset is, however, that the surveys were conducted using the official 
languages of  the country where they were being taken. This means that less integrated, often 
meaning less educated, migrants who do not fully master an official language of  the country 
where they live are not or less likely to be interviewed. Since there is an effect of  structural and 
cultural integration of  migrants on their religiosity (Van der Bracht et al. 2013), this means we 
deal with less religious migrants, meaning we estimate the effects conservatively.
Dependent variables
We examine two dimensions of  religion in our analyses: (1) subjective religiosity and (2) frequency 
of  praying. Although religious service attendance has been widely used in religiosity research, 
the measurement of  the service attendance indicator has, contrary to the other indicators we use, 
proven to be cross-nationally inequivalent (Meuleman and Billiet 2011). Since the inequivalence 
is due to the fact that the indicator does not function for Muslim women, this is an issue which 
can’t be disregarded for migrant religion research.
Subjective religiosity is a metric variable, calculated using the 11-point scale answers to the 
question “Regardless of  whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you 
say you are?”. The scale has a range of  going from ‘Not at all religious’ (0) to ‘Very religious’ (10).
Praying is based on the question “Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, 
if  at all, do you pray?”. Answers varied in a 7-point scale ranging from ‘Every day’ (1) to ‘Never’ 
(7). Scores were dichotomized by grouping scores 1 to 3 to create the category ‘Once a week or 
more’ (1) and 4 to 7 for ‘Less than once a week’ (0).
Contextual variables
Origin’s GINI-coefficient is a measure of  income inequality. It is calculated using the net disposable 
household income and indicates the mean level of  socio-economic inequality on a scale of  0 
(meaning perfect equality) to 100 (meaning perfect inequality). We have calculated the mean 
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of  all available information from data provided by the United Nations University (UNU) (WIID 
2008). Even then, information on some countries was lacking from the data provided by the UNU. 
In that case we took information from, in this order, either the CIA (US’s Central Intelligence 
Agency) (The World Factbook) or GPI (Global Peace Index).
Origin’s HDI (Human Development Index) is a composite index indicating the general human 
development of  countries based on the life expectancy at birth, the adult literacy rate and the 
natural logarithm of  gross domestic product per capita at purchasing power parity. We used the 
HDI of  2002 for all origin countries (HDR 2002). Exceptions here are in the case of  ‘historical 
countries’ which ceased to exist before 2002 but which were indicated by respondents as origin, 
e.g. USSR. In that case we used the HDI from the last available year before the dissolution of  
that country.
Destination’s GINI-coefficient is analogous to the origin’s GINI-coefficient. We calculated the 
mean of  the period during which the surveys were conducted (2004-2008) from data provided by 
the United Nations University (UNU) (WIID 2008). 
Destination’s HDI is also analogous to origin’s HDI: we used the HDI of  2002 for all destination 
countries (HDR 2002). 
Independent variables
Employment status is a categorical variable based on the main activity during the last seven days 
previous to the day when the questionnaire is being taken and on the type of  contract they 
indicated if  they were employed. The answers were recoded into five categories: ‘Employed 
with unlimited contract’ (0), ‘Employed with limited contract’ (1), ‘Unemployed’ (2), ‘Student’ 
(3), ‘Inactive’ (4). The inactive category contains all respondents who are unemployed but not 
looking for a job.
Budget is a categorical variable based on the answer to the question how respondents feel 
about the households income. The 4-point scale answers range from ‘Living comfortably on 
present income’ (1) to ‘Very difficult on present income’ (4).
Health is a dichotomous variable based on respondents’ assessments of  their health. The 
5-point scale answers were recoded into two categories: ‘Bad’ (0), containing original categories 
‘Bad’ (4) and ‘Very bad’ (5), and ‘Good’ (1), containing original categories ‘Very good’ (1), ‘Good’ 
(2) and ‘Fair’ (3). 
Feeling unsafe is a dichotomous variable based on the answers to the question “How safe do 
you – or would you – feel walking alone in this area after dark?”. The 4-point scale answers were 
recoded into two categories: ‘Safe’ (0), containing original categories ‘Very safe’ (1) and ‘Safe’ (2), 
and ‘Unsafe’ (1), containing original categories ‘Unsafe’ (3) and ‘Very unsafe’ (4).
Discrimination is based on the question “Would you describe yourself  as being a member 
of  a group that is discriminated against in this country?”. Respondents answering ‘yes’ to 
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this question were asked to indicate on which grounds they feel discriminated. Research has 
indicated that there is a clear migrant-dimension within this measurement of  different grounds 
of  discrimination (André, Dronkers and Fleischmann 2009). Accordingly, we constructed a 
dichotomous variable with value 1 for all migrants who indicated that they belong to a group 
which is discriminated based on language, race, nationality, ethnicity or religion. Migrants who 
did not feel discriminated or who did but ticked none of  these five groups where given a score 
of  0.
Control variables
We control for sex, age, education and survey wave. Sex is a dichotomous variable with categories 
‘Male’ (0) and ‘Female’ (1). Age is a metric variable in full years. Education is a metric variable 
measuring the years of  full-time education the respondents have completed. Wave is a categorical 
variable with three categories, one for each wave of  the ESS.
Figure 4. 1: Analyses strategy
Method
We discern four different levels in our analyses. Given the structure of  the data, where 
individuals are nested in both hierarchical and non-hierarchical levels, we use cross-classified 
random intercept multilevel models (Rasbash and Goldstein 1994). Figure 4.1 illustrates our 
analyses strategy: on the one hand, (1) individuals (Ni = 5,900) are nested within (2) periods 
of  childhood (Nj = 515), which are nested within (3) origin countries (Nk = 146). On the other 
hand, individuals are nested within (4) destination countries (Nl = 25). Migrants are assigned 
to the period of  childhood according to the year of  birth in 5 birth cohorts of  14 years ranging 
from 1921 to 1990, 14 years being the period of  childhood as designated by our selection of  
first generation migrants. In this way we can untangle on the one hand origin from destination 
country and on the other the specific period spent in the origin countries. The smallest groups, 
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childhood periods, have an average group size of  11.46, well above the minimum of  5 to obtain 
reliable estimates (Clarke 2008). 
We introduce economic inequality and human development at the two country levels. 
Adding the predictor for past contextual effects at the period of  childhood level would be more 
appropriate, but there are no reliable numbers for both indicators for most of  the timespan, 
which would strongly reduce the number of  childhood periods and origin countries, giving 
more weight to countries of  origin with relatively young migrants. Therefore, we limited the 
period of  childhood level to only allow variation, while not adding predictors at that level. 
We use the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation procedures provided by the 
statistical software package MLwiN (version 2.24) (Browne 2011). Cases are weighted at the 
individual level. We estimate a linear model for the effects on subjective religiosity and a binary 
logistic model for the effects on praying. All metric variables have been standardized. Because of  
multicollinearity restrictions GINI and HDI are introduced in different models.
Table 4. 1: Descriptive statistics
Range N (%) Range N (%)
Ave. (Std.) Ave. (Std.)
Dependent Budget
Subjective religiosity 0-10 5.44 (3.07) Living comfortably 0/1 1630 (27.5%)
Praying Coping 0/1 2480 (41.8%)
Less than once a week 0/1 3183 (53.6%) Difficult 0/1 1373 (23.1%)
Once a week or more often 0/1 2754 (46.4%) Very difficult 0/1 454 (7.6%)
Health
Contextual variables Good 0/1 5425 (91.4%)
Origin Bad 0/1 512 (8.6%)
GINI 0-100 36.03 (8.41) Feeling unsafe
HDI 0-1 0.81 (0.13) Safe 0/1 4368 (73.6%)
Unsafe 0/1 1569 (26.4%)
Destination Discrimination
GINI 0-100 29.62 (3.73) No 0/1 4904 (82.6%)
HDI 0-1 0.92 (0.03) Yes 0/1 1033 (17.4%)
Individual Control variables
Employment status Sex
Employed, unlimited contract 0/1 2,509 (42.5%) Male 0/1 2723 (45.9%)
Employed, limited contract 0/1 752 (12.7%) Female 0/1 3214 (54.1%)
Unemployed 0/1 302 (5.1%) Age
Student 0/1 158 (2.7%) Education 0-56 12.43 4.62
Inactive 0/1 2,179 (36.9%) Wave
2 (2004) 0/1 2093 (35.3%)
3 (2006) 0/1 1873 (31.5%)
4 (2008) 0/1 1971 (33.2%)
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Table 4. 2: Cross-classified logistic and linear multilevel models
Subjective religiosity Praying
Model 1: GINI Model 2: HDI Model 1: GINI Model 2: HDI
Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.)
Intercept -0.240* (0.082) -0.254** (0.083) -0.671*** (0.199) -0.706*** (0.204)
Individual variables
Female 0.246*** (0.026) 0.253*** (0.026) 0.796*** (0.063) 0.819*** (0.064)
Age 0.058** (0.017) 0.062*** (0.017) 0.211*** (0.041) 0.223*** (0.041)
Education -0.088*** (0.014) -0.086*** (0.014) -0.085* (0.034) -0.079* (0.034)
Wave
2 (2004) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
3 (2006) -0.052 (0.032) -0.051 (0.032) -0.149 + (0.078) -0.148 + (0.078)
4 (2008) -0.037 (0.033) -0.038 (0.033) -0.119 (0.079) -0.124 (0.078)
Employment status
Employed, unlimited contract Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Employed, limited contract 0.042 (0.041) 0.041 (0.041) 0.038 (0.099) 0.032 (0.099)
Unemployed 0.030 (0.058) 0.019 (0.058) -0.031 (0.141) -0.07 (0.142)
Student 0.114 (0.079) 0.095 (0.079) 0.027 (0.190) -0.035 (0.191)
Inactive 0.083* (0.033) 0.080* (0.033) 0.150 + (0.078) 0.138“ (0.078)
Budget
Living comfortably Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Coping 0.091* (0.032) 0.090** (0.032) 0.184* (0.076) 0.184* (0.076)
Difficult 0.141** (0.039) 0.137*** (0.039) 0.238* (0.093) 0.226* (0.093)
Very difficult 0.229*** (0.055) 0.221*** (0.055) 0.429** (0.132) 0.406** (0.133)
Health 0.052 (0.046) 0.048 (0.046) 0.038 (0.111) 0.024 (0.112)
Feeling unsafe 0.043 (0.030) 0.043 (0.03) 0.185** (0.071) 0.188** (0.072)
Discrimination 0.081* (0.035) 0.078* (0.035) 0.105 (0.085) 0.097 (0.085)
Contextual variables
Destination
GINI 0.028 (0.050) 0.183 (0.125)
HDI 0.041 (0.042) 0.129 (0.104)
Origin
GINI 0.139*** (0.027) 0.459*** (0.066)
HDI -0.156*** (0.023) -0.469*** (0.057)
Variance
Individual 0.841 (0.016) 0.841 (0.016) 3.290 3.290
Childhood 0.012 (0.006) 0.012 (0.006) 0.053 (0.033) 0.050 (0.030)
Origin 0.061 (0.014) 0.048 (0.012) 0.333 (0.083) 0.275 (0.074)
Destination 0.057 (0.022) 0.057 (0.022) 0.329 (0.129) 0.355 (0.138)
DIC 15871.94 15866.13 7171.66 7163.49
Null-model Variance
Individual 0.871 (0.017) 3.290
Childhood 0.025 (0.008) 0.149 (0.045)
Origin 0.081 (0.014) 0.454 (0.108)
Destination 0.061 (0.022) 0.322 (0.122)
+ p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-sided); Ni = 5,900; Nj = 515; Nk = 146; Nl = 25. Cases weighted. 
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Results
Table 4.1 gives an overview of  the descriptive statistics. We notice that first generation migrants 
are, compared to native Europeans,  relatively religious, with a subjective religiosity of  5.44 and 
almost half  of  first generation migrants in our dataset pray once a week or more often. 
Table 4.2 depicts the results of  the analyses and the variance components of  the different 
models. First, from the null-model variance decomposition, we notice that a large part of  
individual levels of  migrant religiosity is determined by their childhood period, origin and 
destination: 16.1% (i.e. the proportion of  contextual variance to the total variance) of  the variance 
in subjective religiosity and 21.9% of  frequency of  praying is a result of  the combination of  the 
three different contexts. The frequency of  praying of  two migrants growing up in the same 
period in the origin country and moving to the same destination country is 21.9% correlated. 
Second, controlling for variance of  the period of  childhood is useful to disentangle the effects 
of  time and origin countries of  migrants, however, after controlling for individual effects, the 
remaining variance at the childhood period level is negligible: only slightly more than 1%. 
Therefore, we can assume that having no parameter included at the childhood period level does 
not affect a reliable estimation of  the effects of  the time spent in origin countries.
Third, we look at the variance decomposition to test our first hypothesis, which stated that 
migrant religiosity is more determined by the context of  origin than by the destination (H1). 
When we look at the model containing only the intercept we notice that there is more variance 
at the origin level than at the destination level: migrants living in the same destination country 
but coming from different origin countries, are 5.9% correlated for subjective religiosity, while 
migrants growing up in the same period and origin country but moving to different destination 
countries have a higher correlation: 10.2%. As already indicated, overall, correlations are higher 
for frequency of  praying and the same conclusions hold: with a correlation of  7.6% at the 
destination level and 14.3% at the childhood and origin level combined, migrant religiosity is 
substantively more determined by the childhood spent in the origin country than later life in the 
destination country, thus supporting our first hypothesis.
Our second hypothesis consists of  three parts: (1) a positive effect of  origin-inequality on 
migrant religiosity (H2a) and (2) destination inequality (H2b) and (3) the prediction that the 
effect of  the origin is higher than that of  the destination (H2c). Our results do not support the 
destination-effect of  inequality: the GINI-coefficient of  the destination-country has no effect on 
the subjective religiosity, nor the frequency of  praying of  migrants. There is, however, a positive 
effect of  inequality on both dependent variables at the origin level: the higher the inequality 
in the country of  origin where first generation migrants spent their childhood, the higher the 
subjective religiosity and frequency of  praying. The fact that the effect of  economic inequality is 
only significant at the origin level is also supported by the explained variance at the origin level. 
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Therefore we conclude that there is a positive effect of  economic inequality in the country of  
origin on migrant religiosity but not in the destination country. The proposition that the effect 
of  the origin is higher than that of  the destination is indirectly supported by these results.
The third hypothesis is analogous to our second, but in this case regarding the negative effect 
of  human development. The second part of  the hypothesis, that there is a negative effect of  
inequality in the destination country on migrant religiosity (H3b), is, again, not supported by the 
evidence: there is no effect of  human development on either subjective religiosity or praying. The 
first part, which predicted a negative effect at the origin level (H3a), is, on the contrary, backed 
by our results: there is a strong negative effect of  human development on migrant religiosity in 
Europe. Migrants living in Europe who grew up in a country with a lower human development 
have a higher subjective religiosity (0.156 standard deviations higher for each standard deviation 
of  human development lower) and higher odds of  praying once a week or more often (odds are 
0.469 times lower for each standard deviation of  HDI higher). Our conclusions are analogous 
to those for economic inequality: there is no significant effect at the destination level, but there 
is one at the origin level. Therefore, we find support for the thesis that the effect of  human 
development is higher at the origin than at the destination level. 
With our fourth hypothesis we predicted that migrants in an insecure position, as indicated 
by an insecure employment status, financial insecurities, a bad health, feeling unsafe and feeling 
discriminated, are more religious (H4). From our results we notice that only some of  these 
insecurities affect migrant religiosity. In fact, only for financial insecurity we notice a positive 
association between insecurity and religion. For both dependent variables, we notice a more or 
less linearly increasing effect of  financial insecurity on migrant religiosity. The other indicators 
of  insecurity, however, demonstrate no clear pattern of  association. First of  all only the inactive, 
comprising those who are unemployed and not looking for a job, have a significantly higher level 
of  subjective religiosity, while the difference in odds ratios for praying for the same category is 
only marginally significant (p < 0.10). We conclude that there is no general association between 
job insecurity and religion. Second, having a bad health seems not to increase migrant religiosity. 
On the contrary, we see a positive effect of  good health on migrant religiosity, although it is not 
significant. Third, the results for feelings of  unsafety are mixed. There is a significant effect of  
feeling safe when walking alone in the dark in one’s area on frequency of  praying, but not on 
subjective religiosity (p = 0.110). Fourth, and final, the results for our last individual predictor 
also offer mixed findings. Although there is an effect of  discrimination on subjective religiosity, 
there is no significant effect on frequency of  praying. Based on these findings we conclude that 
the results for individual insecurities experienced in the destination countries are mixed and 
therefore conclude that we have to reject our fourth hypothesis. 
When we evaluate our models, by looking at the variance decomposition in table 4.3, we 
notice that our model only performs well at the childhood and origin level. Our insecurity factors 
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only succeed in explaining small parts of  the variance at the individual and destination level, 
indicating that the insecurities we’ve studied only effect migrant religiosity for a small part. The 
opposite is true for the childhood and origin levels, however. At the origin level taking economic 
inequality and human development in account reduces the correlations between people coming 
from the same origin countries by proportions ranging from 23.5% to 40.7%. The highest drop 
in contextual variance is attributable to human development: once we take into account the 
human development in the origin country, migrants are more affected by aspects of  destination 
countries than origin countries.
Conclusion and discussion
With this article we want to extend insecurity theory to migrant religiosity in order to contribute 
both to the theoretical development of  insecurity theory and the empirical knowledge of  migrant 
religiosity. By studying migrant religiosity, we have an interesting case study which allows us to 
separate out past and present contextual effects. We applied cross-classified multilevel analyses 
to 5,900 first generation migrants from 515 periods of  childhood within 146 origin countries and 
within 25 destination countries. We draw three major conclusions from this analysis.
First, compared to the application of  insecurity theory at the individual level on natives 
(Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 2011), and to the application of  other frameworks on migrant 
religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011), individual feelings of  
insecurity, experienced in the destination country, poorly predict migrant religiosity. Although 
there is an effect of  financial insecurity on both subjective religiosity and frequency of  praying 
and a feeling of  unsafety on frequency of  praying, other theories, like social integration theory, 
have been more successful in explaining migrant religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006). Apparently, 
the insecurities which affect native religiosity do not affect migrant religiosity in the same way. 
It is possible that migrants evaluate their economic or existential situation more favorably than 
natives do (Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011) and for other influences this can be explained by 
selection effects, for instance the effect that particularly fit people tend to migrate transnationally 
(Mladovsky 2007). Relating again to past insecurities, it is possible that migrants evaluate the 
situation in the destination country relative to their former situation in the origin country, or 
that the insecurities faced in the destination country do not add up to the general insecurity 
caused by the process of  migration and integration itself. In any case, this calls for an alternative 
explanation of  migrant religiosity at that level.
Second, at the contextual level, however, both distinguishing between effects of  the origin and 
destination countries and applying insecurity theory offers interesting prospects of  explaining 
variance in migrant religiosity: it indicates that aspects of  the origin countries are more important 
than destination countries’ aspects. This urges for a need to take both contexts into account 
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instead of  only considering destination countries and/or controlling for origin, which have been 
the most widely used approaches so far (Connor 2010a; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). 
At the same time, however, applying insecurity theory only explains differences in migrant 
religiosity at the origin level. Again, this could be associated with a different way in which 
migrants evaluate their situation in the destination country and, moreover, other indicators, 
especially levels of  native religiosity, have proven to explain variance in destination countries 
successfully (Van Tubergen 2006; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). 
Third, for the theoretical development of  insecurity theory this means that contextual 
insecurities experienced during childhood are indeed more decisive for religiosity than insecurity 
experienced thereafter. Although both past and present effects have been studied, it was until now 
impossible to disentangle both from each other. The observation that religiosity is associated 
more with contextual effects of  the childhood than that of  the years thereafter, supports the 
original proposition of  Norris and Inglehart (2004) and can shift the focus of  future research 
again to past insecurities.
There are some limitations to this study as well. First of  all, as always with cross-sectional 
data, it is difficult to untangle cause and effect. Reverse causations, for instance a higher feeling 
of  unsafety for Muslims due to their higher religiosity in an environment characterized by 
Islamophobia, are possible but for most of  the relations unlikely. For instance, regarding this 
association we notice that in our dataset Muslims feel less often unsafe than non-religious 
migrants.  Future research could however contribute by using longitudinal data.
Second, although we’ve termed the individual effects as present effects, we acknowledge that 
there is a possible spill-over of  past insecurities to present ones. Where the relationship between 
present sources of  insecurity and current migrant religiosity is concerned, however, we believe 
that the experienced insecurity at present affects current insecurity, over and above possible spill-
over effects.
Finally, due to the lack of  reliable indicators of  economic inequality and human development 
for the most part of  the twentieth century, we were not able to estimate the effect of  both over 
time. Resorting to a general mean as we did, it was no longer possible to explicitly assess the 
influence of  inequality and development during the specific childhood period. However, after 
controlling for childhood-period and age there was no substantial childhood period-variation, 
indicating that the influence at the origin level have been relatively stable throughout time for 
migrant religiosity. This supports our model selection and choice for one, time-fixed, measure 
of  both indicators at the origin level.
For future research to migrant religiosity we would strongly advice to (1) include contextual 
effects of  both the destination and origin country and (2) to combine insecurity theory at 
the origin level with other frameworks, like social integration theory, at both the individual 
and destination level. Future cross-national migrant religiosity research should apply a cross-
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classified analysis while combining insecurity theory with other existing frameworks which are 
more applicable to migrant religiosity at both the individual and contextual level, and which 
have proven to be applicable in hierarchical models.
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God bless our children?
The role of generation, discrimination and religious 
context for migrants in Europe
Van der Bracht, K., Van de Putte, B. & Verhaeghe, P.-P.
International migration, Vol. 51, No. 3, p. 23-37.
This paper deals with individual and contextual effects on the religiosity of first 
and second generation migrants in Europe. Determining that little attention has 
been directed towards intergenerational transmission of religion in processes of 
integration, we argue for an intergenerational perspective on immigrant religi-
osity. Social integration theory is used to derive the hypothesis that second 
generation immigrants are less religious than the first generation. Perceived dis-
crimination is introduced in the immigrant-religion research to account for the 
stress buffering capacities of religion. On the contextual level we suppose a pos-
itive effect of native religiosity. Three aspects of religiosity are examined: (1) 
religious affiliation, (2) subjective religiosity and (3) praying. We use four waves 
(2002-2008) of the European Social Survey (ESS) in a 3-level random intercept 
multilevel model with 19,567 individuals, 235 regions and 26 countries. All three 
aspects point to the same conclusions. Among others, the most interesting results 
are that (1) second generation immigrants are less religious than their first gen-
eration counterparts, (2) perceived discrimination has a positive effect on immi-
grant religiosity and the effect is greater for the second generation, (3) native 
religiosity has a positive effect on immigrant religiosity with a greater effect on 
the second generation too and (4) the influence on migrant religiosity is more 
salient at the regional than at the national level.
Introduction
In Europe, religion is generally considered as an obstacle to the integration of  ethnic minorities. A populist statement in the public debate is the presupposition that Muslims have failed to 
integrate in the European society because Islamic and Western cultures are irreconcilable 
(Lucassen 2005). In any case, there is no doubt that religion is an important factor for both 
migration and integration (Hirschman 2004).
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Although considerable disagreement remains concerning the terms integration and 
acculturation, a point of  agreement is that both integration and acculturation are processes that 
span different generations (Alba and Nee 1997; Birman and Trickett 2001). Although integration 
scholars have dealt extensively with intergenerational processes (Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and 
Nee 1997), intergenerational differences in religion have been disregarded (Cadge and Ecklund 
2007). Scholars have either not accounted for intergenerational differences (Van Tubergen 2006) 
or have only included first generation migrants (Connor 2010a; Smits, Ruiter and Van Tubergen 
2010; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). The few intergenerational studies report inconsistent 
results: rising religiosity is reported in the US (Stark 1997; Min and Kim 2005; Alanezi and Sherkat 
2008), stagnation in Germany (Diehl and Koenig 2009) and a decline in the Netherlands (Phalet 
and Ter Wal 2004; Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts 2010). Therefore, more research is needed 
on intergenerational religious processes from a cross-comparative (European) perspective.
Integration is, however, even across generations not a linear process (Vermeulen 2010). It 
can be subject to lapses as a consequence of, for instance, discrimination, which has shown to 
increase ethnic group identification (Verkuyten 2008). Religion can suppress or buffer the effects 
of  stress on well-being (Ellison 1991). Research on the positive effects of  religion for migrants has, 
however, for the most part only dealt with social and material benefits (Hirschman 2004; Ebaugh 
and Chafetz 2000) and only recently touched upon psychological benefits (Connor 2010b).
Migrating and integrating also means coming into contact with new religious contexts. In 
general, Europe is considered as more secular than the rest of  the world (Davie 2000). Research 
has, however, paid insufficient attention to large-scale analysis and contextual effects. Studies 
have been focusing on either one ethnic group (Hurh and Kim 1990), one religion (Connor 
2010a), one country of  origin (Van Tubergen 2007) or a combination of  all these domains (Smits, 
Ruiter and Van Tubergen 2010). The recent increase in availability of  large scale survey-data with 
the New Immigrant Survey (NIS) in the US and the European Social Survey (ESS) in Europe has 
led to an increase in studies focusing on individual and contextual effects (Van Tubergen 2006; 
Alanezi and Sherkat 2008; Higgins, Massey and Jasso 2009; Connor 2010a; Van Tubergen and 
Sindradóttir 2011).  However, the empirical puzzle whether which area exerts most influence has 
been neglected. Moreover, the effects of  generation and discrimination have not been tested in 
combination with a cross-national comparative analysis.
With this article we would like to extend previous research by focusing on the combination of  
four under elaborated aspects: (1) intergenerational differences in religiosity, (2) the influence of  
discrimination, (3) the influence of  the religious context and (4) the question which level exerts 
more influence on migrant religion: the region or the country. The central proposition is that 
through the process of  intergenerational integration, second generation migrants’ religion will 
resemble natives’ religion more than first generation migrants. Since Europe is less religious 
than the rest of  the world, this means that the second generation will be less religious than the 
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first generation. The effect of  discrimination may, however, mitigate these effects. We analyse 
three aspects of  religiosity: (1) being affiliated to a certain denomination, (2) subjective religiosity 
and (3) frequency of  praying. A three-level multilevel-analysis is conducted using the European 
Social Survey, with 19,567 respondents, 235 regions and 26 countries.
Theory and hypotheses
Social integration and religious context
Social integration theory states that the more people are integrated in a social group, the 
more they will conform to the norms of  that group (Durkheim 1986 [1897]; Te Grotenhuis 
and Scheepers 2001). Integration is understood here as the way in which people find their way 
in society (Lucassen 2005). Applied to migrant religion, we expect that the more a person is 
integrated in the receiving society, the more his religiosity will resemble the religiosity of  the 
receiving society. It is assumed that the primary socialization is a decisive element: the difference 
between the first and second generation in terms of  integration is in the first place a consequence 
of  experiencing the socialization in the receiving society. For instance, concerning the political 
trust the second generation resembles natives more than the first generation does (Maxwell 
2010). Although there are considerable differences based on country of  origin and destination, in 
general, we assume that the second generation is culturally more integrated than the first (Crul 
and Vermeulen 2003).
European religiosity is hard to discern. In general, despite some countries where secularization 
is stagnating or where religion is on the rise (Pérez-Nievas and Cordero 2010), religiosity in 
Europe is lower than in the rest of  the world (Davie 2000). We assume that second generation 
migrants, who are more integrated, adjust their religiosity more to the receiving society than 
the first generation, and this European religiosity is lower than the rest of  the world’s religiosity. 
This has been reported for second generation Muslims in the Netherlands (Phalet and Ter Wal 
2004; Maliepaard et al. 2010) , whereas a stagnation is reported in Germany (Diehl and Koenig 
2009). Therefore we predict that second generation migrant religiosity is lower than first generation 
migrant religiosity (H1).
Although social integration theory is applicable to contextual effects as well, surprisingly 
little contextual research has been conducted (Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001; Van Tubergen 
2006). Since first and second generation migrants conform to the religiosity of  the receiving 
society we suppose an effect of  native religiosity on migrant religiosity. Studies indeed report 
an effect of  native religiosity on migrant religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006; Van Tubergen and 
Sindradóttir 2011). Therefore, our second hypothesis is as follows: the lower receiving societies’ 
religiosity, the lower migrant religiosity (H2).
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Considering integration as an intergenerational process means that the second generation 
will conform more to native religiosity than the first generation. On top of  the effect of  the 
receiving society we assume a greater effect on the second than on the first generation. We 
predict that the association between receiving societies’ religiosity and migrant religiosity is higher for the 
second than for the first generation (H3).
Most previous research has focused on contextual effects at the national level. Some scholars 
claim a more local influence on migrant religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006). Indeed, according to 
social integration theory migrants conform to the religiosity of  the community in which they 
are integrated and even within countries differences in religiosity or religious practices can be 
relatively large. We suppose that the influence of  native religiosity, as expressed in H2 and H3, 
is regional rather than national: it is first and foremost the religiosity of  the close environment 
which is of  greatest influence according to the social integration theory (Van Tubergen 2006). 
Therefore our fourth hypothesis is: the association between native religiosity and migrant religiosity is 
higher at the local than at the national level (H4).
Discrimination
Discrimination is a main determinant of  acculturative stress, which occurs when adaptation 
does not run smoothly (Berry et al. 2006). Scholars have pointed to the attenuating capabilities of  
religion for buffering or suppressing stress (Wheaton 1985; Krause and Van Tran 1989). Religious 
explanations create an existential security that reduces stress coming from financial and labor 
market problems (Ellison et al. 2001) and traumas (Ellison 1991).
This effect of  discrimination is not irreconcilable with the integration thesis. Research on 
Muslims in Europe has indicated that a feeling of  rejection of  the ethnical and/or religious 
group to which one belongs causes an increased ethnical identification with the group and higher 
rates of  religious orthodoxy (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007, 2010; Verkuyten 2008; Connor 2010a; 
Fleischmann, Phalet and Klein, 2011). Fleischmann (2010) has demonstrated the positive effect 
of  discrimination on the religious identification of  Turks in Amsterdam and Berlin. Our fifth 
hypothesis predicts that perceived discrimination is associated with a higher migrant religiosity 
(H5).
Discrimination can, however, affect second generation migrants in a different way than the 
first. Second-generation non-western migrants are often considered as an in-between group: not 
fully accepted as Europeans and not fully accepted as members of  the sending society of  their 
parents (Foner and Alba 2008: 14; Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Individuals 
can react in diverse ways to discrimination, one being creating an alternative identity (Tajfel 
and Turner 1986). Although at the same time negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims 
abound in Europe (Allen and Nielsen 2002), rejection-identification theory states that in case of  
discrimination, group members will increase their commitment to attenuate the consequences 
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of  discrimination (Fleischmann, Phalet and Klein 2011). Religion can play the role of  a more 
certain, stable and accepted identity which is often transnational and trans ethnical. Hence, and 
given the positive psychological effects of  religion, our sixth and last hypothesis predicts that 
discrimination has a higher association with migrant religiosity for the second than for the first 
generation (H6).
Data and variables
The European Social Survey is a two-yearly cross-sectional survey among more than 30 European 
countries.  The questionnaire is designed and organized centrally and is subsequently translated 
to the official languages of  the participating countries. Response rates vary between countries 
and waves, but in general a response rate of  70% is pursued per country and wave. The survey 
has been conducted since 2002 and at this moment there are four waves available (2002, 2004, 
2006, 2008), resulting in a total of  184,988 cases. 
The population contains all residents who are 15 or older, regardless nationality. These 
data are, therefore, particularly suitable for research on migrants in Europe. The selection of  
migrants, and the deletion of  missing cases on the variables in our analysis resulted in a final 
dataset of  19,567 cases.
The ESS is aptly designed to use for research on contextual effects since respondents are 
assigned to both the region and the country they live in. The number of  regions per country 
varies from only one (Luxemburg) to 26 (Ukraine). After recoding we retained a total of  235 
regions with at least one migrant. These 235 regions are subdivisions of  26 European countries, 
after exclusion of  Israel, Russia and Turkey.
A disadvantage of  the data is, however, that the surveys were conducted using the official 
languages. This means that migrants that do not fully master an official language of  the country 
of  region where they live are not or less likely to be interviewed, resulting in a sample bias 
towards higher educated and an overrepresentation of  intra-European migrants. We will reduce 
the effects of  this bias by weighing the data and controlling for education, employment status 
and origin. Moreover, findings about migrant religiosity based on the ESS are comparable to 
other cross-national data which were intended to target migrant populations (Van Tubergen 
2006; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). For generational differences in religiosity, however, 
this implies we compare the more integrated groups of  both generations, meaning we estimate 
the effect conservatively. 
Dependent variables
Table 5.1 gives an overview of  the descriptive statistics. We include three different aspects of  
religiosity in our analysis. These are (1) affiliation to a certain denomination, (2) subjective 
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religiosity and (3) praying. Although religious service attendance has been widely used in 
religiosity research, the measurement of  the service attendance indicator has, contrary to the 
other indicators we use, proven to be cross-nationally inequivalent (Meuleman & Billiet, 2011). 
Since the inequivalence is due to the fact that the indicator does not function for Muslim women, 
this is an issue which can’t be disregarded for migrant religion research in Europe. Therefore, we 
decided not to include it as a dependent variable in the analysis.
Affiliation is a dichotomous variable based on the question “Do you consider yourself  as 
belonging to any particular religion or denomination?”. Respondents answering ‘yes’ received a 
score of  1, ‘no’ a score of  0. 
Subjective religiosity is calculated using the 11-point scale answers to the question “Regardless 
of  whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?”. The scale 
has a range going from ‘Not at all religious’ (0) to ‘Very religious’ (10). 
Praying is based on the question “Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, 
if  at all, do you pray?”. Answers varied in a 7-point scale ranging from ‘Every day’ (1) to ‘Never’ 
(7). Scores were dichotomized by grouping scores 1 to 3 to create the category ‘Once a week or 
more’ (1) and 4 to 7 for ‘Less than once a week’ (0). 
Independent variables
Generation is a dichotomous variable with categories ‘First generation’ (0) and ‘Second generation’ 
(1). First generation migrants include respondents being born abroad whose parents are both 
born abroad too. Second generation migrants are respondents born in the country where the 
questionnaire is being taken and who at least have one parent born abroad.
Discrimination is based on the question “Would you describe yourself  as being a member of  
a group that is discriminated against in this country?”. The three possible answers, ‘No’, ‘Yes’ 
and ‘I do not know’ are recoded into two categories: ‘Not discriminated’ (0) and ‘Discriminated’ 
(1). We assume that if  people do not know whether they belong to a group being discriminated 
against, this is due to the fact that they are not being discriminated. The variable includes 
discrimination based on any ground, not only ethnicity. We presume, however, that the reason 
for being discriminated is irrelevant for trying to explain the effect of  discrimination on religion 
and generation differences between the effect. 
Control variables
We control for sex, age, origin, employment status, educational level and survey wave. Sex is a 
dichotomous variable with categories ‘Male’ (0) and ‘Female’ (1). Age is a metric variable in full 
years. Origin is a categorical variable with the six inhabited continents as categories: Europe, 
Africa, Asia, North-America, South-America and Oceania. First generation migrants were 
assigned to the continent where they were born. For the second generation migrants with 
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only one parent born abroad we used the continent of  birth of  that parent, if  both were born 
abroad the continent of  birth of  the father is used as origin. A narrower breakdown, e.g. by 
country or region, is not possible, given that in the first wave only continents where recorded for 
respondents’ parents. Unlike Russia, which for a large part lies within the European continent, 
Israel and Turkey are in this study not considered European countries. Educational level is a 
categorical variable with seven educational levels and one rest category. The level is determined 
by the highest level achieved. National and regional diplomas where recoded to the international 
ES-ISCED-scale, a European adaptation to the Unesco-standard for educational levels. The seven 
levels run from ‘less than lower secondary’ to ‘Master’. Missing values and diplomas that are 
not possible to harmonize into ES-ISCED where assigned to the rest group. Employment status 
is a dichotomous variable with categories ‘Unemployed or inactive’ (0) and ‘Employed’ (1). 
Respondents were asked to indicate their main activity the last 7 days with categories like ‘Paid 
work’, ‘Education’ and ‘Unemployed’. Every respondent that did not answer ‘Paid work’ was 
given a score of  0. Wave is a categorical variable with four categories, one for each wave of  the 
ESS.
Contextual variables
As indicated before, we take into account two contextual levels: regions and countries. For each 
dependent variable we aggregate a corresponding regional and national metric variable. Variables 
are calculated retaining all non-migrant respondents of  the four waves, i.e. 148,180 cases.
Affiliation is the percentage of  inhabitants, without migrants, considering themself  as 
belonging to a certain religion or denomination. As indicated we calculate two variables: one 
with the percentage per region and one with the percentage per country. We maintain this logic 
for the other two dependent variables.
Subjective religiosity is the mean religiosity of  non-migrants for each region.
Praying is the percentage inhabitants, without migrants, that pray once a week or more, apart 
from religious services.
Method
We use multilevel-models with three levels: (1) individual migrants (Ni = 19,567), (2) regions (Nj 
= 235) and (3) countries (Nk = 26). Cases are weighted at the individual level.  The analyses are 
conducted using multilevel models. Individual cases per region vary from 2 to 1,344 with a mean 
of  318.38 migrants per region and countries have a range of  60 to 2,196 individuals.  By breaking 
down migrants per region we retain some regions with few cases. For the sake of  accuracy in 
multilevel-modeling, however, the number of  cases at the second level is of  higher importance 
than the number of  cases at the first level (Hox 2002). Moreover, simulations have indicated that 
estimates are reliable starting from an average of  5 cases per group (Clarke 2008).  
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Religiosity is introduced as a metric variable in a linear multilevel model. The two other 
dependent variables are tested in a logistic multilevel-model. In the first step, we test at which 
level native religiosity succeeds best in explaining migrant religiosity (table 5.2). Therefore, we 
introduce each independent variable corresponding to the dependent variable, for instance 
native subjective religiosity in the analysis with subjective religiosity as the dependent variable, 
first at the regional level and then at the national level. In the second step, we succeed with the 
most successful model and present results of  two models for each dependent variable (tables 
5.3, 5.4 and 5.5). In model 1, we introduce the individual and appropriate contextual variables. 
In model 2 we add two interaction effects, testing whether the effects of  discrimination and the 
contextual variable at the regional or national level differ between generations. All models are 
estimated using the software program MLwiN.  All metric independent and dependent variables 
were standardized.
Since different denominations maintain special regulations about the frequency of  praying, 
we have tested for this effect by adding the denominations to model 2 of  praying. The differences 
between the full model and this test model were negligible, except for a general steep decline in 
magnitude of  the effects of  the other independent variables, due to the fact that we then control 
for non-affiliated respondents. 
Results
Table 5.2 presents the variance and explained variance of  three different models: (1) the 
null-model containing only the intercept, (2) a model containing all individual variables and 
native religiosity at the regional level and (3) a model containing all individual variables and 
native religiosity at the national level. For each step we display the amount of  variance at the 
individual, regional and national level and, if  any, the proportion of  variance explained at each 
level. From the decomposition of  variance we learn that there is reasonable contextual variance: 
the combined intra-class correlations of  both second and third level variance ranges from 10% 
for subjective religiosity to 15.6% for frequency of  praying and 23.6% for affiliation. This means 
that the correlation between two migrants living in the same region is 23.6% for affiliation, 
individual differences only accounting for 76.4% of  the variance. This amount of  variance is 
quite high and indeed higher than documented for migrants by two-level analyses (Van Tubergen 
and Sindradóttir 2011). 
When we look at the decomposition between the two higher levels, regional and national, 
we notice that there is a substantively higher variance at the national level, compared to the 
regional: ranging from 7.9% to 20.1% for the national level versus 2.1% to 3.5% for the regional 
level. However, adding native religiosity at the regional level to the model results in a high 
proportion of  explained variance at both the regional and contextual level: ranging from 47% at 
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the regional and 60% at the national level for affiliation to 58.7% at the regional and 87.7% at the 
national level for frequency of  praying. Adding native religiosity at the highest level obviously 
only reduces variance at that level. The explained variance is only some percentages higher in 
this model. However, if  we compare the total explained variance at the higher levels, meaning 
regional and national combined, results are better for the regional-level than for the national-
level variable: 58.1% versus 56.7% for affiliation, 76.7% versus 70.9% for subjective religiosity 
and 82.5% versus 67.7% for praying. The model fit of  the only linear multilevel model leads to 
the same conclusion: the -2 LogLikelihood of  subjective religiosity is 67.084 (χ²; df=1; p<0.001) 
lower if  the regional variable is used versus the national variable. Based on this comparison 
we found it most optimal to proceed with native religiosity as an independent variable at the 
regional level.
An overview of  the final models is presented in tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. We predicted lower 
religiosity for second generation migrants. From the first model in the tables we find support 
for this generation hypothesis (H1). The chance of  being affiliated to a certain denomination is 
lower for second generation migrants, they report a lower subjective religiosity and they pray 
less often than first generation migrants. This means that we can accept the first hypothesis: 
second generation migrants in Europe tend to have a lower religiosity than first generation 
migrants. 
At the regional level we predicted that higher natives’ religiosity is associated with higher 
migrant religiosity (H2). For all three dependent variables there is a positive effect of  the 
corresponding regional religiosity variable. The effect is the lowest for subjective religiosity and 
highest for affiliation, where an increase of  one standard deviation in the percentage of  regional 
natives’ affiliation means an increase in odds of  affiliation for migrants with 107.5% (e0.730-1). We 
attribute the low effect for subjective religiosity to the fact that of  all indicators of  religiosity, 
this is the least salient: while the level of  religious behaviour of  natives, such as praying, is quite 
easily observable, the subjective religiosity of  natives is not that visible to migrants, and thus, of  
all three dependent variables, least subject to social influence.
Next to this main effect we expected an interaction between second generation and the regional 
effect, because through more integration the second generation experiences the regional effect 
more (H3). The effect on the second generation is higher than on the first, as indicated by the 
positive interaction effects, the highest effect being the interaction with affiliation and the lowest 
subjective religiosity, replicating the effect of  salience of  religious behaviour. We conclude that 
second generation migrants experience the influence of  regional religiosity more than the first 
generation.
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Table 5. 1: Descriptive statistics
Range
N (%)
Range
N (%)
Ave. (Std.) Ave. (Std.)
Individual Employed
Dependent Unemployed and inactive 0/1 9352(47.8%)
Affiliation Employed 0/1 10215(52.2%)
No 0/1 8089(41.3%) Education
Yes 0/1 11478(58.7%) Lower than lower secondary 0/1 1412(7.2%)
Subjective religiosity 0-10 4.90(3.09) Lower secondary 0/1 2592(13.2%)
Praying Upper vocational secondary 0/1 2884(14.7%)
Less than once a week 0/1 12217(62.4%) Upper general secondary 0/1 2529(12.9%)
Once a week or more 0/1 7350(37.6%) Advanced vocational 0/1 1202(6.1%)
Bachelor 0/1 1222(6.2%)
Independent Master 0/1 1353(6.9%)
Generation Other 0/1 6373(32.6%)
First generation 0/1 9590(49.0%) Wave
Second generation 0/1 9977(51.0%) 1 (2002) 0/1 4418(22.6%)
Discrimination 2 (2004) 0/1 5413(27.7%)
No 0/1 16945(86.6%) 3 (2006) 0/1 4624(23.6%)
Yes 0/1 2622(13.2%) 4 (2008) 0/1 5112(26.1%)
Control Contextual
Sex Region
Male 0/1 9075(46.4%) Affiliation 0-100 57.04(21.75)
Female 0/1 10492(53.6%) Subjective religiosity 0-10 4.53(1.07)
Age 15-98 44.66(17.44) Praying 0-100 32.57(18.44)
Origin
Europe 0/1 14541(74.3%) Country
Africa 0/1 1547(7.9%) Affiliation 0-100 57.43(21.26)
Asia 0/1 2305(11.8%) Subjective religiosity 0-10 4.55(1.03)
N.-America 0/1 336(1.7%) Praying 0-100 33.30(18.05)
S.-America 0/1 773(4.0%)
Oceania 0/1 65(0.3%)
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Table 5. 2: variance decomposition
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Table 5. 3: Logistic multilevel models of being affiliated
Affiliation
Model 1 Model 2
Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.)
Intercept 1.218*** (0.151) 1.241*** (0.318)
Independent variables
Control variables
Female 0.292*** (0.032) 0.297*** (0.063)
Age 0.200*** (0.018) 0.185*** (0.036)
Origin
Europe Ref. Ref.
Africa 0.906*** (0.072) 0.887*** (0.134)
Asia 0.656*** (0.057) 0.640*** (0.106)
N.-America 0.140 (0.119) 0.120 (0.151)
S.-America 0.229* (0.091) 0.228** (0.074)
Oceania -0.722* (0.298) -0.701 + (0.411)
Employed -0.164*** (0.034) -0.157** (0.054)
Education
Lower than lower secondary Ref. Ref.
Lower secondary -0.289*** (0.079) -0.298*** (0.079)
Upper vocational secondary -0.311*** (0.079) -0.323*** (0.079)
Upper general secondary -0.527*** (0.080) -0.531*** (0.080)
Advanced vocational -0.582*** (0.093) -0.601*** (0.093)
Bachelor -0.769*** (0.092) -0.774*** (0.092)
Master -0.691*** (0.090) -0.697*** (0.090)
Other -1.402*** (0.125) -1.418*** (0.125)
Wave
1 (2002) Ref. Ref.
2 (2004) -0.172*** (0.047) -0.175 (0.125)
3 (2006) -0.039 (0.050) -0.034 (0.144)
4 (2008) 0.063 (0.049) 0.076 (0.066)
Independent
Second generation -0.342*** (0.034) -0.330*** (0.064)
Discriminated 0.246*** (0.049) 0.191** (0.059)
Contextual variables
Region
Natives’ affiliation 0.753*** (0.063) 0.576*** (0.097)
Interaction
Second generation * Discriminated 0.156* (0.069)
Second generation * Regional var. 0.308*** (0.074)
+ p < 0,1; * p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001 (two-sided)
Ni = 19,567; Nj = 235; Nk = 26; Cases weighted
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Table 5. 4: Linear multilevel models of subjective religiosity
Subjective religiosity
Model 1 Model 2
Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.)
Intercept 0.259*** (0.062) 0.264*** (0.062)
Independent variables
Control variables
Female 0.239*** (0.020) 0.239*** (0.020)
Age 0.082*** (0.013) 0.079*** (0.013)
Origin
Europe Ref. Ref.
Africa 0.421*** (0.065) 0.414*** (0.066)
Asia 0.288*** (0.037) 0.275*** (0.036)
N.-America 0.120 + (0.063) 0.115 + (0.063)
S.-America 0.262*** (0.051) 0.259*** (0.053)
Oceania -0.257** (0.092) -0.263** (0.091)
Employed -0.079*** (0.020) -0.077*** (0.020)
Education
Lower than lower secondary Ref. Ref.
Lower secondary -0.181*** (0.046) -0.181*** (0.046)
Upper vocational secondary -0.272*** (0.038) -0.271*** (0.038)
Upper general secondary -0.322*** (0.047) -0.322*** (0.046)
Advanced vocational -0.314*** (0.052) -0.317*** (0.051)
Bachelor -0.421*** (0.053) -0.422*** (0.052)
Master -0.473*** (0.045) -0.472*** (0.045)
Other -0.489*** (0.111) -0.483*** (0.109)
Wave
1 (2002) Ref. Ref.
2 (2004) -0.036 (0.036) -0.034 (0.036)
3 (2006) -0.020 (0.037) -0.019 (0.037)
4 (2008) -0.003 (0.034) 0.001 (0.034)
Independent
Second generation -0.189*** (0.032) -0.201*** (0.030)
Discriminated 0.124*** (0.019) 0.092*** (0.024)
Contextual variables
Region
Natives’ subjective religiosity 0.245*** (0.023) 0.205*** (0.026)
Interaction
Second generation * Discriminated 0.089** (0.033)
Second generation * Regional var. 0.066** (0.021)
+ p < 0,1; * p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001 (two-sided)
Ni = 19,567; Nj = 235; Nk = 26; Cases weighted
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Table 5. 5: Logistic multilevel models of praying
Praying
Model 1 Model 2
Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.)
Intercept -0.387*** (0.100) -0.386*** (0.098)
Independent variables
Control variables
Female 0.678*** (0.034) 0.679*** (0.034)
Age 0.330*** (0.018) 0.319*** (0.018)
Origin
Europe Ref. Ref.
Africa 1.111*** (0.067) 1.083*** (0.067)
Asia 0.718*** (0.053) 0.672*** (0.054)
N.-America 0.165 (0.124) 0.142 (0.125)
S.-America 0.850*** (0.088) 0.842*** (0.088)
Oceania -0.924* (0.359) -0.959** (0.361)
Employed -0.187*** (0.034) -0.178*** (0.034)
Education
Lower than lower secondary Ref. Ref.
Lower secondary -0.303*** (0.075) -0.298*** (0.075)
Upper vocational secondary -0.468*** (0.076) -0.459*** (0.076)
Upper general secondary -0.487*** (0.077) -0.486*** (0.077)
Advanced vocational -0.522*** (0.093) -0.524*** (0.093)
Bachelor -0.494*** (0.092) -0.496*** (0.092)
Master -0.665*** (0.088) -0.654*** (0.088)
Other -0.649*** (0.102) -0.615*** (0.100)
Wave
1 (2002) Ref. Ref.
2 (2004) -0.043 (0.047) -0.038 (0.047)
3 (2006) 0.004 (0.050) 0.009 (0.050)
4 (2008) -0.060 (0.049) -0.043 (0.049)
Independent
Second generation -0.432*** (0.035) -0.494*** (0.038)
Discriminated 0.315*** (0.048) 0.238*** (0.059)
Contextual variables
Region
Natives’ praying 0.670*** (0.042) 0.529*** (0.044)
Interaction
Second generation * Discriminated 0.256** (0.097)
Second generation * Regional var. 0.291*** (0.036)
+ p < 0,1; * p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001 (two-sided)
Ni = 19,567; Nj = 235; Nk = 26; Cases weighted
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Next to this main effect we expected an interaction between second generation and the regional 
effect, because through more integration the second generation experiences the regional effect 
more (H3). The effect on the second generation is higher than on the first, as indicated by the 
positive interaction effects, the highest effect being the interaction with affiliation and the lowest 
subjective religiosity, replicating the effect of  salience of  religious behaviour. We conclude that 
second generation migrants experience the influence of  regional religiosity more than the first 
generation.
Our fourth hypothesis, that regional native religiosity explains more variance than national 
native religiosity (H4), is again supported by the results. Regional religiosity explains more 
higher-level variance. Although there is higher variance at the national level, this turns out to be a 
composition effect of  the regions. Adding native religiosity at the regional level results in a better 
model fit for the linear model of  subjective religiosity which again supports our hypothesis.
According to our fifth hypothesis discrimination has a positive effect on religiosity (H5). Our 
results clearly indicate support: there is a positive effect of  discrimination on migrant religiosity 
for all three dependent variables. Migrants who feel discriminated are more often affiliated to a 
religion, they feel more religious and pray more often. Next, we predicted in our sixth and final 
hypothesis that the effect of  discrimination is higher for the second generation than for the first 
(H6). We remark a positive significant interaction effect in the second model in tables 3, 4 and 5, 
meaning that the effect on second generation is greater than on first generation migrants. We 
conclude that we find support for both hypotheses: discrimination leads to higher religiosity 
(H5) and the second generation experiences this effect more than the first (H6).
Subsequent analyses demonstrate, however, that the interactions of  generation and 
discrimination and of  generation and regional native religiosity operate differently according to 
origin.  Although the main effects of  discrimination hold for European, African and Asian migrants 
separately, the results for the interactions are somewhat mixed. Among second generation 
European migrants there is a significant interaction effect of  discrimination on praying, but 
only a marginally significant effect on subjective religiosity and no effect on affiliation. Among 
Asian migrants, however, the interactions between generation and discrimination are in line 
with the general analyses, but the main effects turn insignificant, indicating that discrimination 
only affects second generation migrant religiosity and not first generation’s. Results are more 
complicated among African migrants: while there is no effect of  discrimination on praying among 
both generations, there is an effect among the second generation, but not among the first, on 
subjective religiosity and there is no interaction effect on affiliation. These mixed findings seem 
to indicate, again, some support for our in-betweens hypothesis: discrimination is of  greater 
concern among second generation non-European migrants than among their first generation, 
or second generation European, counterparts.
70
C HA P T E R  5
While the main effects of  native religiosity hold among European, African and Asian 
migrants, the interaction effect with generation is again less common. The interaction effect 
occurs among European but less clear among African and Asian migrants: the interaction effect 
is only significant on praying for Asian migrants and on subjective religiosity and praying for 
African migrants. This could indicate that the second generation non-European migrants indeed 
do conform more to native religiosity, but only for religious behaviour, such as praying, while 
they are not less often affiliated than their first generation counterparts. 
Conclusion and discussion
This article makes a contribution to migrants’ religion research, by studying migrants’ religion 
from an intergenerational perspective. Moreover, we addressed the influence of  discrimination 
and regional contextual effects on migrant religion in large-scale research in different countries, 
for different denominations and ethnical backgrounds.
Firstly, our results indicate that second generation migrants in Europe are less religious than 
first generation migrants. They have lower odds of  being affiliated to a certain religion, feel 
less religious and they pray less often. These results extend the findings from the Netherlands 
(Phalet and Ter Wal 2004; Maliepaard et al. 2010) to the rest of  Europe and supports our plea 
for an intergenerational perspective in migrant religion research: different generations need to 
be studied in order to fully capture trends in religiosity among migrants. Although it is at the 
moment, given migration history, not yet possible to include the third generation in the research, 
there are certainly possibilities in the US to do this, as Stark (1977) has shown.
Secondly, we found that discrimination has a positive influence on religiosity. The effects of  
both perceived discrimination (Fleischmann 2010) and immigrant receptivity (Connor 2010a) 
have been attested for Muslims in particular and we have indications that migrants in general 
are susceptible to the effect of  discrimination. It is possible that the religion offers migrants 
psychological advantages if  they are being confronted with acculturative stress. It is remarkable 
that discrimination has a higher impact on second generation migrants’ religiosity than on 
first generations’ religiosity, especially for non-European migrants. We conclude that we 
have indications of  support for the in-betweens hypothesis: religion creates a hold for second 
generation migrants experiencing discrimination and a threatened ethnic identity.
Thirdly, we found some confirmation for the contextual influence of  the region: the influence 
of  native religiosity on migrant religiosity is higher at the regional level than at the national 
level. The regional effects replicate findings at the national level (Van Tubergen 2006; Van 
Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011) and encourage a more local approach to migrant religiosity. 
In concordance with our central proposition that migrants conform religiously to non-migrants 
in an intergenerational process of  integration, we notice that the regional effect is greater for 
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second than first generation migrants. Surprisingly, this effect operates differently for non-
European migrants: for them the intergenerational reduction due to the influence of  native 
religiosity is limited to religious behaviour. Although we utilize a cross-sectional survey and 
longitudinal studies are needed, our results may indicate that migrants adjust their religiosity 
to that of  the receiving society from one generation to another. Stark’s (1977) research on the 
religion of  German migrants in the US points in the same direction: notwithstanding the lower 
religiosity of  the first generation, the third generation had caught up and reported the same levels 
of  religiosity as the rest of  the US. Where immigration of  less religious migrants in the US in 
the 20th century means an intergenerational increase in religiosity, in current Europe religiosity 
decreases in subsequent generations. Further research can move the working area to test these 
hypotheses in other religious contexts and periods. We discern four major limitations of  this 
research. Firstly, there is a selection effect, resulting in a loss of  first generation migrants who do 
not master the local language enough to participate in the survey. We are convinced, however, 
that this means that we have estimated the effect conservatively and that intergenerational 
differences would be even higher if  less integrated first generation migrants were included. 
Secondly, the strong effect of  regional, non-migrant religiosity points to the fact that the influence 
is most salient at lower levels, where migrants themselves can experience religiosity of  the direct 
environment. The data do not allow a more local breakdown but it is reasonable that if  we could 
have used an even smaller context we would have found greater contextual effects on migrant 
religiosity. 
Thirdly, there is the causal link between discrimination and religion: we cannot test for the 
reverse effect, that people are being discriminated for being religious, given the cross-sectional 
data. Berry et al. (2006), however, conclude that limited integration and a bad adaptation are 
consequences of  discrimination and not the other way round. Of  the respondents in our dataset, 
only 2.2% indicate religion as the reason for their discrimination and 60% of  those are first 
generation migrants. The fact that second generation migrants perceive less discrimination 
because of  religion makes the reverse causation seem unlikely. 
Fourthly, given the cross-sectional nature of  our data, we are unable to make causal statements. 
Moreover, there could be selection effects at work as well. This problem is particularly of  interest 
concerning the contextual effects: migrants do not choose their destination countries or regions 
randomly and an effect of  regional religiosity could be due to a selection effect rather than a 
causal one. However, most of  the non-Western, and even part of  intra-European, immigration 
streams are caused by economic or political motives and less by religious motives (Fassmann 
and Münz 1992). This reduces the possibility of  migrants selecting less religious regions because 
they themselves are less religious or vice versa. The fact that the effects hold for different origin 
groups illustrates this effect. Moreover, especially regarding our main variable of  interest, 
generation, selection effects are limited: second generation migrants, by definition, did not select 
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their destination country. Policy implications of  this research are in fact limited to restricting or 
reducing discrimination and the effects of  discrimination, since intervening in religiosity is not 
considered as a part of  public policy in liberal societies. However, in times of  fear for presence 
of  fundamentalist and religiously extreme migrants in Europe, this research indicates that 
religiosity is declining across generations. An exception, however, is the effect of  discrimination: 
if  one would want to counter extremism, blaming migrants themselves or their religiosity could 
prove to be counterproductive. If  convergence towards national averages, or an attenuation of  
radicalism, is wanted then discrimination has to be tackled first and foremost.
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In this paper, we examine the influence of the religiosity of the ethnic commu-
nity on second generation migrants. Theories on cultural transmission are applied 
to assess the influence of interactions within and outside the ethnic community. 
We apply cross-classified multilevel analyses to data on 7,887 second generation 
migrants from four waves of the European Social Survey and examine subjective 
religiosity and the frequency of praying. There is a strong impact of ethnic com-
munity religiosity: second generation migrants tend to be more religious in more 
religious ethnic communities. The influence is higher when second generation 
migrants grew up in traditional family structures, have spent less time in educa-
tional institutions and when they belong to a religious minority in the destination 
country. Our research also shows that the influence is higher on praying than 
it is on subjective religiosity, which could indicate the preservation of religious 
behavior, while religious beliefs might wane.
Introduction
Since the second World War, the ethnic diversity of  most European countries has been altered extensively. In most countries, this alteration has gone hand in hand with an increase in 
religious diversity. At least in Western Europe, traditionally Christian European countries have 
witnessed the arrival of  non-Christian immigrant groups. In the long run, the perpetuation of  
this growing religious diversity is dependent on the preservation of  religiosity within the ethnic 
community. If  ethnic minority communities are successful in transferring religiosity to new 
generations, new migrant denominations and religious traditions will be established more firmly 
in the destination societies and form the foundations of  subsequent transfer processes. If, on the 
other hand, the transfer is limited and the acculturating influence of  the host society is high, 
migrant religions are more likely to disappear. Contrary to the US, where religious institutions 
often produce opportunities for socio-economic and cultural integration, the increased religious 
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diversity has in Europe been associated with perceptions of  increased ethnic tensions (Foner and 
Alba 2008). Therefore, a better understanding of  the evolution of  ethnic minority religiosity 
within ethnic communities and across migrant generations is needed.
The scholarly interest into migrant religiosity has been increasing in both the US and Europe 
over the last few decades (Van Tubergen 2006; Alanezi and Sherkat 2008; Van der Bracht, Van 
de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Although the research has long been hampered by a lack of  
systematic survey data (Cadge and Ecklund 2007), recently studies have focused on the religiosity 
of  the first (Van Tubergen 2006) and second generation (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012) and on 
intergenerational differences in religiosity (Alanezi and Sherkat 2008; McAndrew and Voas 2013; 
Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Results on the evolution of  religious fervor 
across subsequent generations are mixed, however. Some scholars report intergenerational 
stability (Diehl and Koenig 2009), others a decline (Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts 2010; Van 
der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013) while even other studies report an increase among 
second generation Muslim migrants (Roy 2004). Hence, there is no clear image of  whether 
ethnic communities successfully transfer religiosity to second and later generations. 
In an immigration context, children of  immigrants often experience diverging values from on 
the one hand the culture of  the country of  origin and on the other hand that of  the destination 
country (Vedder et al. 2009). The preservation of  ethnic minority religiosity is hence dependent 
upon the successful transfer within the ethnic community in contrast to destination country 
religious patterns. Interactions of  second generation migrants with either the ethnic community 
or the host society therefore determine their susceptibility to either culture. A main source of  
religiosity transfer within the ethnic community are parents. According to previous research 
among natives, religiosity is to a large part dependent upon inheritance through interactions 
with parents (Myers 1996): higher parental religiosity is associated with higher religiosity 
among their children. The quality of  the parental relationship and the family structure influence 
this relationship: good parent-child relations and a traditional family structure aid religiosity 
inheritance (Myers 1996; Schönpflug 2001). This parental influence is, at the same time, not 
constant, however, but dependent upon the religious context. In relatively religious nations, the 
national context exerts a stronger influence than parental religiosity and vice versa (Kelly and 
De Graaf  1997). Apparently, parental influence is tightened if  religious parents are surrounded 
by less religious contexts or relaxed when their religiosity conforms to that of  the context. 
With regards to migrants, previous research already demonstrated the influence of  host society 
religiosity on second generation migrants: second generation migrants seem to conform to the 
level of  religiosity among natives (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Hence, 
second generation migrant religiosity is not only influenced by the religiosity of  the own ethnic 
community, but also by the religiosity of  and interactions with individuals and social institutions 
from the host society. So far, previous research has focused predominantly on Muslim migrants 
75
T H E  R O L E  O F  T H E  E T H N I C  C O M M U N I T Y
and has not addressed the transfer of  religiosity within the ethnic community from an interactive 
perspective.
In this paper, we address the importance of  the ethnic community for the religiosity of  the 
second generation. More specifically, we focus on how religious transmission within the ethnic 
community process is influenced by (1) socialization within the family, (2) interactions with 
peers, (3) interactions with social institutions and (4) the religiosity of  the context in which it 
takes place. We apply cross-classified multilevel analysis of  the influence of  levels of  religiosity 
among first generation co-ethnics on second generation migrants’ subjective religiosity and 
frequency of  praying. Data from four different waves (2-5; 2004-2010) of  the European Social 
Survey (ESS) are used, comprising 7,887 second generation migrants from 106 different origin 
countries and living in 26 European destination countries.
Theory and hypotheses
The social transfer of  cultural traits is crucial for cultural persistence: cultures disappear if  people 
do not transmit existing traits to others (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981). On the other hand, exact 
replication of  cultures is problematic as well, since it limits the ability of  societies to respond to 
new situations (Boyd and Richerson 1985). Scholars who study the social transmission of  cultures 
distinguish three different forms (Berry and Georgas 2008). First, there is vertical transmission, 
through the influence of  parents. Second, individuals are influenced by peers, which is called 
horizontal transmission. The third source of  influences comprise other individuals as well as 
social institutions, so-called oblique transmission. Schönpflug (2001) introduced the concept of  
‘transmission belts’: conditions which enhance the cultural transmission in specific contexts. In an 
immigration context, however, children of  immigrants often experience conflicting values form 
the culture of  the country of  origin and that of  the destination country (Vedder et al. 2009). This 
means that for migrants, cultural persistence is dependent upon transfer within the own ethnic 
community, through parental influence or through contacts with co-ethnics, whereas contacts 
with natives or social institutions of  the destination country represent influences weakening 
cultural persistence, while the religious context impacts upon this relationship. Therefore, we 
need to take into account the influence of  family structures, social integration, social institutions 
and the religiosity of  the context to unravel the process of  ethnic community religiosity transfers 
among migrants. In what follows, we develop hypotheses on how vertical, horizontal and oblique 
interactions influence the transfer within the ethnic community.
Vertical interactions: family socialization
In all cultures, parents transfer their values and practices to their children. Among immigrant 
families, this often means transferring values which differ from the society in which their 
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children grow up (Vedder et al. 2009). Therefore, socialization within the family, and interactions 
with parents play a pivotal role for successfully transferring religiosity within the own ethnic 
community. Previous research already found that parents are crucial for religiosity transfer 
processes: parental religiosity is the main determinant of  religious fervor among their offspring 
(Myers 1996; Martin, White and Perlman 2003; Storm and Voas 2012). While raising their 
children, parents indoctrinate them with their own religious beliefs. After a certain age, however, 
the influence of  parents is often challenged by other influences, causing some to dissociate 
themselves from the beliefs of  their parents (Need and De Graaf  1996; Min, Silverstein and 
Lendon 2012). The crucial role of  parents is at the same time also subject to variation due to the 
quality of  the interactions between parents and their offspring.  The family structure and parents’ 
resources determine the level of  success in transferring values from parent to child (Schönpflug 
2001; Friedlmeier and Trommsdorff  2011; Min, Silverstein and Lendon 2012). Parental influence 
on religiosity is higher among families with a traditional family structure and with resourceful 
parents (Myers 1996): being raised in a single-breadwinner family with a higher-educated father 
increases the influence of  parental religiosity on offspring adult religiosity. The family structure 
and the educational resources of  the father during socialization are thus instrumental in 
determining levels of  religiosity during adulthood. Therefore, we hypothesize that: respondents 
who grew up in more traditional family structures, i.e. in families with an unemployed and lower educated 
mother, and in families with more paternal resources, i.e. with a higher educated father, will experience a 
higher influence of  ethnic community religiosity (H1). 
Horizontal interactions: discrimination
Values and attitudes are transformed through interactions with others (Mead 1934). The more 
people are socially integrated into a certain group and hence interact with members of  that group, 
the more they conform to the norms and values of  that group (Durkheim 1986 [1897]). The 
effects of  structural integration on religiosity have in European research repeatedly been found 
among both natives (Need and De Graaf  1996; Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001) and migrants 
(Van Tubergen 2006; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013): the more integrated, 
the lower the religiosity. Second generation migrants can, on the other hand also experience 
feelings of  rejection, for instance in the case of  discrimination. Perceived discrimination can 
have widespread negative effects for ethnic minorities, such as a weaker physical health and 
higher levels of  depressive symptoms (Missinne and Bracke 2012; Pascoe and Richman 2009). 
With regards to ethnic and religious identity formation, perceived discrimination is associated 
with respectively reactive ethnicity (Portes and Rumbaut 2001) and reactive religiosity (Voas 
and Fleischmann 2012): an increased identification with the own ethnic and religious group 
(Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007, 2010). Confronted with feelings of  rejection in the destination 
country, migrants rally to other identities which are less challenged. They might find solace in 
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identifying more with the own ethnic community and/or the own religious group. This lowered 
social integration into the destination society often coincides with a higher similarity in human 
values within ethnic communities (Hadjar et al. 2012). In this respect, perceived discrimination 
is associated with higher levels of  religiosity among ethnic minorities (Van der Bracht, Van de 
Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). The higher stress on ethnic and religious identification leads to our 
second hypothesis, which predicts that perceived discrimination is associated with a higher influence 
of  ethnic community religiosity (H2).
Oblique interactions: social institutions
According to social transmission theory, interactions with social institutions of  the destination 
country affect the impact of  the ethnic community on the transfer of  cultural traits to the second 
generation. These are called oblique interactions. If  second generation migrants get confronted 
more often with social institutions and other influences of  the destination country, they become 
less susceptible to the influence of  co-ethnics. We focus on two important social institutions 
influencing second generation migrants’ worldviews: the educational system and mass media. 
Through education in the destination society, second generation migrants have more salient 
experiences of  the destination society than their first generation counterparts (Vedder et al. 
2009). Adolescents spend most of  their waking hours in schools, meaning that ethnic minority 
adolescents get more often exposed to ethnic majority peers and ethnic majority educational 
programs through their education in the host society (Vedder et al. 2009). According to scholars 
who follow the scientific worldview-paradigm, education is associated with lower levels of  
religiosity, as the scientific approach to the world of  the former contradicts the traditional 
religious explanations (Bruce 1999). As people age, the influence of  parental religiosity tends to 
decrease (Francis and Brown 1991). Education could have the same emancipating effect. Among 
immigrant families, parental stress on collectivism is loosened for higher educated offspring 
(Phalet and Schönpflug 2001), indicating that education might alter the transmission of  values. 
Higher-educated migrants tend to be less religious (Van Tubergen 2006; Van der Bracht, Van 
de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013) but it has not yet been examined how education might alter the 
transfer of  religiosity within the ethnic community.
Mass media may be another social institution of  the destination country exerting a major 
influence on various aspects of  human life, such as attitudes towards the death penalty (Sotirovic 
2001) or even eating disorders (Abramson and Valene 1991). Among migrants, media use can have 
an integrating effect, since higher rates of  integration are associated with higher levels of  media 
consumption (Peeters and d’Haenens 2005). Hence, consuming media has an integrative effect 
on migrants. So far, the association between media use and religiosity has mainly been studied 
by communication scientists, exploring the effects of  religiosity on media use. These studies 
report a lower use of  several different media, such as internet and television (Hamilton and 
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Rubin 1992; Armfield et al. 2003), among more religious individuals. Among Chinese migrants 
in the US, using media increases information and knowledge of  the host society, thus supporting 
acculturation in the US (Hwang and He 1991). Given the integrating effect of  media use and 
education for migrants, we can thus conclude that exposure to and contact with social institutions 
in the destination country are associated with a lower influence of  ethnic community migrants’ religiosity 
(H3).
The religious context
Traditionally, the influence of  the religious context on migrant religiosity has been explained by 
applying social integration theory: migrants conform to levels of  religiosity in the social group 
in which they integrate (Van Tubergen 2006). Results confirm that migrants are more religious 
in more religious backgrounds and vice versa and the influence of  contextual religiosity is even 
higher for second than first generation migrants (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 
2013). The contextual religiosity also influences the ability to transfer religiosity, however. As 
Kelley and De Graaf  (1997) have demonstrated, intergenerational transmission of  religiosity is 
affected by the national context in which it takes place. Parental influence is either reinforced or 
relaxed, in national contexts with respectively low and high levels of  religiosity: parents protect 
their offspring from the supposed noxious effects of  a secularized environment. Therefore 
we hypothesize that the influence of  ethnic religiosity will be higher in countries with lower levels of  
religiosity (H4).
Next to the effect of  living in a secularized environment, adhering to a minority religion 
in the destination country might also be associated with a higher influence of  the religiosity 
of  co-ethnics. Previous research already indicated that value similarity within groups is higher 
among groups whose values differ most from the general societal values (Boehnke, Hadjar and 
Baier 2007). Groups who differ more from the general societal values devote more attention to 
transferring values to their offspring. This effect is not exclusive to religiosity, however: Schwartz 
(1992) found that parents put in more effort to transfer values which are less common in a given 
society. Therefore, we hypothesize that the influence of  ethnic religiosity will be higher for individuals 
who adhere to a minority denomination in their destination country (H5).
Data and variables
We use data from four different waves (2-5; 2004-2010) of  the European Social Survey (ESS). 
The ESS is a two-yearly cross-sectional survey which started in 2002 and is still ongoing. At the 
moment of  writing, we have information on over 30 countries and over 230,000 individuals. 
The central organizing team of  the European Social Survey develops the questionnaire, which 
is subsequently translated to the official languages of  the participating countries. Data is then 
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gathered during face-to-face interviews among the resident population aged 15 years or older. 
Although response rates of  at least 70% are pursued, there is some variation in response rates by 
countries and waves: from 43.6% in France in 2004 to 81.4% in Bulgaria in 2010. The complete 
dataset of  waves two to five contains 194,894 cases. For the analyses, we only select second 
generation migrants, meaning respondents born in the country where they are surveyed with at 
least one parent being born abroad. Moreover, we can only calculate first generation religiosity, 
our main variable of  interest, for second generation migrants who come from origin countries 
with sufficient first generation migrants in the data to calculate mean levels of  religiosity for the 
community. Therefore, we decided to exclude migrants from countries with less than five first 
generation migrants in the ESS data. After the selection of  migrants and the listwise deletion of  
missing cases on the variables in the analyses, we retain 7,887 second generation migrants.
Dependent variables
We examine two dimensions of  religion: (1) subjective religiosity and (2) frequency of  
praying. Although religious service attendance has been widely used in previous research, the 
measurement of  the service attendance indicator in the ESS might not be a valid indicator of  
religiosity. According to Meuleman and Billiet (2011), the measurement of  religious service 
attendance is inequivalent due to the fact that the indicator does not function for Muslim 
women, for whom service attendance is less common. Given that we focus on ethnic minorities 
in Europe, a substantial part of  which are Muslim, we decided not to include this dependent 
variable in the analyses.
Subjective religiosity is a metric variable, calculated using the 11-point scale answers to the 
question “Regardless of  whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you 
say you are?”. The scale goes from ‘Not at all religious’ (0) to ‘Very religious’ (10).
Praying is a metric variable based on the question “Apart from when you are at religious 
services, how often, if  at all, do you pray?”. Answers varied in a 7-point scale ranging from 
‘Every day’ (1) to ‘Never’ (7). This variable has been reverse-coded, meaning that a higher score 
indicates a higher frequency of  praying. In this way, both dependent variables are coded in the 
same direction.
Independent variables
Working mother is a dichotomous variable indicating whether respondents’ mother had a job at 
the age of  14. Respondents who indicated that their mother had no job at the age of  14 were 
given code 0 and all other answers were recoded into code 1. In our sample, 37.1% of  second 
generation migrants grew up in a family with a job-less mother when they were 14 years old.
Educational level mother is introduced as a metric variable in the models. The variable measures 
the highest level of  education of  respondents’ mothers. The educational level is recorded in a 
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variable with five categories, based on the International Standard Classification of  Education 
(ISCED) by UNESCO: less than lower secondary education, lower secondary education 
completed, upper secondary education completed, post-secondary non-tertiary education 
completed and tertiary education completed. On average, second generation migrants’ mothers 
have not completed secondary education.
Educational level father is also introduced as a metric variable in the models and based on the 
same categorical recording. On average, fathers are somewhat higher educated than the mothers 
in our sample, although they too have not completed secondary education.
Discrimination is a dichotomous variable indicating whether respondents feel they belong to 
a group which is being discriminated in the country where they live based on color, nationality, 
religion, language or ethnicity. If  respondents indicated that they perceived group discrimination, 
they were given a list of  group memberships which could lead to discrimination and asked 
whether they could indicate on which grounds they perceive group discrimination. If  second 
generation migrants indicated discrimination based on color, nationality, religion, language or 
ethnicity, they received a score of  1. If  they did not perceive discrimination or only discrimination 
based on other grounds than the ones mentioned, they received a score of  0. 6.3% of  second 
generation migrants feel discriminated based on color, nationality, religion, language or ethnicity.
Years of  full-time education is a metric variable indicating the amount of  years respondents 
have spent on full-time education. Outliers which were more than three standard deviations 
removed from the average have been removed from the analyses. On average, our respondents 
have studied for 12.6 years in full-time education.
Media use is a metric variable which measures the total time spent on watching TV, listening to 
the radio or reading newspapers on an average weekday, in hours. On average, second generation 
migrants use these media for 4.2 hours a day.
Religious minority is a categorical variable with four categories. The variable indicates 
whether respondents adhere to a minority religious denomination in their destination country. 
Minority religions are defined by calculating the most common religious denomination for 
each destination country in the dataset. If  none of  the religious denominations has at least 40% 
adherents, that country is considered religiously diverse. This variable is constructed by taking 
into account the self-categorization of  individuals who were asked whether they belong to a 
certain denomination. This variable had 8 categories: ‘Roman Catholic’, ‘Protestant’, ‘Eastern 
Orthodox’, ‘Other Christian’, ‘Jew’, ‘Muslim’, ‘Eastern Religion’ and ‘Other non-Christian’. 
Subsequently, we categorized religious minorities as those individuals who adhere to another 
denomination than the majority in the destination country.  Given that most European countries 
have a Christian tradition and have experienced widespread trends of  religious disaffiliation, we 
make a distinction between non-affiliated, Christian and other minorities. The four resulting 
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categories are: ‘majority’, ‘non-affiliated minority’, ‘Christian minority’ and ‘other minorities’. 
The latter category consists mainly of  Muslim minorities.
At the contextual level, we introduce the influence of  levels of  religiosity of  first generation 
migrants of  the same origin country and of  natives in the destination country. For each dependent 
variable, we calculated corresponding contextual variables, i.e. for instance subjective religiosity 
of  natives for the analysis of  subjective religiosity and the frequency of  praying of  natives for the 
analyses of  frequency of  praying among second generation migrants.
Ethnic community subjective religiosity is the mean level of  subjective religiosity among all first 
generation migrants in the last four waves of  the ESS for each origin country separately. To be 
able to calculate reliable levels of  religiosity among the first generation, we only retained origin 
countries for which at least five respondents were surveyed.
Ethnic community frequency of  praying is the mean frequency of  praying of  first generation co-
ethnics, for each origin country separately.
Native subjective religiosity is the mean level of  subjective religiosity among all natives for each 
destination country in the last four waves of  the ESS. Religiosity is clearly lower among natives, 
with an average of  6.1, than among co-ethnics, with an average of  4.5.
Native praying is the mean frequency of  praying among natives, for each origin country 
separately. Natives pray less frequently, with an average of  3.2, compared to the ethnic community, 
who have an average of  3.7.
Control variables
We control for sex, age and ESS wave. Female is a dichotomous variable indicating whether 
respondents are male (0), i.e. the reference category, or female (1). Age is a metric variable 
indicating the age in full years of  respondents at the time of  the survey. Wave is a metric variable 
indicating the wave of  the European Social Survey. As the ESS is a two-yearly survey, each 
increase of  wave corresponds with two years, starting from 2004 (i.e. the second wave) onwards. 
The effect of  wave could hence indicate possible trends in religiosity among second generation 
migrants during the period under study.
Method
Given that our second generation migrants are nested in the non-hierarchical levels of  origin 
and destination countries, we apply cross-classified random intercept multilevel models 
(Rasbash and Goldstein 1994). We discern three different levels: (1) 7,887 individuals come from 
(2) 106 different origin countries and live in (3) 26 different destination countries. Given the 
cross-classified structure of  the data, we apply Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation 
procedures provided by the statistical software package MLwiN (version 2.28) (Browne 2011). 
Analyses were performed in R, using the R2MLwiN package (Zhang et al. 2013). This algorithm 
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has also proved to provide more robust and conservative statistical tests (Stegmueller 2013). We 
estimate linear models for the effects on subjective religiosity and frequency of  praying.
Table 6. 1: Descriptive statistics
Range Ave. (Std.)
Individual
Dependent
Subjective Religiosity 0-10 4.596 (3.025)
Praying 1-7 3.2 (2.386)
Control
Gender
Male 0/1 3632 (46.1%)
Female 0/1 4255 (53.9%)
Age 14-97 43.14 (17.647)
Wave 0-3 1.458 (1.137)
Independent
Working mother
No 0/1 2943 (37.3%)
Yes 0/1 4944 (62.7%)
Educational level mother 1-5 2.464 (1.325)
Educational level father 1-5 2.69 (1.416)
Discrimination
No 0/1 7391 (93.7%)
Yes 0/1 496 ( 6.3%)
Years of  full-time educa-
tion
0-24 12.64 (3.636)
Media use 0-10.5 4.206 (1.857)
Religious minority
Majority 0/1 4011 (50.9%)
Non-affiliated minority 0/1 1552 (19.7%)
Christian minority 0/1 1907 (24.2%)
Other minority 0/1 417 (5.3%)
Contextual
Ethnic community
Subjective religiosity 4.182-8.459 6.110 (0.788)
Praying 2.141-6.786 3.689 (0.699)
Natives
Subjective religiosity 2.498-6.919 4.467 (1.058)
Praying 1.823-5.307 3.169 (1.034)
For each dependent variable we estimate four different models. Firstly, we estimate a null-
model, containing only the intercept. In this way, we can decompose the variance between the 
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three respective levels. Secondly, in model 1, we include the control variables and the measure 
of  religious fervor of  the ethnic community at the origin level. Thirdly, in model 2, we add the 
main effects of  all remaining independent variables to the model. In this way, we can calculate 
to what extent aspects of  family socialization, social integration, discrimination, influence from 
social institutions in the destination country and the religious fervor among natives explain the 
influence of  religious fervor in the community on second generation migrants. Fourthly, in the 
final full model, we include interaction effects between the effect of  the religious fervor at the 
origin level and all independent variables. In this final model, we can test to what extent the 
influence of  the religiosity of  the first-generation co-ethnics is mediated by family socialization, 
discrimination, contact with social institutions in the destination country and the religious 
fervor among natives. Table 6.1 displays descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent 
variables. All metric variables have been centered in the analyses in order to make the main 
effects of  the interactions meaningful.
Results
The results of  the cross-classified multilevel analyses for subjective religiosity and frequency of  
praying are depicted in respectively table 6.2 and table 6.3. Looking at the variance decomposition 
in the respective null-models allows us to determine to what extent religiosity is affected by 
either individual or contextual characteristics. The higher the proportion of  variance at the 
higher levels, the higher the influence of  contextual characteristics. For the null-models of  both 
subjective religiosity and frequency of  praying, we notice that there is considerable variance at 
the higher levels: 11.8% of  the variance in subjective religiosity and 18.9% in frequency of  praying 
is due to the origin and destination country. In other words, second generation migrants coming 
from the same origin country and living in the same country are 18.9% correlated in terms of  
how frequently they pray. These numbers are comparable to the variance decomposition of  
first generation migrants (Van Tubergen 2006) and underline the necessity to apply multilevel 
models, which take these contextual influences into account. In our first model, we notice a 
strong positive effect of  the religiosity of  first generation co-ethnics on the religiosity of  second 
generation migrants: the subjective religiosity for two migrants from different origins, which have 
a difference of  1 in their mean score of  subjective religiosity, is 0.367 higher. This strong influence 
of  co-ethnics is attenuated when adding the main effects: the effects of  the religiosity of  co-
ethnics declines with 83.7% for subjective religiosity and 63.5% for frequency of  praying between 
model 1 and model 2, after adding the main independent effects. The effect of  ethnic community 
religiosity on second generation migrants’ subjective religiosity is no longer significant after 
adding the main independent effects. Apparently, family structures, discrimination, contact with 
social institutions and the religiosity of  the context explain a substantial portion of  the influence 
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of  the religiosity of  co-ethnics. These results indicate that the impact of  this variable might differ 
according to the aforementioned characteristics and urge us to further explore the relationship 
between the religiosity of  second generation migrants and the religiosity of  co-ethnics. To test 
our hypotheses, we look at the main effects and at the interaction effects of  the full models of  
subjective religiosity and praying.
Table 6. 2: Cross-classified multilevel models of subjective religiosity
Reduced models Full model
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Main effects Interactionsa
Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.)
Intercept 4.696*** (0.193) 3.543*** (0.209) 0.794 (0.658) -1.514 (1.979)
Female 0.891*** (0.064) 0.742*** (0.058) 0.739*** (0.058)
Age 0.016*** (0.002) 0.011*** (0.002) 0.011*** (0.002)
Wave -0.047* (0.030) -0.126*** (0.027) -0.125*** (0.027)
Individual
Working mother -0.122 + (0.065) 0.358 (0.485) -0.076 (0.078)
Educational level mother -0.083** (0.030) 0.337 (0.218) -0.069* (0.036)
Educational level father 0.008 (0.028) -0.257 (0.204) 0.044 (0.033)
Discrimination 0.542*** (0.124) 0.774 (0.941) -0.038 (0.143)
Years of  education -0.037*** (0.009) 0.134* (0.065) -0.028** (0.010)
Media Use -0.085*** (0.016) -0.040 (0.125) -0.007 (0.020)
Religious minority
Majority Ref. Ref. Ref.
Non-Affiliated minority -1.934*** (0.092) -1.749** (0.668) -0.033 (0.111)
Christian minority 1.939*** (0.079) 2.313*** (0.633) -0.062 (0.104)
Other minority 2.746*** (0.156) -0.826 (1.244) 0.503** (0.179)
Contextual
Ethnic community subj. rel. 0.367*** (0.091) 0.060 (0.058) 0.427 (0.314)
Native subj. rel. 0.828*** (0.107) 0.686* (0.345) 0.023 (0.054)
Variance
Destination 0.777 (0.261) 0.688 (0.231) 0.287 (0.108) 0.313 (0.117)
Origin 0.316 (0.093) 0.259 (0.088) 0.039 (0.031) 0.029 (0.025)
Individual 8.203 (0.133) 7.938 (0.128) 6.347 (0.103) 6.313 (0.102)
DIC 39047.012 38787.219 37010.651 36977.652
a With Subjective religiosity at the origin-level
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; two-sided; Nindividual = 8,123; Norigin = 102; Ndestination = 26.
Our first hypothesis predicted higher levels of  religiosity and a higher influence of  co-ethnic 
religiosity on second generation migrants if  socialization takes place in more traditional families. 
Looking at model two, we notice that second generation migrants who grew up in a family with 
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an economically inactive and lower-educated mother tend to feel more religious and pray more 
frequently. Moreover, from the interaction terms in the full model, we notice that the influence 
of  levels of  subjective religiosity among co-ethnics are higher for second generation migrants 
whose mothers are lower educated. Second generation migrants who grew up in a family with a 
mother who had the highest educational level are less influenced by the religiosity in the ethnic 
community than migrants with a lower educated mother. For each educational level higher, 
the impact of  the ethnic community religiosity declines with 0.069 (p<0.05). When it concerns 
frequency of  praying, we see a higher influence for second generation migrants with economically 
inactive mothers. Compared to stay-at-home mothers, respondents with employed mothers 
are less influenced by the ethnic community. The influence of  the ethnic community is 0.172 
(p<0.05) lower for respondents with employed mothers. Regarding the effect of  the educational 
level of  the father, we notice no significant main effect, nor an effect of  the interaction with the 
community religiosity-variable. The results for the traditional family structure are in line with 
the findings among natives in the US, but contradict those for the resources of  parents (Myers 
1996) and previous studies which stressed the importance of  fathers’ resources for transferring 
human values among migrant families (Schönpflug 2001). Apparently, fathers’ resources are less 
crucial for successfully transferring the religiosity of  co-ethnics than for transferring human 
values within the family. Therefore, we can conclude that we have partial support for our first 
hypothesis: although second generation migrants growing up in a traditional family tend to be 
more religious and tend to be more influenced by religious fervor among co-ethnics, fathers’ 
resources do not influence religiosity.
The second hypothesis predicted that migrants who feel discriminated would experience the 
influence of  community religiosity more strongly. We find, however, only limited support for 
this hypothesis among our results. Although migrants who feel discriminated feel more religious 
and pray more frequently, they do not experience the influence of  the community more than 
non-discriminated migrants. Therefore, we can conclude that this hypothesis is not supported by 
our results: although previous research has shown an increased ethnic identification (Verkuyten 
and Yildiz 2007, 2010), this apparently does not lead to a stronger influence of  the religiosity of  
co-ethnics among second generation migrants.
With our third hypothesis, we predicted a lower religiosity and a lower influence of  
community religiosity for second generation migrants who come more into contact with social 
institutions of  the destination country. We test the effects of  years spent in schools and the use 
of  public media. The results confirm the effects of  spending time in full-time education for 
subjective religiosity only: second generation migrants who spent more time in education are 
less religious and are less strongly influenced by the religiosity of  co-ethnics when it comes to 
subjective religiosity. For each additional year of  full-time education, the influence of  ethnic 
community religiosity declines with 0.028 (p<0.01). For subjective religiosity, migrants’ own 
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educational level therefore adds to the effect of  their mothers’ educational level. The effect 
of  respondents’ own educational level is higher than that of  their mother, given the scale of  
both variables. The maximum difference in terms of  the ethnic community effect is -0.276 for 
mothers’ educational level and -0.672 for respondents’ educational level. There is, however, no 
significant interaction effect on the frequency of  praying. Media use is associated with a lower 
religiosity among second generation migrants, although it does not lead to a lower influence of  
community religiosity. Spending more time in full-time education might have an emancipatory 
effect on second generation migrants, making the impact of  the religiosity of  co-ethnics less 
stringent, comparable to the effect of  aging for the influence of  parental religiosity (Francis and 
Brown 1991).
The fourth hypothesis predicted a lower influence of  community religiosity in destination 
countries where natives are more religious themselves. Subjective religiosity and the frequency 
of  praying are positively associated with levels of  religiosity in the destination countries: second 
generation migrants conform to the religiosity in the host society. Looking at the interaction 
effects in the full model, we notice that the influence of  community religiosity is not associated 
with living in a destination country with a higher religiosity among natives.  Therefore, we can 
conclude that we have found no support for our fourth hypothesis.
With our fifth and final hypothesis, we predicted that the influence of  ethnic community 
religiosity will be higher for second generation migrants who are religious minorities in their 
destination country (H5). From the second model we notice that affiliated minorities tend to be 
more religious than migrants who adhere to the dominant religion in their destination country. 
As expected, non-affiliated minorities are less religious than adherents of  the majority religion. 
Looking at the interaction effect between religious minority and the ethnic community religiosity, 
we see that other minorities, i.e. non-Christian adhering minorities tend to be more influenced 
by the ethnic community religiosity than migrants who adhere to the religious majority. Non-
adhering and Christian minorities are not more influenced than migrants adhering to the 
majority denomination in the destination country. Effect sizes for both dependent variables are 
comparable, although there is a difference in scale between subjective religiosity (11-points) and 
frequency of  praying (7 points). This means that the transfer of  frequency of  praying among 
non-Christian minority adherents is more successful than that of  subjective religiosity. These 
results indicate support for previous research which found that transfer of  values is stressed 
more in communities who have values which differ more from those of  general societal values 
(Boehnke, Hadjar and Baier 2007). Therefore, we can conclude that we found support for this 
hypothesis.
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Table 6. 3: Cross-classified multilevel models of praying
Reduced models Full model
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Main effects Interactionsa
Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.)
Intercept 3.383*** (0.202) 2.082*** (0.204) -0.144 (0.412) -1.843* (0.904)
Female 0.807*** (0.049) 0.703*** (0.044) 0.701*** (0.045)
Age 0.020*** (0.001) 0.016*** (0.002) 0.017*** (0.002)
Wave -0.025* (0.022) -0.077*** (0.021) -0.077*** (0.021)
Individual
Working mother -0.116* (0.050) 0.536* (0.261) -0.172* (0.068)
Educational level mother -0.049* (0.023) 0.028 (0.112) -0.021 (0.030)
Educational level father -0.001 (0.021) -0.025 (0.105) 0.008 (0.028)
Discrimination 0.432*** (0.096) 0.665 (0.444) -0.062 (0.108)
Years of  education -0.026*** (0.007) 0.022 (0.034) -0.013 (0.009)
Media Use -0.068*** (0.012) -0.007 (0.065) -0.017 (0.017)
Religious minority
Majority Ref. Ref. Ref.
Non-Affiliated minority -1.404*** (0.071) -1.863*** (0.366) 0.126 (0.101)
Christian minority 1.322*** (0.061) 1.271*** (0.326) 0.014 (0.088)
Other minority 1.641*** (0.118) -0.481 (0.623) 0.473*** (0.141)
Contextual
Ethnic community praying 0.307*** (0.071) 0.112* (0.046) 0.554* (0.226)
Native praying 0.876*** (0.097) 1.045*** (0.212) -0.044 (0.052)
Variance
Destination 0.965 (0.309) 0.827 (0.265) 0.235 (0.084) 0.231 (0.082)
Origin 0.147 (0.052) 0.130 (0.051) 0.014 (0.016) 0.013 (0.012)
Individual 4.779 (0.078) 4.509 (0.073) 3.755 (0.061) 3.748 (0.061)
DIC 34784.105 34325.469 32866.804 32858.526
a With Praying at the origin-level
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; two-sided; Nindividual = 8,123; Norigin = 102; Ndestination = 26.
Looking at the explained variance of  the two dependent variables, we notice that our models 
are more successful in explaining differences in praying between second generation migrants 
than differences in subjective religiosity. The total explained variance  in the full model is 32.2% 
for frequency of  praying, while 28.4% for subjective religiosity. This indicates that the transfer of  
religiosity within the ethnic community, and the context of  interactions in which it takes place, 
determine second generation migrants’ frequency of  praying for almost a quarter, while it is less 
determinant for their subjective religiosity. Moreover, the transfer of  frequency of  praying is less 
dependent upon interactions in general: we only found that frequency of  praying is transferred 
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more successfully among traditional family structures and non-Christian minority groups. 
This could again indicate that the transfer of  religiosity within the ethnic community is more 
successful for religious behavior than for religious beliefs. At the same time, we can conclude that 
our models are relatively successful in explaining levels of  religiosity among second generation 
migrants: more than a quarter of  subjective religiosity can be explained by the variables in our 
model, while almost one third of  the variance in frequency of  praying is explained.
Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we analyzed religiosity among second generation migrants living in Europe, focusing 
on the influence of  ethnic community religiosity. We looked at how the influence of  the ethnic 
community differs according to interactions with various individuals and social institutions, by 
focusing on the family structure (vertical interaction), peer influence (horizontal interaction) 
and social institutions (oblique interaction). Moreover, we also assessed the influence of  the 
religious context. Data from four waves of  the European Social Survey were analyzed, applying 
cross-classified multilevel analyses on 7,887 second generation migrants from 106 different origin 
countries and living in 26 destination countries. The results lead to two interesting conclusions.
First, ethnic communities in European countries are quite successful in transferring religiosity 
to the second generation. Being part of  ethnic communities in which the religious fervor is high, is 
associated with a higher religiosity among the second generation. At the same time, the strength 
of  the relationship is influenced by the socialization context, contacts with social institutions and 
the religious context in which second generation migrants are raised. Religiosity transferring is 
more successful when second generation migrants are raised in traditional families and when 
they have spent less time in educational systems of  the destination country. At the same time, in 
accordance with what Kelley and De Graaf  (1997) found for the influence of  parental religiosity, 
we notice that the influence of  the religiosity of  co-ethnics is tightened when the transfer takes 
place in a religious context which diverges from that of  the ethnic community. This means that 
the influence is higher in contexts where there is a divergence between migrants’ denomination 
and the majority denomination in the destination country. The transfer is hence most successful 
among non-Christian but adhering second generation migrants who are religious minorities 
in their destination country. These results are in line with previous research, which found that 
intergenerational transmission within families is dependent on interactions with different social 
agents (Myers 1996) and the quality of  these interactions (Schönpflug 2001). The transfer of  
religiosity to the second generation after migration is clearly not a linear process, but a complex 
interactional negotiation between possibly conflicting influences within the family on the one 
hand and social institutions and the religious context of  destination countries on the other hand.
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Second, the results indicate interesting disparities in the transfer of  subjective religiosity on 
the one hand and the frequency of  praying on the other. Although both aspects of  religiosity 
are successfully transferred to second generation migrants, the transfer of  the latter appears to 
be more successful. Previous research already found high intergenerational stability in service 
attendance among Muslim migrants (van de Pol and Van Tubergen 2013; Maliepaard and Lubbers 
2013), and our results indicate that the transfer of  religious behavior after migration is more 
successful than less salient aspects of  religiosity, like subjective religiosity. This could indicate a 
tendency towards active religious involvement and behavior while religious beliefs themselves 
are less internalized. In the long term this could mean that subsequent migrant generations 
hold on to certain behaviors and traditions, while the influence of  religious beliefs is waning. 
This stands in sharp contrast with European trends of  secularization as described by Dobbelaere 
(2002): a privatization of  religiosity in that the influence of  public forms of  religiosity decreases 
in favor of  more personal and private forms of  religious beliefs. Future research would do well 
to explore this possible trend among second generation migrants in Europe further.
 As with any research, this paper is subject to some limitations as well. First of  all, the measures 
of  the religiosity in the ethnic community have been aggregated at a relatively high level, meaning 
that they might not directly measure the religiosity in the local ethnic community. However, 
additional analyses aggregating first generation migrant religiosity at a lower lever produce 
similar results and a comparable model fit.  Other sensitivity analyses showed, on the other hand, 
that limiting the dataset to communities for which more than 25 first generation observations 
were at hand did not influence the results either. Therefore, we conclude that, given the data 
at hand, the indicator used in the analysis is probably the best possible approximation of  the 
ethnic community religiosity. Second, given the divergence between subjective religiosity and 
the frequency of  praying, analyzing other measures of  religiosity could strengthen the finding 
of  a possible privatization of  religiosity. However, given that the measure of  service attendance 
in the ESS is not reliable and no other measures are included, adding more dependent variables 
was not an option. Further research would do well, however, by analyzing other dependent 
variables as well. Third, the different interactions, horizontal, vertical and oblique, have been 
studied by using proxies due to data limitations. Although we do believe that we have selected 
variables which approximate the different interactions relatively close and in line with previous 
research (Myers 1996), further research could improve upon these studies by focusing more 
strongly on variables such as perceived parent-child relationships, social integration into the 
ethnic community and the host society and direct interactions with specific social institutions of  
the host society. 
With this paper, we uncovered some aspects of  how religiosity is perpetuated through 
time by transferring it within immigrant communities to younger generations. Interestingly, 
this process is quite successful, in particular with regards to religious behavior such as praying. 
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This means that, over the next generations, religious behavior of  ethnic minorities in Europe 
might be prolonged, in particular among religious minority adherents, while there may be 
some indications for a waning influence of  religious beliefs themselves. Further research could 
improve upon this study by examining how this trend contrasts with a European trend towards 
a privatization and more meaning-based experience of  religion.
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Ethnic school segregation
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Public concerns over the possible effects of school segregation on immigrant 
and ethnic majority religiosity have been on the rise over the last few years. In 
this paper we focus on (1) the association between ethnic school composition 
and religious salience, (2) intergenerational differences in religiosity and (3) the 
role of ethnic school composition for intergenerational differences in religiosity. 
We perform analyses on religious salience among 3,612 16-years old pupils in 
Belgian secondary schools. Ethnic minorities in schools with a higher share of 
ethnic minorities tend to be more religious. Ethnic school composition also mod-
erates the relationship between migrant generation and religiosity: second gen-
eration migrants tend to be more religious in ethnic minority dominated schools. 
For ethnic Belgians the association is moderated by their religious affiliation: 
Catholics tend to be more religious while non-affiliated ethnic Belgians are less 
religious in schools with a higher share of ethnic minority pupils.
Introduction
Over the last few years we have witnessed increasing concerns in Europe about the religiosity of  immigrants, focusing predominantly on Muslim immigrants. More recently, worries 
about the religious fervor of  adolescents and the role of  school segregation have been raised. 
After some highly debated cases in the public media of  peer pressure by devoted fellow students, 
a prohibition on wearing a headscarf  was installed in Flemish public schools (northern part of  
Belgium). A similar ban has been in effect in France since 2004. In the UK, the school inspection 
bureau has launched inquiries into some Muslim-majority school governing bodies and found 
that at least some of  them try to promote Islam in schools and remove un-Islamic topics and 
activities from the school. Ethnic school segregation in Europe is clearly causing increasing 
concerns with regards to both ethnic minority pupils as the whole school population in general. 
Religiosity is now added to the list of  possible correlates of  ethnic school segregation, along with 
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worries about educational achievement and the social integration of  ethnic minority students 
(Agirdag, Van Houtte and Van Avermaet 2011).
This growing public attention has not been paralleled in academic research, however. Only 
a handful of  studies have examined the relationship between school context and adolescent 
religiosity (Regnerus, Smith and Smith 2004; Barrett et al. 2007; De Hoon and Van Tubergen 
2014). In general, these studies found that pupils’ religiosity is positively associated with the 
average religiosity of  peers in the school they attend. The influence of  schools is not surprising: 
adolescents spend most of  their waking hours in schools, making schools the main stage for 
socialization and contact with peers. Schools are therefore one of  the most important social 
institutions for shaping adolescents’ values and beliefs. Given that adolescence can be a pivotal 
life phase in forming individuals’ religiosity and spirituality (King and Boyatzis 2004; Norris and 
Inglehart 2004), the influence of  schools on religiosity cannot be overlooked.
One of  the remaining questions concerning the role of  schools on adolescents’ religiosity is 
precisely the influence of  school segregation. Since large-scale immigration to Europe took off  
after the second World War, most Western European countries have absorbed substantial ethnic 
minorities, often from majority Muslim countries in North Africa or the Middle East (Voas 
and Fleischmann 2012). The incorporation of  these immigrants in the school system has been 
skewed, however, leading to large-scale ethnic school segregation (Agirdag, Van Houtte and Van 
Avermaet 2011). Most Western European countries have therefore schools on a continuum from 
no ethnic minority students to only ethnic minority students. Given that ethnic minority pupils 
in general, and Muslims in particular, are more religious than the ethnic majority in Western 
Europe (De Hoon and Van Tubergen 2014), the concentration of  ethnic minorities might affect 
the religiosity of  pupils in these schools. Ethnic school segregation can affect pupils’ attitudes 
and behavior due to more salient religious prescriptions. In the Netherlands and Norway, for 
instance, pupils in schools with more Muslims consumed less alcohol, regardless of  their own 
ethnic background (Amundsen, Rossow and Skurtveit 2005; Van Tubergen and Poortman 2009). 
Surprisingly, previous research has not examined how ethnic school segregation may affect 
religiosity in itself.
This ethnic school composition is one of  the social contexts in which individuals interact. 
Differences in ethnic minority religion according to the context are often explained in terms 
of  social integration effects (Durkheim 1986 [1897]): the more socially integrated individuals 
are in a certain social group, the more they conform to the values, norms and beliefs of  that 
social group. Previous research has for instance shown that through contact with the ethnic 
majority, ethnic minorities conform to the general level of  religiosity in the host society and the 
more they are socially integrated into the host society, the higher their level of  conforming (Van 
Tubergen 2006). This social integration is also the explanation of  intergenerational differences 
in religiosity: second generation ethnic minorities conform more to host society religiosity than 
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their first generation counterparts (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Although 
there has been an increase in academic attention towards intergenerational differences in ethnic 
minority religiosity, these differences have not been tested among adolescents. Given the pivotal 
role of  adolescence in the development of  religiosity, the question remains whether these 
intergenerational differences already occur during adolescence or whether they develop later. 
Moreover, ethnic school composition plays an important role in this respect. The opportunities 
for intergenerational conforming might depend upon the ethnic composition of  the school. In 
ethnic minority-dominated schools, intergenerational differences in religiosity might be reduced 
due to a social integration into ethnic minority groups, rather than in ethnic majority social 
groups. For a better understanding of  intergenerational differences in religiosity, the literature 
would benefit from an assessment of  this topic among adolescents and the impact of  the ethnic 
school composition upon them.
With this study, we examine the associations between (1) ethnic school segregation and 
adolescent religious salience, (2) intergenerational differences in ethnic minority religious 
salience and (3) the role of  ethnic school composition for intergenerational differences in ethnic 
minority religious salience. We derive hypotheses from Durkheim’s social integration theory 
(1986 [1897]), which states that social integration into certain groups leads to sharing the values 
and beliefs of  that group and from Blau’s (1977) structural opportunity theory, which states 
that group sizes and distributions shape the opportunities for inter-group contact. This leads 
to the central propositions of  this paper. First, given the higher religiosity of  ethnic minorities 
in Western European countries, pupils in schools with a higher proportion of  ethnic minority 
peers will be more religious than pupils in schools with a lower proportion. Second, religiosity 
will be lower among second and third generation migrants than among their first generation 
counterparts. Third, these intergenerational differences will be smaller for adolescents in schools 
with a higher proportion of  ethnic minority peers. To test these hypotheses, we apply cross-
classified multilevel models on 3,612 16-years old adolescents from 48 different ethnic origins in 
55 Flemish (northern part of  Belgium) secondary schools.
Theory and hypotheses
Ethnic school segregation
In his seminal work Le Suicide, Durkheim (1986 [1897]) introduced social integration theory. 
The more frequent social contact is between individual members of  a group, the more socially 
integrated that group is. Due to this contact, individuals become immersed in the values and 
ideas of  the social group. These values guide each individuals’ behavior and helps them to play 
their social role in their respective groups. This means that the integration of  individuals within 
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social groups determines their values, ideas and beliefs. Differences in values, ideas and beliefs 
between individuals is in other words caused by integration into different social groups in society. 
This theory has been applied successfully to religious groups: people conform to the religiosity 
of  the social group in which they are integrated (Need and De Graaf  1996). Among immigrants, 
previous studies have shown that immigrants also conform to levels of  religiosity in the host 
society and that more integrated migrants conform even more to ethnic majority religiosity 
(Van Tubergen 2006;  Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). The other way round, 
ethnic minorities with less ethnic majority friendships resemble the religious behavior of  the 
own ethnic group more (Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013). Given the importance of  schools in 
adolescents’ lives, this means that pupils might be expected to conform to levels of  religiosity 
in the school they attend. Previous research in the US has indeed found that pupils who attend 
schools with more religious peers tend to become more religious over time (Regnerus, Smith 
and Smith 2004).
Pupils’ opportunities for social integration within schools depend on the social composition of  
their school, however. The sociological laws of  contact within and across groups was stipulated 
by Blau’s (1977) structural opportunities theory. According to this theory, heterogeneity in a 
society determines the opportunities for contact across social groups. Based on the assumption 
that people prefer in-group associations over out-group associations in the first place and prefer 
associating with out-group members over not associating at all, Blau (1974) deducts that group 
size governs the probability of  intergroup relations. Members of  small groups have more 
opportunities to associate with members of  other groups than members of  larger groups. In 
other words, minority group members have more contact with majority group members than 
the other way round. Indeed, previous research found that inter-ethnic friendships are more 
common in schools with higher ethnic heterogeneity ( Johnson, Crosnoe and Elder 2001; Van 
Houtte and Stevens 2009). Hence, school composition might determine the opportunities for 
social integration: smaller groups within schools will have a higher propensity to integrate into 
larger school-groups than the other way round.
Given the repeated findings that religiosity among ethnic minorities is higher than among the 
ethnic majority in Western Europe (Voas and Fleischmann 2012; De Hoon and Van Tubergen 
2014), the proportion of  ethnic minorities in schools might determine the opportunities for 
social integration into either a more religious ethnic minority group or a lesser religious ethnic 
Belgian group. Therefore, we hypothesize that: the higher the proportion of  ethnic minorities in a 
school, the higher the religious salience among pupils (H1). 
Intergenerational differences
Social integration theory has also been successfully applied to the intergenerational integration 
of  immigrants in their respective host society. The primary socialization of  second generation 
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migrants in the host society plays a vital role for their social integration into that society. Apart 
from socio-economic integration (Portes and Zhou 1993), the socio-cultural integration of  second 
generation migrants is also more pronounced than that of  their first generation counterparts. 
Second generation migrants tend to have more ethnic majority friends (Martinovic 2013), political 
attitudes more similar to those of  the ethnic majority (Maxwell 2010) and identify more often 
with the host society (Fokkema et al. 2012) than first generation migrants. These results indicate 
a higher conformism to the ethnic majority through a better social integration for second than 
for first generation migrants. This effect has also been shown for religiosity. Although migrants in 
general conform to the general religiosity of  the host society (Van Tubergen 2006), conforming 
is more pronounced among second generation migrants (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and 
Verhaeghe 2013). As yet, no study has assessed whether these intergenerational differences 
manifest themselves during adolescence already. Moreover, most research has only focused on 
differences between first and second generation migrants. It is unclear how religion evolves in 
later migrant generations. Based on previous research on the differences among adults between 
first and second generation migrants we hypothesize that: the religious salience among second and 
third generation migrant adolescents will be more similar to that of  ethnic Belgians than that of  first 
generation migrants (H2). 
Intergenerational differences and ethnic school segregation
One of  the reasons for studying intergenerational differences in religiosity among adolescents 
is the possible association with the ethnic school segregation in many Western European 
countries. Although social integration is expected to be associated with lower religiosity among 
later generation ethnic minority pupils, schools with a higher percentage of  ethnic minorities 
might function as a buffer against this intergenerational waning of  religiosity. The transmission 
of  cultural traits from one generation to the next is, according to social psychologists, influenced 
by three different sources: vertical interactions, i.e. through parents, horizontal interactions, i.e. 
through peers, and oblique interactions, i.e. through other individuals and social institutions 
(Berry and Georgas 2008). Although parental transmission of  religiosity is generally effective 
(Myers 1996), it is dependent upon the religious context in which it takes place (Kelley and De 
Graaf  1997). Moreover, interactions with ethnic majority peers and social institutions of  the 
destination country might weaken the impact of  parental transmission (Van der Bracht and Van 
de Putte 2015). The influence of  schools in the host society has already been demonstrated: 
previous studies have repeatedly shown that higher education is associated with lower levels 
of  religiosity among ethnic minorities (Van Tubergen 2006; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and 
Verhaeghe 2013). The share of  ethnic minorities in a school might determine the intergenerational 
transmission of  religiosity however: in schools with a higher share of  ethnic minorities, pupils 
are more isolated from host society influences and influenced more by the higher religiosity of  
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the ethnic community. Therefore, we hypothesize that: in schools with a higher proportion of  ethnic 
minority pupils, second and third generation migrants’ religious salience will differ more from ethnic 
Belgians than in schools with less ethnic minority pupils (H3).
Context
The migration history of  Belgium is comparable to that of  most Western European countries. 
After the Second World War, Western European governments regulated the influx of  labor 
migrants from first Southern Europe and subsequently Turkey and North Africa. Labor 
markets had high demands of  unskilled labor, which could not be filled domestically, resulting 
in migration flows of  lower educated labor migrants (Verhaeghe, Van der Bracht and Van de 
Putte 2012). Decades of  follow-up migration through family formation and family reunion has 
transformed traditionally ethnic homogeneous nations into a multiethnic society. 
However, while the migration history of  Belgium is comparable to that of  most Western 
European countries, the school segregation is not. School segregation is more pronounced in 
Belgium, which makes Flanders a very interesting case ( Jacobs et al. 2009). An important reason 
for this more pronounced school segregation is the educational policy of  free parental school 
selection. Since every parent can choose a school for their child and there are no regulations, 
parents can select or avoid a specific school because of  the student composition. Especially 
for secondary education, the proximity of  the school is not the first concern of  the parents 
(Creten et al. 2000). They are more concerned with the ‘reputation’ of  the school, the offered 
fields of  study and the religious affiliation of  the school. However, since middle class, mostly 
ethnic Belgian parents, have more resources to act upon their wish to send their children to a 
‘good white middle class school’, the free parental choice  resulted in socio-economic, ethnic 
and religious segregation. The latter is a consequence of  the origin of  most labor migrants, 
who came from more religious, often Muslim majority, countries. This religious diversification 
coincided with a period of  secularization in Western Europe (Norris and Inglehart 2004). The 
ethnic segregation has therefore also created schools on a continuum of  only Christian or non-
affiliated ethnic Flemish pupils on the one hand and schools with only ethnic minority pupils 
who affiliate predominantly with Islam.
Data and variables
We used data from RaDiSS (Racism and Discrimination in Secondary Schools) (D’hondt, Van 
Praag, Stevens and Van Houtte 2015), a survey conducted during the school year 2011-2012 among 
4,322 third-grade students (i.e. Grade 9 in U.S. school system terms) in 55 secondary schools in 
Flanders, the Dutch-speaking, northern part of  Belgium. Students were selected through multi-
stage sampling. In the first stage, 104 schools were sampled according to the urbanization of  the 
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school neighborhood and ethnic composition of  the students. Secondary schools are regularly 
asked to participate in academic research in Flanders and therefore often apply the principle of  
‘first come, first served’. A total of  55 secondary schools were willing to participate in the survey, 
resulting in a response rate at the school level of  53%. The non-response was not selective on the 
ethnic composition of  schools. The ethnic composition of  the participating schools ranges from 
4.2% to 100% ethnic minority students. All third-grade students present were asked to complete 
a written questionnaire, in presence of  a researcher and one or more teachers. Non-response 
at the level of  students was due to students’ absence at school, for instance due to illness. This 
results in relatively high response rates at the student level, with 92.5%, and a non-response 
which is only selective insofar as the absence of  students is selective, for instance due to students’ 
(chronic) ill health. After listwise deletion of  individuals with missing values for the variables in 
the analysis we retain 3,612 pupils. The loss in information is mainly due to a lack of  data on 
the socio-economic status of  the parents. Additional analyses without including socio-economic 
status of  the parents reveal similar results, however.
Dependent variables
As dependent variable, we used religious salience. Students were asked “How important is religion 
to you”. Answers were recorded on a 5-point Likert-scale, ranging from “Not at all important” to 
“Very important”. A higher score on this variable indicates a higher religious salience.
Independent variables
We distinguished between variables at the level of  students and at the level of  schools and 
between independent and control variables. We subsequently introduce the independent and 
control variables at the student and school level.
Migrant background is a categorical variable, indicating whether adolescents have a migrant 
background, and if  so, to which migrant generation they belong. This variable has four categories: 
‘ethnic Belgian’, ‘first generation’, ‘second generation’ and ‘third generation’. First generation 
migrants are adolescents who have been born outside of  Belgium. Second generation migrants 
are adolescents who were born in Belgium but have at least one parent with a foreign nationality. 
Third generation migrants are adolescents who are born in Belgium, whose parents have the 
Belgian nationality but who have at least one grandmother with a foreign nationality. Ethnic 
Belgians are adolescents who are born in Belgium and who have parents and grandmothers with 
the Belgian nationality. Ethnic Belgian adolescents form the reference category in our analyses. 
At the student level, we control for age, sex, denomination, socioeconomic status, track and ethnic 
minority friendships. Age is a metric variable in full years, based on the reported birth year of  
individuals in the questionnaire. Sex is a dichotomous variable with categories ‘Male’ (0) and 
‘Female’ (1). Denomination is a categorical variable comprising four categories: ‘Catholic’, ‘Muslim’, 
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‘other affiliation’ and ‘no affiliation’. This variable has been constructed from respondents’ 
answers to the question ‘What is your religion?’. Given the small number of  respondents who 
answered ‘Protestant’ or ‘Jewish’, we collapsed these categories with the answer category ‘other 
affiliation’. Answers to the category ‘liberal’ and ‘no affiliation’ were combined in the category 
‘no affiliation’. Given that the ‘Catholic’ category contains the most respondents, this category 
will serve as reference category in our analyses. Socioeconomic status (SES) was measured using 
the International Socio-Economic Index of  Occupational Status (ISEI) (Ganzeboom, De Graaf  
and Treiman, 1992). This results in a metric variable with a range from 16 to 90. For each parent, 
the ISEI was derived from the International Standard Classification of  Occupations (ISCO-88), 
and the highest score out of  both parents was assigned as socioeconomic status to the students. 
As already indicated, SES was the variable with a considerable proportion of  missing values. 
Imputing values for parents’ SES was considered unreliable, however, given that we dispose of  
very few information on parents’ characteristics. Imputing parental SES based on their children’s 
characteristics was considered unfeasible. Track is a categorical variable with three categories, 
distinguishing between an academic, technical and vocational track. Ethnic minority friendships 
is a metric variable, indicating how many friends with a non-Belgian ethnicity students had. 
Answers to the question “How many of  your friends are from non-Belgian descent” were 
recorded on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘nobody’ to ‘all’. 
At the school level, we introduce the independent variable percentage ethnic minorities, as well 
as the control variables school size and school sector.
Percentage ethnic minorities is a metric variable, indicating the percentage of  ethnic minorities in 
respondents’ own grade year. This variable has been constructed by aggregating the percentage 
of  respondents not in the category ‘ethnic Belgian’ of  the migrant background variable at the 
school level. This variable thus measures the percentage of  non-ethnic Belgians in the same 
grade as respondents.
School size is an indicator of  the total number of  students enrolled in a certain school. The 
data has been obtained from the Flemish Educational Department. School sector is a dichotomous 
variable, distinguishing between Catholic and Public schools. Although both are financially 
supported by the Flemish government, there is a difference in religious education. In public 
schools, religious education is provided for each student according to the denomination they 
adhere. In Catholic schools, only Catholic education is available for students, irrespective of  
students’ individual religious adherence. For Muslim students in the sample this means that 
Islamic religious education is available in public schools, while they have to attend Catholic 
classes in Catholic schools. Between 70% and 75% of  Flemish students attend Catholic schools.
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Method
The students in the sample are nested in schools, which means that the most appropriate 
estimation technique for analyses of  religious salience among adolescent Muslim ethnic 
minorities is multilevel modeling (Hox 2010). Given that previous studies demonstrated that 
migrant religiosity is to a large extent dependent upon variations in religiosity in their respective 
origin countries (Van Tubergen 2006, Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Van de Velde 2014), we 
also take the level of  ethnic origins into account. For this level, we derived the ethnic origin 
based on respondents’ place of  birth, the nationality of  their parents and the nationality of  
their grandmothers, in accordance with the migrant background variable. This means that first 
generation migrants received their country of  birth as ethnic origin, second generation migrants 
the nationality of  their mother, or father if  only the father had a foreign nationality and for third 
generation migrants the nationality of  their foreign born maternal grandmother, or their other 
grandmother if  the maternal grandmother was foreign-born. In this way, we were able to assign 
97.6% of  respondents to an ethnic origin, with the Belgian group being the largest. Given that 
this also resulted in a considerable number of  ethnic groups with very few members, often only 
1, we limited the analyses to ethnic origin groups with at least 4 members. This reduced the 
number of  ethnic origins from 108 to 48. This reduction and the listwise deletion of  respondents 
for whom no ethnic origin could be assigned resulted in a drop of  240 respondents from the 
analyses. Given that the ethnic origin and the school level are not hierarchical, we apply cross-
classified linear three-level models, with (1) 3,612 individuals nested in (2) 48 ethnic origins and 
(3) 55 secondary schools. All analyses have been performed in R, using the lme4 package (Bates 
et al., 2014).
We present three different models. In the first model, we include all individual and contextual 
main effects. With this model, we can test the first two hypotheses, concerning respectively 
the association between ethnic school composition and religiosity and the intergenerational 
differences in religiosity. To test these hypotheses, we respectively examine the statistical effects 
of  the percentage of  ethnic minorities in school and the migrant background effects. In the 
second model, we include an interaction effect between migrant background and the percentage 
of  ethnic minorities in schools. In the second model, we add an interaction effect between the 
percentage ethnic minorities of  the school and the migrant background. This model enables 
us to test the third hypothesis, which stated that the intergenerational difference might differ 
according to the ethnic school composition of  adolescents. To test this hypothesis, we look 
at the interaction terms estimating the differences in religiosity according to different levels 
of  ethnic composition of  the different schools (Figure 7.1). The third model is presented to 
highlight differences in the effect of  ethnic segregation in schools for adolescents with different 
denominations, by adding an interaction between denomination and the percentage of  ethnic 
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minority pupils in schools. For each model we present unstandardized coefficients, their standard 
errors, the variance components and the deviance as a measure of  the fit of  the four different 
models. All metric variables in the analyses have been grand-mean centered.
Table 7. 1: Descriptive statistics
Full sample Ethnic Belgians Ethnic minorities
Sig. 
Diff.Range #/Ave.
(%)/
(Std.) Range #/Ave.
(%)/
(Std.) Range #/Ave.
(%)/
(Std.)
Dependent
Importance of  religiosity 1-5 2.803 (1.443) 1-5 2.146 (1.012) 1-5 3.761 (1.442) ***
Individual
Independent
Migrant background
Ethnic Belgian 0/1 2142 (59.3%) 0/1 2142 (100.0%) 0/1 0 (0.0%)
First generation 0/1 399 (11.0%) 0/1 0 (0.0%) 0/1 399 (27.1%)
Second generation 0/1 880 (24.4%) 0/1 0 (0.0%) 0/1 880 (59.9%)
Third generation 0/1 191 (5.3%) 0/1 0 (0.0%) 0/1 191 (13.0%)
Control
Age 13-21 15.49 (0.756) 13-18 15.244 (0.53) 14-21 15.848 (0.883) ***
Sex
Male 0/1 1876 (51.9%) 0/1 1114 (52.0%) 0/1 762 (51.8%)
Female 0/1 1736 (48.1%) 0/1 1028 (48.0%) 0/1 708 (48.2%)
Denomination
Catholic 0/1 1538 (42.6%) 0/1 1201 (56.1%) 0/1 337 (22.9%)
Muslim 0/1 813 (22.5%) 0/1 13 (0.6%) 0/1 800 (54.4%)
Other affiliation 0/1 112 (3.1%) 0/1 35 (1.6%) 0/1 77 (5.2%)
No affiliation 0/1 1149 (31.8%) 0/1 893 (41.7%) 0/1 256 (17.4%)
Socio-economic status 16-90 50.096 (16.875) 16-90 54.937 (15.649) 16-90 43.041 (16.098) ***
Track
Academic 0/1 1609 (44.5%) 0/1 1191 (55.6%) 0/1 418 (28.4%)
Technical 0/1 943 (26.1%) 0/1 531 (24.8%) 0/1 412 (28.0%)
Vocational 0/1 1060 (29.3%) 0/1 420 (19.6%) 0/1 640 (43.5%)
Ethnic minority friends 1-5 2.454 (1.041) 1-5 2.016 (0.694) 1-5 3.092 (1.129) ***
School
Independent
Percentage Ethnic Min. 0.042-1 0.421 (0.278) 0.042-0.976 0.29 (0.197) 0.042-1 0.613 (0.267) ***
Control
School size 82-1170 643.929 (275.461) 82-1170 683.44 (275.199) 82-1170 586.357 (265.607) ***
School sector
Public 0/1 1539 (42.6%) 0/1 698 (32.6%) 0/1 841 (57.2%)
Catholic 0/1 2073 (57.4%) 0/1 1444 (67.4%) 0/1 629 (42.8%)
+ p < 0,1; * p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001 (two-sided)
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Results
Table 7.1 displays the descriptive statistics of  the dependent, independent and control variables, 
for the full sample and for ethnic Belgians and ethnic minorities separately. In the last column, 
the table shows the significance level of  the difference in means between ethnic Belgians and 
ethnic minorities for all metric variables in the table. We notice from the table that, in line with 
previous research, ethnic minorities report significantly higher levels of  religiosity than ethnic 
Belgians. The distribution of  religious denominations is also fundamentally different between 
ethnic Belgians and ethnic minorities. Among ethnic Belgians, the Catholic form a majority, 
with 56.1%, and the remainder are mostly not affiliated. Among ethnic minorities, there is a 
slight majority of  Muslims, with 51.2%, almost a quarter identify as Catholics and only 18.2% 
consider themselves not affiliated to a denomination. Ethnic minorities tend to have significantly 
more ethnic minority friends than ethnic Belgians. The table also shows the disadvantageous 
position of  ethnic minorities compared to ethnic Belgians in Flemish schools. Ethnic minorities 
are significantly older, pointing to a higher proportion of  students who have been retained 
at least a year among ethnic minorities. They are also underrepresented in the academic and 
overrepresented in the vocational track and have a significantly lower socio-economic status.
Table 7. 2: Bivariate school variables correlation
% EM % Muslims Mean religiosity Mean SES School size School sector
% EM 1
% Muslims 0.934*** 1
Mean religiosity 0.908*** 0.959*** 1
Mean SES -0.791*** -0.748*** -0.717*** 1
School size -0.200 -0.236 -0.190 0.126 1
School sector -0.406*** -0.371** -0.284* 0.370** 0.111 1
+ p < 0,1; * p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001 (two-sided); N = 55
The intertwined nature of  school segregation is illustrated by table 7.2, which displays bivariate 
correlations between all school-level indicators. This table shows that ethnic and religious 
segregation is intensively associated: the percentage of  ethnic minorities and the percentage 
of  Muslims is 0.933 correlated. This segregation is also associated with differences in the mean 
level of  religiosity in schools: the mean religiosity is 0.908 correlated with the percentage of  
ethnic minorities and 0.959 with the percentage of  Muslims. Schools with a high proportion 
of  ethnic minorities are therefore also schools with a high proportion of  Muslim adolescents 
and a higher religiosity. Ethnic and religious segregation are further also associated with socio-
economic segregation: the higher the percentage of  ethnic minorities in a school, the lower the 
mean socio-economic status. The percentage of  ethnic minorities and Muslims is also higher 
in public schools, which is in turn associated with a lower mean religiosity and a higher mean 
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socio-economic status in Catholic schools. In what follows we test the hypotheses by looking at 
the results of  the cross-classified multilevel analyses in table 7.3.
Table 7. 3: Cross-classified multilevel models of religious salience
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.)
Intercept  2.650*** (0.269)  2.660*** (0.264)  2.726*** (0.253)
Individual
Age  0.017 (0.023)  0.008 (0.023)  0.007 (0.023)
Female  0.036 (0.030)  0.038 (0.030)  0.042 (0.029)
Denomination
Catholic Ref. Ref. Ref.
Muslim  1.280*** (0.072)  1.210*** (0.072)  1.177*** (0.080)
Other affiliation  0.668*** (0.088)  0.617*** (0.088)  0.599*** (0.094)
No affiliation -1.097*** (0.035) -1.101*** (0.036) -1.178*** (0.038)
Socio-economic status  0.001 (0.001)  0.002 + (0.001)  0.002 + (0.001)
Track
Academic Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical  0.007 (0.047) -0.023 (0.045) -0.032 (0.045)
Vocational  0.034 (0.049)  0.002 (0.048) -0.006 (0.048)
Migrant background
Ethnic Belgian Ref. Ref. Ref.
First generation  0.495 + (0.272)  0.456 + (0.272)  0.426 (0.261)
Second generation  0.314 (0.270)  0.331 (0.267)  0.311 (0.255)
Third generation  0.102 (0.275)  0.154 (0.272)  0.130 (0.261)
Ethnic minority friends  0.085*** (0.017)  0.088*** (0.017)  0.085*** (0.017)
Contextual
School size -0.012 (0.008) -0.011 (0.008) -0.009 (0.008)
Catholic school -0.067 (0.048) -0.071 (0.047) -0.074 (0.048)
Percentage Ethnic Minorities  0.322** (0.102) -0.020 (0.127)  0.436** (0.154)
Interaction
First generation * Percent EM  0.786*** (0.204)  0.712** (0.230)
Second generation * Percent EM  0.662*** (0.161)  0.598** (0.188)
Third generation * Percent EM  0.070 (0.276)  0.048 (0.276)
Muslim * Percent EM -0.399 + (0.218)
Other affiliation * Percent EM -0.515 (0.316)
No affiliation * Percent EM -0.821*** (0.157)
Variance
School 0.012 0.011 0.011
Origin 0.068 0.067 0.061
Individual 0.681 0.677 0.672
Deviance 8950.12 8926.383 8898.574
+ p < 0,1; * p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001 (two-sided); Nindividual = 3,612; Norigin = 48; Nschool = 55
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The first hypothesis, predicted that a higher percentage of  ethnic minorities in schools 
would be associated with a higher level of  adolescents’ religiosity (H1). We find support for 
this hypothesis (first model Table 7.3): there is a significant positive effect of  the percentage of  
ethnic minorities in schools on adolescents’ religiosity. Adolescents in a school with the highest 
proportion ethnic minorities (100%) have a 0.309 higher predicted value of  religious salience 
than adolescents in a school with the lowest proportion of  ethnic minorities (4.2%). This is a 
considerable effect on a five-point scale, indicating that there is indeed an association between 
the percentage of  ethnic minorities in a school and pupils’ religiosity. Therefore, we conclude 
that this hypothesis is supported by the results.
The second hypothesis predicted that the difference in religiosity between ethnic Belgians 
and second and third generation migrants would be smaller than the difference between ethnic 
Belgians and first generation migrants (H2). To test this hypothesis, we look at the first model in 
table 7.3. Our findings somewhat support this hypothesis. Although first generation migrants in 
our sample are more religious than ethnic Belgians, this difference is only marginally significant 
(p = 0.069). Second and third generation migrants on the other hand do not differ significantly 
from the ethnic majority in Belgium. This suggests that conforming to ethnic majority religiosity 
might also occur to a great extent among first generation migrants. This somewhat contradicts 
previous research, which found differences in religiosity across different migrant generations 
(Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). This might mean that conforming to levels 
of  religiosity among ethnic Belgians occurs equally among first as among later generation 
migrants. We therefore conclude that this hypothesis is not supported by our results.
The intergenerational differences might vary according to the ethnic composition of  the 
schools which adolescents attend, however. The third hypothesis predicted that the difference 
between ethnic Belgians and second and third generation migrants would be higher for 
adolescents in schools with a higher proportion of  ethnic minority pupils (H3). To test this 
hypothesis, we look at the interaction effects of  the second model in table 7.3. The interaction 
effects are also displayed in figure 7.1. Figure 7.1 contains the predicted religiosity of  first, 
second and third generation migrants compared to ethnic Belgian religiosity, in a school with 
the least ethnic minority pupils, a school with 50% minority pupils and a school with 95% ethnic 
minorities. For each migrant generation, the top of  the bar indicates significant differences 
compared to ethnic Belgian religiosity. At first glance, it is obvious that migrant religiosity is 
to a large extent associated with the percentage of  ethnic minorities in the school they attend. 
First generation migrants’ religiosity differs only marginally significant (p = 0.058) from 
ethnic Belgian religiosity in schools where ethnic Belgians do not form a majority, while it is 
significantly higher in schools with 95% ethnic minority pupils. Second generation migrants’ 
religiosity only differs significantly from ethnic Belgian religiosity in schools with a very high 
proportion of  ethnic minority pupils. In schools with very few ethnic Belgian pupils, first and 
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second generation migrants are significantly more religious than ethnic Belgians, while this 
is not the case in schools with few ethnic minority pupils. There is no significant difference 
between ethnic Belgian religiosity and third generation migrant religiosity, however. Therefore, 
we can conclude that we have found partial support for the third hypothesis: second generation 
migrants’ conformism to ethnic Belgian religiosity is associated with ethnic school composition, 
while this is not the case for third generation migrants, who resemble ethnic Belgian religiosity 
regardless of  ethnic school composition.
Figure 7. 1: Predicted effect of ethnic school composition, by migrant background
+ p < 0,1; * p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001 (two-sided)
The second model gives the impression that ethnic school composition is only associated with 
adolescent religiosity for pupils with a migrant background. The third model contradicts this 
interpretation, however. In this model, we added an interaction effect between denomination and 
ethnic school composition. This reveals that the association between ethnic school composition 
and religiosity was suppressed for ethnic Belgians due to denominational differences in the 
effect. The main effect of  ethnic school composition in model 4 is the effect for Catholic ethnic 
Belgians, since these form the reference categories of  migrant background and denomination. 
For Catholic ethnic Belgians, we notice a positive effect, meaning that Catholic ethnic Belgians 
tend to be more religious in schools with more ethnic minority pupils. Non-affiliated ethnic 
Belgians on the other hand, tend to be less religious in schools with a higher proportion of  
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ethnic minorities. Religious ethnic Belgians are thus more religious in schools where they are a 
minority. Non-religious ethnic Belgians are less religious in schools where they are a minority. 
This indicates that ethnic school composition is also associated with ethnic Belgians adolescents’ 
religiosity, although this is mediated by whether or not they consider themselves affiliated to a 
religious denomination.
Conclusion and discussion
With this study, we addressed (1) the association between ethnic segregation and religiosity 
among ethnic minorities and ethnic Belgians, (2) intergenerational differences in religiosity 
among ethnic minorities and (3) the role of  ethnic segregation for intergenerational differences. 
We applied social integration theory and structural opportunities theory on adolescent religiosity 
of  ethnic minorities and ethnic Belgians in Flemish schools by performing cross-classified linear 
three-level models on 3,612 adolescents from 48 different ethnic origins in 55 different secondary 
schools. From these analyses, we draw two important conclusions.
First, we found that adolescents in schools with a higher share of  ethnic minorities tend to 
be more religious. This finding is comparable to previous research in the U.S. (Regnerus, Smith 
and Smith 2004; Barrett et al. 2007), in that the religious make-up of  schools is associated with 
their pupils’ religiosity. Previous research already reported that ethnic residential segregation is 
associated with higher religiosity among Muslims in Western Europe (Voas and Fleischmann 
2012). Next to residential segregation, ethnic school segregation might also create a bubble 
of  higher religiosity and form an environment in which religiosity flourishes, in an otherwise 
relatively secularized society (Norris and Inglehart 2004). However, this association between 
ethnic school composition and religiosity is not limited to ethnic minorities. Ethnic school 
composition also affects ethnic Belgians’ religiosity, although this association depends upon their 
religious affiliation. Among Catholic affiliated pupils, attending a school with a higher share of  
ethnic minorities is associated with a higher religiosity, while the opposite is true for non-affiliated 
ethnic Belgians. The ethnic school composition might create more salient religious fields within 
schools, which could affect the whole school, regardless of  the specific denomination adolescents 
affiliate with. Confronted with a relatively religious school population, non-affiliated adolescents 
might avert themselves even more from religiosity.
Second, the intergenerational differences in religiosity among ethnic minority adolescents 
in secondary schools reveal more intricate patterns than previously reported. Among first and 
second generation migrant adolescents, levels of  religiosity do differ from that of  the ethnic 
majority, but only in schools in which ethnic minorities are the numerical majority. Previous 
studies found a conformism among immigrants to levels of  ethnic majority religiosity and that 
this conformism was more pronounced among second generation migrants than among first 
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(Alanezi and Sherkat 2008; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). For third generation 
migrants, we found no difference in religiosity compared to ethnic Belgians, regardless of  the 
ethnic school composition. This is in line with previous research in the US, where it was found 
that by the third generation, ethnic minorities showed no difference in religiosity compared 
to the ethnic majority (Stark 1997). The results for the second generation might indicate the 
importance of  the ethnic school composition: although clear intergenerational differences have 
been found among adults, ethnic minority dominated schools might serve as a sort of  microcosm 
in which religion flourishes. Previous research among Muslims in Western Europe reported that 
ethnic residential segregation is associated with higher religiosity (Voas and Fleischmann 2013). 
Apart from residential segregation, ethnic school segregation might therefore also reinforce 
ethnic minority religiosity by limiting contact with, generally less religious, ethnic majority 
peers. When these interactions increase at later age, this might lead to more conformism among 
ethnic minorities during adult life, as previously reported. Further research could examine this 
thesis by examining longitudinal data and examining how religiosity develops from adolescence 
into adult life.
One of  the major limitations of  this research are possible selection effects, meaning that 
schools might be selected by parents and students based on religious preferences. Given the free 
choice of  schools in Belgium (Agirdag, Van Houtte and Van Avermaet 2011), adolescents and 
parents who attribute more importance to religiosity may therefore chose schools with a higher 
proportion of  co-ethnics and co-religionists, as previous research in the Netherlands has shown 
(Maliepaard and Lubbers 2012). A Flemish study confirms that 60% of  the parents take the 
religious affiliation of  a secondary school into account (Creten et al. 2000). However, in Flanders 
this equates to a choice between Catholic versus public schools, where the first have a better 
reputation than the second. There is the idea that Catholic schools provide the best education, 
are strict and give your child the best chances to succeed in higher education. As a consequence, 
many parents do not choose a Catholic school based on religious preferences, but because of  
their quality perceptions. Moreover, it would be especially unlikely for more religious Catholic 
ethnic Belgian pupils to select ethnic minority-dominated schools, which are generally populated 
by Muslim pupils. Yet, we found that religious Catholic ethnic Belgian pupils in ethnic minority-
dominated schools tend to be more religious. Previous research in the U.S. has indicated that 
attending schools with peers who are more religious has an effect on students’ religiosity, after 
taking into account prior levels of  religiosity (Barrett et al. 2007). Therefore, we can expect that, 
even if  selection of  schools on religious grounds happens among ethnic minorities, this is likely 
to ultimately reinforce religiosity among all adolescents in those schools, ethnic Belgian and 
minorities. Further research could test this prediction by using longitudinal data.
A second limitation to this research is that we were unable to fully disentangle religious 
school segregation from other forms of  school segregation, such as ethnic and socio-economic 
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segregation. Given that religious, ethnic and socio-economic segregation are largely intertwined 
in Flemish schools, we were unable to distinguish between the influence of  for instance ethnic 
and religious school segregation. However, this interwoven pattern of  school segregation is the 
specific school context in which most of  ethnic minority adolescents in Western Europe are 
socialized. As already indicated, it is exactly this pattern which possibly creates a bubble in which 
groups of  ethnic minority adolescents grow up in Western European countries. Disentangling 
the different aspects of  this environment may be more a theoretical discussion than an analysis 
of  the sociological processes present in this environment.
Third, due to the nature of  the dataset, we were unable to examine multiple dimensions of  
religiosity among ethnic minority adolescents. Most scholars agree that religiosity is a multi-
dimensional concept, which entails among others religious affiliation, religious commitment 
and religious practice. In this paper, we only focused on religious commitment. Further research 
would do well to analyze other dimensions of  religiosity as well, as previous research has 
indicated that religiosity might differ according to the dimension focused upon (Davie 1990).
In sum, this study gives a unique insight in how religious patterns differ according to the 
ethnic composition of  the school. First, a higher percentage of  ethnic minority students is not 
only associated with more religious fervor among ethnic minority students, but also among 
Catholic students of  Belgian descent. Second, no differences can be found between first and 
second generation ethnic minority students and ethnic Belgian students in terms of  religiosity 
in schools with few ethnic minority students, while in schools with almost exclusively minority 
students, significant differences can be found between these two groups of  students. Hence, 
this study shows that religious fervor is an outcome worthwhile discussing in relation to ethnic 
segregation in school.
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Diverging contexts
Intergenerational differences in migrant religiosity at 
both sides of the Atlantic
Van der Bracht, K. & Van de Putte, B.
Submitted to Sociology of  religion, current status: ‘Under review’
Despite growing attention, there is little knowledge of the intergenerational dif-
ference in religiosity among migrants living in different contexts. In this paper, 
we examine how contextual religiosity, immigrant receptivity and immigrant 
transnationalism affect the intergenerational gap in religiosity among migrants 
in Europe, the US and Canada. We analyzed religious affiliation and frequency 
of praying among 45,099 migrants. The results indicate that second generation 
migrants’ religiosity aligns with native religiosity, while immigrant receptivity and 
the immigrant transnationalism framework are less successful in explaining inter-
generational differences in religious affiliation. The transmission of praying is less 
dependent on the context than religious affiliation.
Introduction
With recent reports in the US, Canada and Europe on Muslim immigrants who join violent extremist groups in Syria and Iraq (Public Safety Canada 2014; Pew Research 
Center 2014), the religion of  immigrants in the Western World has reached the top of  the 
public agenda again. Europe has witnessed an increase in ethnic and religious diversity since the 
large-scale immigration from Muslim countries took off  after the Second World War (Voas and 
Fleischmann 2012). In the US and Canada, on the other hand, the religious and ethnic diversity 
has also increased to new heights, due to the rise of  Latin American and Asian immigration 
(Menjívar 1999; Ellison and McFarland 2013). This increasing ethnic and religious diversity at 
both sides of  the Atlantic make research on migrant religiosity highly relevant for current public 
policy.
Over the last years, scholars have also devoted renewed attention to immigrant religiosity 
(Cadge and Ecklund 2007). Studies on the US, Canada and Europe have tackled such diverse issues 
as the influence of  religion on migration decisions (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003), the influence of  
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migration on religiosity (Connor 2008; Massey and Higgins 2011; Van Tubergen 2013), religious 
integration processes among migrants (Van Tubergen 2006; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and 
Verhaeghe 2013) and the influence of  religiosity on the socio-economic integration (Connor and 
Koenig 2013) or mental health (Connor 2010b). Findings show that religion plays an important 
role in migration decisions and adapting to live in a new society, in terms of  overall integration 
and the mental well-being of  individuals. Given these interrelations, the academic literature 
would certainly benefit from a better understanding of  immigrant religiosity as well.
Little is known, however, about how religion evolves from one generation to the next among 
immigrant groups. Reviewing evidence on both sides of  the Atlantic demonstrates that previous 
research is inconclusive when it comes to intergenerational differences in religiosity (Cadge and 
Ecklund 2007). In the US, second and third generation migrants report higher levels of  religious 
participation than first generation migrants (Stark 1997; Alanezi and Sherkat 2008). Second 
generation Korean-Canadians also report higher levels of  religiosity than their first generation 
counterparts (Cleveland and Chang 2009). In Europe on the other hand, both a religious decline 
(Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts 2010; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013) and 
religious stability have been reported ( Jacob and Kalter 2013). The increased religious diversity 
which resulted from immigration to the West, is affected by the intergenerational transmission 
of  religiosity. If  immigrant communities are successful in transmitting religiosity from the first to 
subsequent generations, religious changes across generations will be limited. Second generation 
migrants often feel that they have to strike a balance, however, between parental and homeland 
religious identities on the one hand and host society religious identities on the other hand (Levitt 
2009). This issue is more stringent for migrant communities that form religious minorities in 
the host society or that tend to deviate from general host society religious observance. The 
mixed findings of  intergenerational differences across contexts might be a result of  the religious 
climate in these contexts, which differs to a large extent between European countries, the US and 
Canada (Norris and Inglehart 2004). As yet, no study has conducted a cross-Atlantic comparative 
study to examine intergenerational differences in migrant religiosity, however.
Apart from the religious context, host societies’ receptivity of  immigrants might also 
determine to what degree immigrants strike a balance between home and host society religious 
cultures. The literature on transnationalism, however, argues that the role of  individual nation 
states on immigrants’ lives is declining and lives are lived to an increasing extent across borders 
(Levitt 2003). This literature stems from a globalist perspective on the waning role of  the nation 
state (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999). In this view, immigrants’ lives cannot be understood 
within the borders of  either the sending or receiving countries. Immigrants’ religious lives are 
enacted in both sending and receiving societies, through regular contacts with families, friends 
and religious institutions at both sides. Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) have criticized this 
approach, however, arguing that the transnationalist approach neglects the crucial impact nation 
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states may have on the transnational lives of  immigrants. The authors argue that cross-border 
movements, as well as enduring connections between communities in both countries are subject 
to political constraints. Transnational activity and host society policy towards immigrants are 
therefore considered like two sides of  the same medal. Hence, both sustained contacts with the 
sending society and receiving society immigrant receptivity might impact upon the religious 
observance of  first and second generation immigrants. Although previous research has found an 
effect of  immigrant receptivity on Muslim religiosity (Connor 2010a), no study has confronted 
this approach with a transnationalist framework.
In this paper, we want to contribute to the literature on immigrant religiosity by examining 
intergenerational differences in religiosity among first and second generations in the US, Canada 
and Europe. After determining whether these differences vary across national contexts, we assess 
whether these differences can be explained by (1) the religious context and (2) receiving societies’ 
immigrant receptivity and (3) transnational social fields. The central proposition is that second 
generation migrants tend to integrate into the religious culture of  the destination country more 
than first generation migrants, although this path may be moderated by the legal and social 
immigrant receptivity and the transnational social fields of  migrant communities. We use data 
from US’s General Social Survey (GSS), Canada’s Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS) and Europe’s 
European Social Survey (ESS) and examine the effects on religious affiliation and the frequency 
of  praying.
Theory and hypotheses
Intergenerational differences and the religious context
As already indicated, previous findings on intergenerational differences in migrant religiosity 
have been mixed. Differences in migrant religiosity are often explained with Durkheim’s (1986 
[1897]) social integration theory, which states that people conform to the norms and values of  
the group in which they are socially integrated. Social integration theory predicts that migrants 
conform more to the dominant norms and values in that society if  they are more integrated, 
i.e. have more interactions with host society natives. Previous studies indeed found that first and 
second generation migrants tend to conform to levels of  religiosity among non-migrants in the 
host society: the higher the religiosity among natives, the higher the religiosity among migrants 
(Van Tubergen 2006; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Although integration 
or assimilation are not linear processes, scholars agree that they span different generations (Alba 
and Nee 1997). Due to primary socialization in the host society, later generations are expected to 
have higher rates of  integration and thus higher levels of  conforming to native religiosity. These 
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differences have been found in previous research: second generation immigrants are closer to 
non-migrant political attitudes than their first generation counterparts (Maxwell 2010).
Given that immigrants tend to conform to the norms and values of  the host society, the 
religious context of  that society might determine in which direction second generation migrant 
religiosity deviates form first generation religiosity. A cross-Atlantic comparison makes for an 
interesting case study to examine the impact of  the religious context. It has repeatedly been 
demonstrated that both affiliation and rates of  religious behavior are much higher in the US 
than in Europe (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Canada, on the other hand, is somewhere in between 
the US and Europe (Lindsay 2008). Although the debate whether this is the causal mechanism 
behind these differences is still open (Norris and Inglehart 2004), another major distinction 
between Europe and the US is the religious plurality. Whereas most European countries are 
characterized by one dominant, often state-regulated if  not state-sponsored, denomination, 
the US is much more religiously plural, with several denominations and a focus on voluntary 
membership. Based on economic theory, the situation in the US has been compared to a 
competitive religious market, whereas most European countries resemble a religious monopoly 
(Iannaccone 1991). Immigrants at both sides of  the Atlantic face either a vital religious market 
with strong competition and high levels of  affiliation and religious observance, or countries 
with only one denomination, with mostly nominal members who rarely participate. According 
to social integration theory, migrants will conform to either of  these diverging religious fields.
The divergent intergenerational trajectories at both sides of  the Atlantic, might therefore be 
explained by these differences between the religious contexts. Stark (1997) already found that 
although German immigrants to the US had lower rates of  religiosity than other Americans, by 
the third generation they had caught up and displayed levels comparable to the rest of  the host 
society. The same logic can be applied to the European context, where immigrants often display 
higher levels of  religiosity than the rest of  the host society and where a lower religiosity among 
second generation migrants has been reported (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 
2013). Although the thesis of  religious integration towards the level of  natives in the host society 
has been put forward in both contexts separately, it has not been put to the test. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
The intergenerational difference in religiosity varies according to the destination context (H1). These 
differences can be explained by the religiosity of  the context: the higher native religiosity, the lower the 
intergenerational difference (H2).
Immigrant receptivity
Since the nineties of  the last century, the buzzword in the literature on migrant religiosity has 
been religious transnationalism (Levitt 2003).  Scholars of  immigrant transnationalism argue 
that the global capitalist system has given rise to a new phenomenon of  migration: migrants 
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who live in several societies simultaneously (Glick-Schiller, Bash and Szanton-Blanc 1992; Portes, 
Guarnizo and Landolt 1999). These scholars examine how migrants “[make] a living through 
continuous regular contact across national borders” (Portes et al. 1999: 218). Improvements in 
international transport and communication have simplified the process and reduced the costs 
of  travelling between origin and destination countries, as well as to maintain other forms of  
homeland ties on a day-to-day basis, for instance through telephone and internet or by sending 
financial and material remittances. Although these cross-border ties are as old as migration itself, 
transnationalist scholars argue that the intensity increased to such a degree that transnationalism 
can be described as a distinct social field (Portes et al. 1999). Transmigrants are migrants of  
a new era, for whom national borders are increasingly permeable (Glick-Schiller, Basch and 
Szanton-Blanc 1995). Religious transnationalism of  immigrants can entail, for instance, long-
distance memberships in home-country religious organizations and taking part in worshipping 
or other events when visiting the home country, or being a member of  transnationally organized 
denominations (Levitt 2004). Although studies on transnational religiosity among migrants 
originate predominantly from the US, previous studies have found a similar phenomenon among 
second generation Muslim migrants in Europe, in that they tend to rally to a transnational 
Islamic identity, stripped from all local and cultural aspects (Voas and Fleischmann 2012).
This view has been criticized on a number of  points (Mouw et al. 2014). Some studies 
demonstrated that transnational activities may be rather limited (Dahinden 2005, Waldinger 
2008). Only a small proportion of  the migrant population engages in regular transnational 
activity and it tends to decline with a better integration in the host society and across generations 
(Fokkema et al. 2012; Mouw et al. 2014). From a more theoretical point of  view, Waldinger 
and Fitzgerald (2004) argue that transnationalist scholars assume what they try to explain: the 
construction of  a social field across borders. Establishing this social field is, however, subject 
to state control: nation states constrain or enable cross-border movement and contact. In the 
first place, states regulate external borders, i.e. they decide who enters and who leaves. At later 
stages, states’ also determine internal borders, i.e. citizenship acquisition regulations. Citizenship 
regulations determine who can become a full member of  the receiving society. Apart from 
limiting the opportunities for integration, these membership regulations might also incite 
feelings of  rejection and disadvantage, thus increasing symbolic ethnic boundaries (Foner and 
Alba 2008). In order to attenuate the negative consequences of  discrimination, immigrants have 
a tendency to reinforce their ethnic identity, a phenomenon which is called ‘reactive ethnicity’ 
(Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Muslims in Europe indeed have this tendency to increase the 
identification with the own ethnic and religious group (Fleischmann, Phalet and Klein 2011). 
Hence, more welcoming policies towards immigrant incorporation will speed up the social and 
religious integration of  immigrants. 
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The ‘reactive ethnicity’ phenomenon would mean that second generation migrants rally to the 
own ethnic group, resulting in conforming more to first generation migrants’ religiosity, hence 
reducing the intergenerational difference. Previous research has shown that discrimination can 
have a stronger effect on second generation migrants and migrants who feel more integrated, 
leading to lower perceptions of  acceptance in the destination society (ten Teije, Coenders and 
Verkuyten 2013). Second generation migrants often feel unaccepted in both origin and destination 
society and feel ‘in-between’ both cultures (Foner and Alba 2008). For them, religiosity can often 
transcend ethnic cultures and thus form a positive identity, detached from their contested ethnic 
backgrounds. This phenomenon has been found among second generation Muslims in Europe, 
who focus on a ‘pure’ form of  Islam, stripped from all local and cultural influences (Voas and 
Fleischmann 2012). Given this effect of  perceived rejection by the host society, we predict that:
The intergenerational difference in religiosity will be greater in countries with more receptive policy 
towards immigrants (H3).
Social closure is not the exclusive terrain of  nation states, however. Although nation states’ 
regulations are probably the first gatekeeper for immigrants’ incorporation into society, social 
closure is also enacted by regular contact with natives in the host society. Although in most 
cases exclusion and discrimination is restricted by legislation and policy, discrimination on racial 
and ethnic grounds is repeatedly reported at both sides of  the Atlantic (Pew Research Center 
2013; Eurobarometer 2008). Previous studies indeed found a ‘reactive religiosity’-effect: first 
and second generation migrants in Europe tend to report higher levels of  religious beliefs and 
participation if  they perceive group discrimination (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 
2013). Therefore, the social receptivity context might also exert an influence on the religious 
integration of  individuals, over and above the influence of  state receptivity. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that:
The intergenerational difference in religiosity will be greater in countries with a more receptive social 
climate towards immigrants (H4).
Transnationalism
Transnationalism can also affect the intergenerational differences in religiosity, given its 
effect on the integration into the host society. Assimilation and transnationalism seem to be 
antithetic, given that the former presumes the disappearance of  ethnic differences and the latter 
the maintaining of  homeland associations. Host societies often doubt the loyalty of  immigrants 
who live their lives both ‘here’ and ‘there’. Assimilation into the host society is therefore 
often understood as a political reorientation to the receiving society, while discarding loyalties 
to the sending society (Waldinger 2008). Creating opportunities or constraints for migrant 
incorporation, is hence also a process of  nation-state building in determining who is assimilated 
and thus a full member of  the receiving society (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). Although 
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transnational actions can sometimes foster integration in the host society (Guarnizo, Portes and 
Haller 2003; Pantoja 2005; Waldinger 2012; Mouw et al. 2014), socio-cultural integration seems 
to be negatively related to transnationalism: the higher the integration, the less transnational 
activity among second generation immigrants in European and American cities (Fokkema et al. 
2012). Sustained home-country contact might be caused by a lower socio-cultural integration, 
while at the same time preventing this form of  integration. Therefore, it can be expected that 
the socio-cultural integration of  immigrants living in communities that display higher levels of  
transnational activity will be lower. Although less common than among the first generation, 
transnational activity does play a role in the lives of  the second generation (Fokkema et al. 2012). 
Second generation migrants often feel that they have to strike a balance between conforming 
to the competing sending society identities and receiving society identities (Levitt 2009). Higher 
levels of  transnational activity can thus reduce the opportunities for integration into the host 
society. Therefore, it can be expected that in transnationally active communities, the difference 
in religiosity between first and second generation migrants will be lower. Hence, we hypothesize 
that: 
The intergenerational difference in religiosity will be greater for migrants living in communities with 
less transnational activity (H5).
Data and methods
We selected datasets for Europe, the United States and Canada based on two criteria. The data 
had to be gathered from the year 2000 onwards and the surveys had to contain representative 
data on first and second generation migrants. For Europe, we selected the European Social 
Survey (ESS). The European Social Survey is an ongoing biannual survey conducted in around 
30 European countries each wave. At the moment of  writing, data on six waves of  the ESS are 
available since 2002 onwards. We selected waves 2-5 (2004-2010), given that the information 
on the origin of  second generation migrants was not available at the national level in the first 
wave. In total, these four waves contain data on 170,485 individuals living in Europe.  For the 
United States, we selected the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS is also a biannual survey , 
conducting representative surveys of  the American population. At the moment of  writing, data 
up until 2012 is available. Therefore, we selected seven waves of  the GSS (2000-2012). These 
seven waves comprise information on 18,945 individuals. For Canada, we selected the Ethnic 
Diversity Survey (EDS). This survey was designed to oversample ethnic minorities living in 
Canada in 2002. Although this means that the EDS has not sampled representative data, the 
survey contains data on ethnic Canadians and contain weights based on ethnicity which allow 
the data to be weighed representatively. The public version of  the EDS contains data on 41,695 
individuals. The total dataset thus comprises 231,125 individuals from Europe, the United States 
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and Canada. After listwise deletion of  the missing cases on the variables in our analyses and the 
selection of  first and second generation migrants, we retain 45,099 cases. Data in the analyses 
have been weighted at the individual level with the weights provided in the datasets  to establish 
the representativity of  the data.
 In the ESS, questionnaires were available in the official language(s) of  the countries in which 
they were administered. The GSS questionnaires were, apart from English, also available in Spanish 
and in the EDS, interviews have been administered in English, French, Mandarin, Cantonese, 
Italian, Punjabi, Portuguese, Vietnamese and Spanish. This means that ethnic minorities who 
did not master an official language or one of  the additional questionnaire languages were not 
likely, or less likely interviewed, resulting in a sampling bias towards higher educated and better 
integrated migrants. The effects of  this bias have been reduced in the analyses by controlling 
for educational level, employment status and origin, and additionally for a variable indicating 
whether the interview has been conducted in an official language or not. For intergenerational 
differences in religiosity, however, this implies that we compare the more integrated groups 
of  both generations, meaning that we possibly underestimate the difference between first and 
second generation migrants. These effects are therefore tested conservatively.
Dependent variables
We examine two dependent variables: religious affiliation and frequency of  praying. Although 
religious service attendance is a dimension of  religiosity which is often examined in the sociology 
of  religion, the measurement of  the service attendance indicator has, contrary to the other 
indicators, proven to be cross-nationally inequivalent (Meuleman and Billiet 2011). For Muslim 
women, for whom service attendance is less common, the measure of  service attendance is not 
reliable to measure differences in religiosity. Given that the religiosity of  Muslims is an important 
part of  immigrant religiosity in the West, we decided to retain Muslims in the sample and focus 
on religious affiliation and frequency of  praying.
Religious affiliation is a dichotomous variable which measures whether an individual feels he 
or she belongs to a certain religious belief  or denomination. Respondents who indicated that 
they are affiliated to a certain religion or denomination received a score of  1, others a 0.
Praying is a also a dichotomous variable. Respondents were asked to indicate how often they 
prayed. Responses were recorded on different scales in the three different surveys but were 
recoded to be comparable across surveys. In the EDS, this question was only asked to those 
respondents who indicated that they are affiliated to a denomination. Therefore, we restrict 
analyses on this dependent variables in all other datasets to respondents who indicated that 
they are affiliated as well. This means that the sample size for analyses of  frequency of  praying 
are somewhat lower. Respondents who indicated that they prayed at least once a week or more 
often received a score of  1, those who prayed less frequently a score of  0.
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Independent variables
At the individual level, our main variable of  interest is migrant generation, as this measures the 
difference between migrant generations. The variable migrant generation has two categories, 
i.e. ‘first generation’ and ‘second generation’. These variable was constructed based on the 
questions on the birth place of  respondents and their parents’ birthplace. Respondents who were 
born in the country of  the survey with both parents born there as well, were considered natives. 
Respondents who were not born in the country of  the survey were considered first generation 
migrants. Second generation migrants, are respondents who were born in the country of  the 
survey but whom had at least one parent who was not. In the analyses, natives will form the 
reference category.
At the individual level, we control for sex, age, education, employment status and questionnaire 
language. Sex is a dichotomous variable, with a score of  1 for women and a score of  0 for men. 
Age is a metric variable, measuring the age in full years. Education is a metric variable, measuring 
the years of  full-time education respondents have completed. For the EDS, which only contained 
information on the attained educational level, we assigned each individual the minimum number 
of  years needed to attain their educational level, based on UNESCO data. After this process, the 
distribution of  years of  education was similar to that of  the European and American sample. 
Employment status is again a dichotomous variable, indicating whether individuals were employed 
or not at the time of  the interview. Individuals who had a full-time or part-time job received a 
score of  1, others a score of  0. Questionnaire language is a dichotomous variable which indicates 
whether the interview was taken in a non-official language of  the country where it has been 
taken, i.e. Spanish in the GSS or Mandarin, Cantonese, Italian, Punjabi, Portuguese, Vietnamese 
or Spanish in the EDS. Respondents who did use a different language received a score of  1, those 
who took the interview in an official language a score of  0.
Given that certain denominations have different prescriptions on the frequency of  praying, 
we control for religious denomination in the analysis of  frequency of  praying. Denomination is 
a categorical variable with six categories, i.e. Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, 
Jewish, Islam and Other. This variable was based on self-identification by respondents who 
indicated that they are affiliated to a certain denomination. Categorization of  respondents into 
these categories was based on the ESS, which had the least detailed answer categories of  the 
three surveys under study.
At the contextual level, we discern destination-country variables on the one hand and one 
ethnic community variable on the other hand.
Native affiliation is a metric variable, measuring the percentage of  natives who indicate that 
they are affiliated to a religious denomination. This variable was constructed by aggregating 
the dichotomous dependent variable of  affiliation, for all natives in each destination country 
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separately. This means that the variable has a range of  0 to 1, with 0 indicating that none of  the 
natives are affiliated to a religious denomination and a score of  1 indicating that all natives in that 
certain country are affiliated to a religious denomination. The actual percentages range from 
15.6% (Estonia) to 98.9% (Cyprus).
Native praying is a metric variable, measuring the percentage of  natives who indicate that 
they pray at least once a week or more often. This variable has been constructed in two steps. 
First, we calculated the percentage of  natives who pray once a week or more often, based on the 
dependent variable praying, analogously to native affiliation. This percentage, however, indicates 
the percentage who prays frequently for each country, among those who indicated that they 
have an affiliation. This percentage is, hence, a somewhat distorted measure of  native religiosity: 
in countries with very few affiliated natives who pray with high frequency, this measure would 
indicatethat country as highly religious. Therefore, in the second step, we multiplied this 
percentage with the percentage affiliated in each country. This variable therefore measures the 
percentage of  the total population of  natives who pray once a week or more often. The actual 
percentages range from 5.8% (Estonia) to 74% (United States).
Policy receptivity is a metric variable measuring destination countries’ policy towards 
immigrants, based on the MIPEX, or Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX 2010). This is 
an index measuring integration policies in all European Union Member states and some other 
Western European countries. It thus includes data on most European countries, Canada and 
the US.  The index compares legal frameworks to promote migrant integration on seven policy 
areas: labour market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, long-term 
residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination. This results in an index ranging from 0 
to 100, with higher scores indicating more welcoming policies towards immigrants. The actual 
scores range from 24 (Turkey) to 83 (Sweden). The index has been calculated two times, once 
in 2007 and once in 2010. Given that data on the US is only available for 2010, we used the 2010 
index in our analyses.
Social receptivity is a metric variable measuring how welcoming natives are towards immigrants. 
This variable has been calculated by aggregating data from the World Values Survey and the 
European Values Study (WVS/EVS). For the destination countries under study, we examined 
the data of  the fifth wave of  the WVS (2005-2006) and the fourth wave of  the EVS (2008). For 
each country separately, we calculated the percentage of  natives who indicated that they would 
not like to have an immigrant or a foreign worker as a neighbor. To be in line with the indicator 
of  policy receptivity, we subsequently reverse-coded this variable, meaning that the variable 
now indicates the percentage of  natives who did not dislike immigrants or foreign workers as 
neighbors. The actual scores range from 64.6% (Estonia) to 97% (Canada).
Remittances is a metric variable measuring the amount of  financial remittances send each year. 
This variable has been calculated at the ethnic community level, meaning that each ethnic group 
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in each destination country has a different value. Data on financial remittances were retrieved 
from the World Bank (Ratha and Shaw 2007). They calculated bilateral financial remittance 
flows, meaning an overview of  ingoing and outgoing flows from and to each country, from 
2010 onwards. We used the data on 2010 and linked the flows according to ethnic background, 
meaning that Vietnamese migrants in the US were given the figure of  outflows from the US to 
Vietnam. The variable is expressed in millions of  US dollars and they have a range from 0, for 
some small communities, to 21,693.4 million US dollars for the Mexican community in the US.
Method
Based on the sampling methods and hypotheses, we discern four different levels. First of  all, 
at the individual level, we have (1) first and second generation migrants. These are nested in 
(2) ethnic communities, (3) destination countries and (4) origin countries. The destination 
countries consist of  the different countries where the surveys have been conducted. In total, we 
have information on 28 different destination countries. Origin countries on the other hand, are 
based on the information on ethnic origin in each survey. In the ESS, data at the national level 
was available. Therefore, we nested respondents in the ESS in their country of  birth for first 
generation migrants, or the country of  birth of  their father for second generation migrants. 
If  the father was born in the country of  the survey, respondents were nested in their mother’s 
birth country. In the GSS and EDS on the other hand, respondents were asked what their ethnic 
origin is. Answers were recorded in a mix of  both individual countries, as well as broader 
geographical regions. Respondents were nested in these origins. For some individual countries, 
there is therefore an overlap between the ESS, GSS, and EDS, while broader ethnic groups were 
further harmonized between GSS and EDS. In total, we discern 187 different ethnic origins. 
Finally, we also have a level which combines the information on both origin and destination: 
the community level. Migrants are nested in these according to each combination of  origin and 
destination countries, for instance Mexicans in the US or Italians in Canada. We discern 1,414 
different ethnic communities in our data. Given this nesting, multilevel models are the most 
appropriate estimation methods to test our hypotheses. Figure 1 illustrates the different levels in 
our analyses. The range of  cases and the mean per higher-level unit can be found at the bottom 
of  table 8.1.
We present three different models for each dependent variable. In the first model, we include 
all individual and contextual variables, except for remittances, and a random slope of  the 
intergenerational difference across destination countries. Given that we cannot assign remittance-
values to larger ethnic groups in the GSS and EDS, we only add remittances in the last model, 
as this reduces the sample size drastically. In the second model, we test how the context affects 
the intergenerational difference in religiosity among immigrants. Therefore, we add interactions 
between the intergenerational difference and the contextual effects of  native religiosity, policy 
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receptivity and social receptivity. In the third and final model, we include both a main effect of  
remittances and in interaction with the intergenerational difference in religiosity. Cases in the 
analyses have been weighted at the individual level and al metric variables have been grand-mean 
centered. The remittances-variable has been standardized to make the scale of  the variable more 
comparable to the other variables in the analyses. The data have been processed using R and 
analyzed using the lme4 package (Bates et al. 2014).  Given that the dependent variables in our 
analyses are dichotomous, we fitted logistic generalized linear models.
Figure 8. 1: Analyses strategy
Results
The descriptive statistics are depicted in table 8.1. We notice that first and second generation 
migrants resemble natives more on religious affiliation than on frequency of  praying. With 70.8% 
and 71.2% affiliation among respectively natives and migrants, there is virtually no difference 
between natives and migrants in terms of  religious affiliation. These general differences 
obfuscate cross-national divergences, however, as can be noticed from table 8.2, which contains 
the levels of  religiosity for natives, first generation migrants, second generation migrants and 
the intergenerational difference by country. Canada and the US are indeed among the most 
religious countries, although some European countries tend to have relatively high levels of  
affiliation as well. Similar differences can be found for first and second generation migrants 
respectively. Consequently, there is considerable variation in the intergenerational difference in 
religiosity as well: in most countries, second generation migrants tend to be less religious than 
first generation migrants. Interestingly, we find that there is a strong positive correlation (0.798; 
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t=6.761; df=26; p<0.001) between native religiosity and the intergenerational gap: in countries 
where natives have high levels of  religious affiliation, the negative difference between first and 
second generation migrants tends to be smaller. Indeed, in most countries, the percentages 
among natives are closer to those of  second generation migrants than they are to first generation 
migrants. Similar levels of  variation are found among natives and generations when it comes 
to praying once a week or more often. Among native respondents who indicated that they 
belong to a certain affiliation 24.5% pray at least weekly in Denmark, compared to 83.3% in 
the US. Again, we notice considerable variation in the intergenerational difference in religiosity 
among migrants across countries. The correlation between native frequency of  praying and the 
intergenerational difference is insignificant, however (0.305; t=1.633; df=26; p=0.115). These 
findings underline the importance of  studying the intergenerational gap in migrant religiosity 
from a cross-national perspective. We test our hypotheses based on the results of  our cross-
classified multilevel analyses displayed in tables 8.3 and 8.4. For each model we present the log 
odds, the standard errors, the variance components and the deviance.
With our first hypothesis, we predicted that the intergenerational difference in religiosity 
differs according to the destination context (H1). We test this hypothesis by looking at the random 
slope of  second generation at the destination level in models 1 of  table 8.3 and 8.4. We notice 
considerable variance at the random slope level for both affiliation and praying. Comparing these 
first models to the same model without a random slope and covariance  indicates that adding 
a random slope to the model significantly improves the models of  both affiliation (χ²=81.043; 
df=2; p<0.001) and frequency of  praying (χ²=33.828; df=2; p<0.001). This means that there is 
a significant difference across countries in the difference between first and second generation 
migrants. Although model 1 indicates for both attendance and frequency of  praying that second 
generation migrants tend to be less religious than first generation migrants, the random slope 
indicates that this difference is not universal across countries. We can therefore accept our first 
hypothesis. In what follows, we will assess how we can explain these cross-national divergence in 
intergenerational differences by looking at the interaction effects between the second generation 
and native religiosity, policy receptivity, social receptivity and remittances.
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Table 8. 1: Descriptive statistics
Affiliation Praying
Range Ave./Freq. SD/% Range Ave./Freq. SD/%
Dependent
No 0/1 12988 (28.8%) 0/1 13274 (42.5%)
Yes 0/1 32111 (71.2%) 0/1 17977 (57.5%)
Year 0-12 4.471 (3.077) 0-12 4.194 (3.041)
Seks
Male 0/1 21048 (46.7%) 0/1 13965 (44.7%)
Female 0/1 24051 (53.3%) 0/1 17286 (55.3%)
Age 18-98 45.896 (18.243) 18-98 47.03 (18.729)
Education 0-40 13.599 (4.254) 0-40 13.493 (4.355)
Employed
No 0/1 19894 (44.1%) 0/1 14310 (45.8%)
Yes 0/1 25205 (55.9%) 0/1 16941 (54.2%)
Questionnaire language
Official 0/1 43767 (97.0%) 0/1 30270 (96.9%)
Minority 0/1 1332 ( 3.0%) 0/1 981 ( 3.1%)
Generation
First 0/1 20991 (46.5%) 0/1 15149 (48.5%)
Second 0/1 24108 (53.5%) 0/1 16102 (51.5%)
Denomination
Roman Catholic 0/1 13441 (43.0%)
Protestant 0/1 8618 (27.6%)
Eastern Orthodox 0/1 2694 ( 8.6%)
Jewish 0/1 566 ( 1.8%)
Islam 0/1 2237 ( 7.2%)
Other 0/1 3695 (11.8%)
Native religiosity 0.156-0.989 0.708 (0.199) 0.058-0.74 0.392 (0.149)
Policy receptivity 35-83 63.722 (11.596) 35-83 64.666 (11.148)
Native receptivity 0.646-0.97 0.912 (0.088) 0.646-0.97 0.924 (0.077)
Remittances 0-21693.416 1107.012 (2944.337) 0-21693.416 1121.448 (3094.551)
N
Destination 39-22462 28 (1610.679) 31-17923 28 (1116.107)
Origin 1-5875 187 (241.171) 1-4374 178 (175.567)
Community 1-5117 1414 (31.895) 1-3971 1188 (26.306)
Individual 45099 31251
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Table 8. 2: Mean religiosity for natives, first and second generation migrants and 
intergenerational difference by country
Affiliation Praying
Natives 1st Gen. 2nd Gen. Intergen. gap Natives 1st Gen. 2nd Gen. Intergen. gap
Austria 71.8% 72.0% 67.2% -4.8% 50.1% 61.6% 54.1% -7.5%
Belgium 43.2% 62.0% 44.5% -17.5% 46.6% 64.6% 48.9% -15.7%
Bulgaria 79.7% 74.3% 82.2% 8.0% 25.1% 57.7% 32.1% -25.6%
Canada 81.5% 81.9% 79.4% -2.5% 48.2% 60.4% 51.9% -8.5%
Croatia 80.1% 82.9% 76.4% -6.5% 66.0% 78.8% 58.1% -20.7%
Cyprus 98.9% 97.1% 100.0% 2.9% 67.1% 65.3% 64.5% -0.8%
Czech Republic 25.8% 50.9% 23.3% -27.6% 43.3% 55.2% 46.4% -8.7%
Denmark 60.7% 65.6% 54.5% -11.1% 24.5% 52.4% 37.3% -15.0%
Estonia 15.6% 53.5% 30.0% -23.5% 37.4% 36.1% 31.4% -4.7%
Finland 64.7% 55.2% 57.5% 2.4% 43.9% 57.4% 57.1% -0.3%
France 47.4% 64.1% 46.6% -17.5% 35.6% 64.0% 38.3% -25.7%
Germany 54.1% 70.8% 54.6% -16.3% 42.3% 56.9% 45.0% -11.9%
Greece 92.8% 84.9% 92.3% 7.4% 70.8% 70.5% 84.7% 14.1%
Hungary 60.3% 72.3% 60.9% -11.4% 46.7% 44.7% 52.9% 8.2%
Ireland 83.6% 65.7% 73.7% 8.0% 77.9% 72.3% 70.9% -1.4%
Italy 79.7% 82.4% 77.3% -5.1% 61.3% 78.6% 41.2% -37.4%
Luxembourg 74.6% 71.5% 65.3% -6.2% 32.4% 46.8% 27.9% -18.8%
Netherlands 41.6% 59.3% 37.3% -21.9% 65.2% 70.4% 50.6% -19.8%
Norway 53.5% 63.9% 46.2% -17.7% 32.8% 49.3% 43.1% -6.2%
Poland 92.0% 92.0% 86.9% -5.1% 76.5% 87.0% 74.9% -12.1%
Portugal 86.3% 83.7% 69.4% -14.3% 67.9% 77.0% 63.9% -13.1%
Slovakia 78.1% 61.6% 71.0% 9.4% 66.6% 60.4% 68.3% 8.0%
Slovenia 56.5% 50.2% 38.4% -11.8% 43.6% 35.8% 40.5% 4.7%
Spain 72.1% 78.9% 61.3% -17.6% 46.9% 65.0% 42.1% -22.9%
Sweden 30.2% 42.1% 24.4% -17.7% 34.5% 51.6% 28.8% -22.8%
Switzerland 69.6% 68.5% 61.1% -7.4% 57.7% 57.6% 51.8% -5.8%
United Kingdom 45.8% 59.4% 35.7% -23.7% 50.7% 77.1% 59.9% -17.2%
United States 88.9% 85.3% 83.8% -1.5% 83.3% 83.6% 82.3% -1.3%
Total 70.8% 74.2% 68.6% -5.6% 55.4% 62.0% 53.3% -8.6%
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Table 8. 3: Cross-classified multilevel models of affiliation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.)
Intercept  0.997*** (0.109)  0.962*** (0.104)  0.900*** (0.108)
Individual
Year  0.013* (0.007)  0.014* (0.007)  0.014* (0.007)
Female  0.355*** (0.027)  0.355*** (0.027)  0.381*** (0.029)
Age  0.016*** (0.001)  0.016*** (0.001)  0.016*** (0.001)
Education -0.028*** (0.003) -0.028*** (0.003) -0.028*** (0.004)
Employed -0.094*** (0.029) -0.094** (0.029) -0.087** (0.030)
Questionnaire language -0.350*** (0.094) -0.346*** (0.094) -0.536*** (0.106)
Second generation -0.303*** (0.089) -0.248** (0.076) -0.196** (0.073)
Contextual
Native affiliation  3.851*** (0.357)  3.154*** (0.359)  3.145*** (0.347)
Policy receptivity  0.003 (0.006)  0.005 (0.007)  0.005 (0.007)
Social receptivity -0.202 (0.864) -0.107 (0.998) -0.093 (0.966)
Remittances  0.018 (0.038)
Interaction
Sec. Gen. * Native affiliation  1.211** (0.376)  1.272*** (0.360)
Sec. Gen. * Policy receptivity -0.005 (0.007) -0.003 (0.007)
Sec. Gen. * Social receptivity -0.212 (1.020) -0.221 (0.970)
Sec. Gen. * Remittances -0.068** (0.021)
Variance
Destination
Intercept 0.117 0.085 0.072
Second generation 0.158 0.089 0.074
Covariance Intercept & Second generation -0.095 -0.046 -0.039
Origin 0.371 0.369 0.380
Community 0.190 0.188 0.197
Individual
Deviance 35,610.5 35,599.4 31,578.7
+ p < 0,1; * p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001 (two-sided)
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Table 8. 4: Cross-classified multilevel models of praying
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.)
Intercept 0.552*** (0.112)  0.561*** (0.109)  0.490*** (0.117)
Individual
Year -0.006 (0.009) -0.007 (0.009) -0.011 (0.009)
Female  0.664*** (0.030)  0.664*** (0.030)  0.707*** (0.033)
Age  0.017*** (0.001)  0.017*** (0.001)  0.017*** (0.001)
Education -0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004)
Employed -0.138*** (0.032) -0.138*** (0.032) -0.123*** (0.035)
Questionnaire language  0.030 (0.093)  0.029 (0.093) -0.221* (0.111)
Second generation -0.267** (0.081) -0.277*** (0.071) -0.250*** (0.072)
Denomination
Roman Catholic Ref. Ref. Ref.
Protestant -0.087+ (0.046) -0.081+ (0.046) -0.133** (0.049)
Eastern orthodox -0.488*** (0.079) -0.482*** (0.079) -0.423*** (0.090)
Jewish -0.990*** (0.141) -0.987*** (0.141) -1.092*** (0.164)
Islam  0.153* (0.077)  0.154* (0.077)  0.246* (0.101)
Other  0.326*** (0.059)  0.329*** (0.059)  0.423*** (0.068)
Contextual
Native affiliation  3.047*** (0.255)  2.654*** (0.338)  2.760*** (0.354)
Policy receptivity  0.000 (0.004)  0.005 (0.006)  0.005 (0.006)
Social receptivity -0.618 (0.663)  0.314 (0.902)  0.457 (0.942)
Remittances  0.038 (0.030)
Interaction
Sec. Gen. * Native praying  0.590+ (0.349)  0.490 (0.357)
Sec. Gen. * Policy receptivity -0.008 (0.006) -0.008 (0.006)
Sec. Gen. * Social receptivity -1.320 (0.896) -1.284 (0.894)
Sec. Gen. * Remittances -0.024 (0.021)
Variance
Destination
Intercept 0.098 0.073 0.081
Second generation 0.111 0.062 0.058
Covariance Intercept & Second generation -0.090 -0.056 -0.048
Origin 0.289 0.288 0.257
Community 0.065 0.065 0.036
Individual
Deviance 28,378.8 28,369.8 23,821.1
+ p < 0,1; * p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001 (two-sided).
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With our second hypothesis, we predicted that the intergenerational difference would be 
smaller in countries where religiosity would be higher (H2). We therefore look at the interaction 
effect between native religiosity and second generation. From the second model in table 8.3 we 
notice that we found a significant negative main effect and a significant positive interaction effect. 
We can compare the predicted intergenerational differences across countries by calculating the 
difference for the least and most religious country, respectively Estonia and Cyprus. When we 
fill in these countries’ levels of  native religiosity into the equation, we notice that the predicted 
intergenerational difference for Estonia is strongly negative with -0.874, and slightly positive 
for Cyprus, with 0.135. This means that in the most religious countries, there tends to be a 
small increase in religious affiliation across generations, while there is a strong decrease across 
generations in the least religious countries. These results seem to support social integration 
theory. We find less support for the effect on frequency of  praying, given that the interaction 
effect is only marginally significant. This means that the intergenerational gap is not related 
to natives’ religiosity across countries. We can hence conclude that we have found only partial 
support for our second hypothesis.
 With our third hypothesis, we predicted that the intergenerational gap across countries would 
be related to policy receptivity towards immigrants (H3). To test this hypothesis, we look at the 
interaction effects of  the MIPEX-index of  policy receptivity with the slope for second generation, 
in model 2 of  tables 8.3 and 8.4. The interaction effects in both models are insignificant. This 
means that the intergenerational gap in religiosity cannot be explained by policy receptivity 
towards immigrants. We therefore reject our third hypothesis.
 The fourth hypothesis predicted that the intergenerational difference would also be affected 
by the social receptivity of  the context where migrants live (H4). This hypothesis can be tested 
by looking at the interaction effect between second generation and social receptivity. We notice 
from model 2 in tables 8.3 and 8.4 that this coefficient is also insignificant for both dependent 
variables, meaning that social receptivity does not affect the cross-national differences in the 
intergenerational gap. Therefore, we have to reject this hypothesis again.
 With our fifth and final hypothesis, we predicted that the intergenerational gap would be 
smaller for migrants living in ethnic communities with more transnational activity (H5). We 
test this hypothesis by looking at the interaction effect between remittance flows and second 
generation in the third model of  tables 8.3 and 8.4. We notice a significant negative interaction 
effect, and a significant negative main effect of  second generation. When we solve the equation for 
communities with no remittance flows, and the community with the highest flow of  remittances, 
i.e. Mexicans in the US, we notice that our hypothesis is not supported by the results. On the 
contrary, for migrants in communities with more remittance flows, the intergenerational gap 
is even larger than for those: for Mexicans in the US the predicted gap is -1.184, while it is only 
-0.185 for migrants living in communities with no remittance flows. This contradicts our fifth 
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hypothesis. More counterevidence is found in the analysis of  frequency of  praying: we find an 
insignificant interaction effect of  remittance flows. This means that we can therefore also reject 
our fifth and final hypothesis.
Conclusion and discussion
With this paper we shed light on intergenerational differences in religiosity among immigrants 
and how these diverge in different contexts. We extended previous research in Europe by 
broadening the scope to the Canadian and American context. We examined if  the fundamentally 
different religious context affects the intergenerational religiosity gap differently. We also 
assessed the influence of  immigrant transnationalism on migrant religiosity, while integrating 
the criticisms on this perspective. These theories were tested on data of  the European Social 
Survey, the Canadian Ethnic Diversity Survey and the American General Social Survey, containing 
20,991 first and 24,108 second generation migrants in total. We applied cross-classified logistic 
multilevel models. The results of  these analyses lead to two interesting conclusions.
First, we found substantial cross-national variation in the intergenerational gap in both 
rates of  affiliation and frequency of  praying. The place where immigrants live determines 
whether the second generation will be more, evenly or less religious than the first generation. 
Intergenerational differences in rates of  affiliation can be explained to a certain extent by taking 
the religious context of  the host society into account. Second generation migrants conform 
more to the religiosity of  the host society than the first generation migrants. This means that 
disaffiliation across migrant generations occurs in less religious countries and that there is 
virtually no disaffiliation or even higher levels of  affiliation than the first generation in highly 
religious countries. These findings not only support social integration theory, they also confirm 
the direction of  intergenerational religious integration which had been hypothesized in previous 
research (Stark 1997; Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Among those who are 
affiliated, the intergenerational gap in praying could not be explained by the religious climate 
where immigrants live, however. Previous research already indicated that the transmission of  
praying and service attendance from first to second generation migrants is more successful than 
the transmission of  religious beliefs (van de Pol and Van Tubergen 2013; Maliepaard and Lubbers 
2013). Those who remain affiliated also tend to remain religiously active in their denominations. 
Religious behavior among immigrants thus seems to be transmitted successfully, while religious 
beliefs and rates of  affiliation are less shared across generations. The European pattern of  
low levels of  affiliation seems to be replicated among second generation migrants. Whether 
this means that in the long term, migrants might be moving towards a situation of  ‘believing 
without belonging’ (Davie 1990) in analogy with the rest of  Europe, remains the subject of  
further research.
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Second, although both the original theories of  transnationalism and their critics have 
spurred new and exciting insights into migration scholarship, applying these theories to migrant 
religiosity research is less successful. Transnational activity, in the form of  remittance sending 
does not decrease the intergenerational gap in religious affiliation, but rather increases it, and it 
has no effect on frequency of  praying. Our results therefore contradict previous research which 
found that transnational activity had a negative effect on socio-cultural integration (Fokkema 
et al. 2012). The alternative perspective which argues for looking at the effect of  nation states 
does not perform better, however. A more receptive context for immigrants does not increase 
intergenerational differences in religiosity. This also contradicts previous research, which found 
that Muslims in Europe are more religious in less welcoming contexts (Connor 2010a). The 
question whether transnationalism affects the immigrant community as a whole, and especially 
the second generation, could therefore be raised. This is a substantial question, related to previous 
findings that transnational activity is limited to a small subgroup of  the migrant community 
(Waldinger 2008). At the same time, this is also a methodological question, pertaining to the 
measurement of  transnational activity at either the group level or the individual level (Mouw et 
al. 2014). This might apply to the criticisms on the transnationalist literature as well: feelings of  
rejection might only matter for those who come into contact with state-enforced boundaries for 
immigrants or for those who perceive discrimination themselves. From our study, we remember 
that national-level receptivity and community-level transnational activity does not affect the 
intergenerational gap in religiosity.
As with any research, this paper is subject to limitations. First, as already mentioned, we 
had to rely on a group-measurement of  transnational activity, meaning that we look at the 
level of  transnational activity of  a group as a whole, rather than measuring respondents’ own 
transnational behavior (Mouw et al. 2014). Further research could therefore improve on this 
research by taking into account individual-level information on transnational behavior. Given 
the often limited scope of  transnational activity, this might shed more light on the link between 
transnationalism and migrant religiosity. Second, due to data limitations, we had to restrict the 
analysis to rates of  affiliation and frequency of  praying. This means that religious beliefs, other 
types of  religious behavior and other aspects of  religiosity have been neglected. Moreover, as 
the field of  sociology of  religion suffers from ‘Christocentrism’ (Cadge, Levitt and Smilde 2011), 
it is not quite clear how well our current surveys measure various manifestations of  religiosity. 
Therefore, adding more detailed questions to large-scale surveys could certainly improve our 
understanding of  migrant religiosity. 
Our findings present indications of  convergence between migrant and native religiosity over 
successive migrant generations when it comes to affiliation. In light of  the public concerns about 
religious radicalization of  younger generation migrants, this study demonstrates that their 
religiosity is more likely to align to native religiosity. However, further research would do well 
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to focus more in-depth on which subgroups of  the migrant population maintain strong ties to 
religiosity and which groups dissociate themselves from religiosity. Moreover, future studies need 
also to differentiate between different aspects of  religiosity and apply different approaches to 
different dimensions. Our results show for instance a divergent explanation for rates of  affiliation 
and frequency of  praying. Finally, the research would also benefit from a more in-depth analyses, 
by looking for instance at even more migrant generations, as well as a more broader scope, by 
including even more different contexts into the analyses.

131
9
General conclusions
In this dissertation, we provided a sociological analysis of  religiosity among immigrants in Europe. Previous research into migrant religiosity has been dominated by a focus on Muslim 
groups and case studies of  specific groups within countries. This has resulted in (1) a lack of  
attention to theories from the sociology of  religion, (2) neglect of  intergenerational processes 
among ethnic minorities and (3) a lack of  understanding of  the generalizability of  findings from 
Muslim groups to other minority groups. Therefore, we wanted to fill three important gaps in 
the research literature. First, we wanted to test recent theories from the sociology of  religion 
on ethnic minority religiosity. Second, we wanted to examine intergenerational differences in 
religiosity among ethnic minorities. Third, we wanted to test the effect of  small-scale segregation. 
We tried to fill these gaps by testing hypotheses derived from (1) insecurity theory, (2) social 
integration theory and (3) structural opportunities theory. These hypotheses have been tested in 
five empirical chapters, using nationally comparative datasets which allow assessing the influence 
of  characteristics at the macro, meso and micro level of  analysis. In this general conclusion, we 
look back at how we have contributed to the literature, discuss some points for further research 
and describe the implications of  our findings for scholars and public policy.
Major findings
Insecurity theory
Our first objective was to test recent theoretical developments from within the sociology of  
religion to the research of  ethnic minority religion. Norris and Inglehart’s (2004) insecurity 
theory tries to provide an answer to the question why religion varies throughout the world, since 
previous efforts to answer this question by secularization and religious market theory have been 
contradicted by numerous empirical studies. The theory states that individuals who experience 
existential insecurities while growing up tend to be more religious in later life. Differences 
in religiosity throughout the world can be explained by differences in existential insecurities 
caused by economic inequality or a limited access to basic needs such as food and health 
care. In line with the approach of  Norris and Inglehart, we tested the influence of  contextual 
factors such as insecurity and the human development of  a country, both for the origin and the 
destination country, and also examined individual causes of  existential insecurity (Immerzeel 
and Van Tubergen 2011). Our first empirical study in chapter 4 reveals that insecurity is indeed 
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a predictor of  religiosity, albeit only in certain circumstances. As predicted by insecurity theory, 
first generation migrants who grew up in insecure conditions tend to be more religious than 
migrants who did not experience insecurities. Migrants from countries with a higher economic 
inequality or a lower human development level are more religious. When it comes to insecurities 
after migration in the destination country, however, we could not find a link with religiosity. We 
found no association between religiosity and economic inequality or human development. At 
the individual level, religiosity was only higher for individuals who perceive household budget 
problems. This finding contributes to the literature in two ways.
First, we found support for Norris and Inglehart’s (2004) proposition that insecurities 
experienced throughout childhood are more important than insecurities in later life. This 
proposition was put forward in their seminal book in 2004, in analogy with post materialism 
theory (Inglehart 2008), but not formally tested. Our paper was the first to disentangle the 
influence of  contexts during childhood and in later life by focusing on migrants who moved 
between contexts. Second, our finding that only origin country insecurities contribute to 
religiosity, and not insecurities in the destination country, contradicts findings from a previous 
study among the ethnic majority in Europe (Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 2011). This study 
reports that individuals in Europe do tend to be more religious if  they experience insecurity, 
both during the past and present and from individual and contextual causes. The fact that the 
relation between insecurities experienced in Europe and religiosity among immigrants is absent 
might mean that migrants evaluate their living conditions differently, when compared to the 
insecurities in their origin country. Moreover, as already pointed out by Norris and Inglehart 
(2004), social welfare systems might be an important factor in reducing existential insecurities 
in a relatively equal fashion. Given the development of  the social welfare systems in Europe, 
variation in insecurity might be limited when compared to variation in insecurity in contexts 
outside of  Europe.
We can conclude that applying insecurity theory to explain differences in migrant religiosity 
offers interesting prospects for the study of  ethnic minority religiosity. First generation migrants 
who come from an origin country that produces more insecurity during socialization report 
higher levels of  religiosity during adult life. Insecurity theory therefore seems to provide a 
promising alternative to classical secularization theory and religious market theory. Insecurity 
theory has shown to be successful in explaining differences in religiosity throughout the world 
and now also among migrants who live in Europe and who originate from all over the world. 
After several decades of  academic debate about theories dating back to Weber and Durkheim, 
the new paradigm of  insecurity might be best compared to Marx’s thesis of  opium of  the people 
(1979), in that religion forms a buffer to existential insecurities for individuals. Although Marx 
pointed to the organisation of  religion as a way of  dazing the people, religion might actually 
increase the demand for religiosity as a way of  alleviating the existential insecurities individuals 
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have. The following decades will show whether insecurity theory is indeed capable of  explaining 
religiosity across different contexts and across time periods and hence performs better than the 
secularization and religious market theories.
Intergenerational differences
Our second objective was to look at how religion among migrants evolves from the first to 
subsequent generations. To attain this objective, we applied social integration theory (Durkheim 
1897) in our empirical studies in chapters 5 to 8. Social integration theory predicts that values, ideas 
and beliefs are disseminated through interactions with other groups and individuals. Based on 
this theory we hypothesized that (1) migrants with more interactions with host society members 
and institutions will adapt their religiosity to that of  the host society, (2) this adaptation will be 
higher for second generation migrants, (3) perceptions of  exclusions will be associated with a 
reduced adaptation to host society religiosity and (4) second generation migrants with more 
interactions with the ethnic community adapt their religiosity more to that of  the host society. 
We discuss the conclusions we can infer from our findings regarding each of  these hypotheses.
In accordance with previous research that applied social integration theory (Van Tubergen 
2006), we found that migrants are influenced by the religiosity of  the society in which they live. 
Migrants tend to conform to levels of  religiosity in the host society: in countries with more 
religious inhabitants, migrants tend to be more religious themselves. Given the relatively low 
levels of  religiosity in Europe, however, the relation between social integration and religiosity 
is often negative. This means that ethnic minorities for whom more social interaction can be 
expected with host society members, such as higher educated and employed migrants, have 
lower levels of  religiosity. This means that there occurs some form of  adaptation to the religious 
environment of  the host society.
This adaptation brings us to our second finding: this process through social integration takes 
place in an intergenerational way. The religiosity of  second generation migrants is influenced 
more by host society religiosity than the first generation. This means that, across generations, 
migrants adapt to the religiosity of  the host society they live in. This can indeed explain why 
previous research found diverging intergenerational differences in different contexts. A rise 
in religiosity in the U.S. and a decline in Europe among second generation migrants can be 
explained by migrants conforming to the religiosity of  the host society. This finding is in line with 
the traditional intergenerational paradigm in the socio-economic assimilation and integration 
literature, and confirms previous findings on for instance conforming to political attitudes in 
the host society (Maxwell 2010). This does not mean that immigrants assimilate religiously. We 
did not perform an analysis of  shifting between denominations. We do know from previous 
research, however, that shifting between religions is relatively rare, even in a vital religious field 
such as the U.S. only up to one third of  people switch religions (Loveland 2003), and switching 
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is very uncommon among Muslim migrants in Europe (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). In terms 
of  overall religiosity, however, they tend to conform to the general religious environment in the 
place where they live. 
With our third finding, we take into account relapses in the intergenerational conforming to 
host society religiosity, by focusing on the role exclusion plays for ethnic minorities. Previous 
research has shown that ethnic minorities tend to divert themselves from the host society when 
they experience discrimination and exclusion and that this process of  distancing is even stronger 
among the second generation. We found that perceived discrimination had an increasing effect 
on religiosity. This runs contrary to the lowering effect the European religious environment has 
on ethnic minorities. The reactive ethnicity and related reactive religiosity hypotheses explain 
this effect of  discrimination by pointing to an increased ethnic and religious identification. Ethnic 
minorities who perceive discrimination are expected to dissociate themselves from the host 
society and at the same time increase the interaction with the own ethnic community, especially 
the second generation. We found no support for this interaction, however: the influence of  the 
ethnic community on second generation migrant religiosity is not stronger for individuals who 
perceive discrimination. This might be explained by the phenomenon of  feeling ‘in-between’, 
which has previously been observed among Muslims (Foner and Alba 2008). Second generation 
migrants often feel not fully accepted as Europeans, nor as members of  the sending society of  
their parents. Therefore, they often reinforce their religious identity to compensate for their 
threatened ethnic identity. This could mean that perceived discrimination is associated with 
increased religiosity, sometimes specifically external to the own ethnic community. Another 
point at which we could not confirm previous research is the role of  context receptivity on 
religiosity. Although Connor (2010a) found that Muslims tend to have a higher religiosity if  
they live in European regions where natives are less welcoming towards ethnic minorities, we 
could not replicate this result and found no effect of  context receptivity. Social receptivity, nor 
institutional receptivity in the destination country seem to be related to migrant religiosity. This 
discrepancy might be partially due to a difference in context, in that receptivity is more influential 
at a regional than at a contextual level (Connor 2010a), or to the fact that Muslims might be 
more sensitive to perceptions of  exclusion due to the conflation of  Muslims and migrants in 
public debates (Meer and Modood 2009).
Our fourth finding relates to the role of  the ethnic community for ethnic minority religiosity. 
As ethnic minorities conform to the host society religiosity in an intergenerational process, 
the question is: how does the ethnic community affect this process? We found that the ethnic 
community indeed has an influence on migrant religiosity and that interactions with either the 
ethnic community or the host society tend to influence to what extent the ethnic community 
influences second generation migrants’ religiosity. Second generation migrants who were raised 
in more traditional households tend to be influenced more by ethnic community religiosity. 
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The influence of  the community is the strongest for non-Christian religiously affiliated ethnic 
minorities. This confirms previous research in the social psychological literature which found 
that the transfer of  values is stressed more in communities who have values which differ more 
from those of  the rest of  society (Boehnke, Hadjar and Baier 2007). Therefore, the preservation 
of  religiosity might be more successful for religious minority groups, especially for individuals 
who live in more traditional household settings.
In sum, we found that second generation migrants therefore are somewhere in between the 
religiosity of  the ethnic community and the religiosity of  the host society. Whether they end up 
closer to either one of  these influences depends on a number of  factors. First of  all, interactions 
with the host society and/or the ethnic community pull second generation migrants towards 
the dominant religious pattern of  each group. In general, however, second generation migrants 
tend to be closer to host society religiosity than the first generation. This last conformism is, 
however, somewhat attenuated in the case of  perceived discrimination. When second generation 
migrants perceive discrimination, they tend to experience a reduced influence of  host society 
religiosity. At the same time, they are not more influenced by the ethnic community religiosity, 
however. They are influenced more by the ethnic community when they are raised in traditional 
households and belong to religious minority groups.
Small-scale segregation
With our third objective, we wanted to look at how ethnic segregation in small-scale settings 
influences migrant religiosity. Previous research had found that among Muslims, ethnic 
residential segregation is associated with a stagnating level of  religiosity (Voas and Fleischmann 
2012). It was unclear, however, whether this association also holds among other groups and in 
other settings. Therefore, we applied Blau’s (1974) structural opportunities theory and tested 
the influence of  school segregation in chapter 7 of  this dissertation. Structural opportunities 
theory predicts that group sizes and distributions predict the opportunities for interactions 
between individuals from different groups. Therefore, ethnic school composition governs the 
opportunities for interethnic and interreligious contact, thus leading to religious influences across 
groups. Given the lower level of  religiosity among the ethnic majority, this means we expect 
higher religiosity for individuals in schools with a high proportion of  ethnic minority pupils. We 
found that ethnic segregation in the school context is indeed associated with a higher religiosity 
among ethnic minorities. Moreover, the effect of  ethnic school segregation on religiosity is not 
limited to ethnic minorities. Ethnic majority Catholic pupils also tend to have a higher religious 
commitment if  they attend schools which have a majority of  ethnic minority pupils.
This shows that findings from previous research among Muslim minorities might to a certain 
extent be applicable to other minority groups as well. Indeed, previous research among Muslims 
already demonstrated that ethnic residential segregation might create a protective bubble for 
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Muslim communities’ religiosity (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Moreover, in combination with 
the finding that religious minority groups tend to transfer their religiosity more successful, this 
shows that segregation might contribute to form a shield from influences of  the host society, 
in which ethnic minority religiosity is transferred more successfully to later generations. This 
finding also furthers our understanding of  how groups influence other groups’ religiosity. 
Traditionally, previous research focused on how the ethnic majority influences ethnic minority 
religion. Our finding that ethnic and religious school segregation influences ethnic majority 
religion as well shows that the relation can also run in the opposite direction.
Towards an integrated model
Combining our results, we are able to make general predictions of  religiosity among migrants 
in Europe across generations. It seems that religiosity among migrants is becoming similar to 
that of  the host society. Especially among the third generation, there are few differences in levels 
of  religiosity among ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority. Although cultural and religious 
differences will probably persist for a longer time, the religious fervor seems to be adapting across 
generations. At the same time, this process is hampered for migrant groups with influential ethnic 
communities and in the case of  perceived discrimination. As we have seen, ethnic communities 
are influential in the same way as the host society: the more interactions individuals have with 
the ethnic community, the more they are similar to the religiosity of  their community. This 
influence of  the ethnic community is also higher in the case of  segregation, in schools and 
possibly other settings as well. When later generation migrants perceive discrimination and 
exclusion, religiosity tends to be higher as well. Therefore, the intergenerational adaptation to 
levels of  religiosity in the host society is far from a linear and one-directional process.
One of  the main goals of  this dissertation was a plea to go from the analysis of  the specific 
to the analysis of  the more general. These have resulted in the processes we identified above 
and the predictions that are based on these processes. Our findings can give a new direction 
to the understanding of  ethnic minority religiosity in Europe and to further analyses thereof. 
The question therefore is: can these general processes be applied to specific groups or cases? 
Going back to the most studied group in Europe, Muslims, previous research has documented 
intergenerational stability in religiosity among Muslim migrants in the Netherlands (Maliepaard, 
Lubbers and Gijsberts 2012). Muslim groups in the Netherlands, and other Western European 
countries, are known to be cohesive, sizable and segregated minority groups and report high 
levels of  perceived discrimination (Bolt, Hooimeijer and Van Kempen 2002; Karsten et al. 2006; 
Andriessen, Fernee and Wittebrood 2014). Therefore, intergenerational stability in religiosity, 
might be due to a higher influence of  the ethnic community, the ethnic segregation and the 
perceived discrimination. The benefit of  our approach is therefore that the general processes we 
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identified might explain specific cases as well. The test of  this proposition is therefore to go back 
in the opposite direction and test whether our general analysis can explain specific cases as well.
Limitations and suggestions for further research
In this dissertation, we made an explicit choice for a quantitative and comparative study of  
ethnic minority religion in Europe, based on international comparative large scale survey data. 
Although this strategy has led us to some interesting general conclusions, it has also limited our 
scope. Overall, the downside of  our approach has therefore been that we have discussed social 
processes concerning religiosity among ethnic minorities in general, thus losing grasp with the 
effects for specific groups or contexts. In the upcoming part, we will discuss the limitations of  
our approach and how these can be overcome in future research.
Examine differences
This dissertation has revolved around the search of  similarities in religiosity across groups. We 
wanted to go beyond previous research which was based on case studies of  single ethnic minority 
groups, often in only one context. Therefore, we looked for a comparison of  different ethnic 
groups, analyzed comparable indicators of  religiosity and performed analyses on a comparable 
set of  countries. These choices also mean neglecting various differences. Future research should 
therefore pay more attention to each of  these differences.
First, we have devoted little attention to differences between ethnic and religious groups. In 
the few cases where we did take into account group differences, we found that the processes we 
identified indeed play out differently for different ethnic and religious groups. We found that 
second generation migrants from religious minority groups are more similar to the religiosity 
of  their ethnic community than other groups. Moreover, we had to identify groups based on 
national origins, thus grouping together different ethnic and regional groups that might live 
together in the same nation state but nonetheless differ in terms of  religiosity. Therefore, future 
research could improve upon our findings by testing whether the relationships we identified hold 
for all ethnic and religious groups and in different contexts. Our test of  the role of  small-scale 
segregation contexts for ethnic minority religiosity shows that findings from specific minority 
groups can be replicated among a broad collection of  different minority groups. The question 
at hand for future research is whether the opposite direction can be pursued as well: can our 
findings be replicated among different specific groups in specific contexts? The marked religious 
stability among Muslims in the Western World is one indication that the general patterns we 
have uncovered might play out differently for different ethnic and religious groups (Voas and 
Fleischmann 2012).
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Second, to ensure comparability across groups, we restricted the analyses to indicators of  
religiosity that can be considered typical aspects of  religious lives, across different ethnic and 
religious groups. Therefore, we chose to examine religious affiliation, religious commitment 
and religious behavior. Concerning the latter, we were unable to include an indicator on service 
attendance, since that indicator in the European Social Survey (ESS) does not work for Muslims 
(Meuleman and Billiet 2011). This is an interesting example of  the problematic nature of  
selecting indicators for the quantitative study of  religiosity among ethnic minorities. To enable a 
comparative analysis, indicators run the risk of  being too specific and linked to denominational 
aspects, such as prescriptions concerning the frequency of  praying or service attendance. At the 
same time, the sociology of  religion struggles with finding the right indicators for measuring 
religiosity in a wide spectrum of  cultures and religious traditions, due to a focus on Christianity 
(Cadge, Levitt and Smilde 2011). This is especially important for the study of  religion among ethnic 
minorities in Europe, whose religious lives do not necessarily fit in Christocentric frameworks. 
Future research could therefore improve upon this study in two ways. First, by looking at other 
indicators of  religiosity. If  possible, these indicators should entail both comparability across 
cultures while at the same time being specific enough to grasp the complexity of  religious lives 
across contexts. Second, by uncovering different dynamics for different dimensions of  religiosity. 
Our findings have indicated for instance that the transfer of  religious behavior within the 
ethnic community to later generations is more successful than that of  religious beliefs. The 
famous thesis of  Grace Davie that Europe can be characterized as a place of  ‘believing without 
belonging’ (1990) demonstrates that contrasting different dimensions of  religiosity uncovers 
different dynamics for each dimension. Therefore, future research could improve upon this 
dissertation by examining whether there exists a similar pattern in religiosity due to conformism 
to the host society on some dimensions, while other dimensions are preserved within ethnic 
communities across generations.
Third, due to data limitations and to ensure comparability, we limited the data to European 
countries, supplemented with the United States and Canada in the last chapter. Europe was 
particularly suited to address the impact of  the context, given the variance in religiosity across 
countries. At the same time, Europe is quite unique in that vast regions are characterized by 
widespread secularization. Although this has uncovered interesting insights into the conformism 
among ethnic minorities in terms of  religion, the results could have been less pronounced when 
other world regions would have been examined. Moreover, Europe can also be characterized 
as a world with a relatively high level of  freedom of  religion, whereas this is less the case in 
other countries. In other world regions, religious conformism might not be a voluntary process 
and religious preservation within the ethnic community might be restrained. Therefore, future 
research could test whether these relations also hold in other world regions. Furthermore, 
although we assessed the impact of  the religious environment in Europe, by testing the effect of  
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ethnic majority religion, we did not take institutional aspects of  religion into account. Countries 
differ in terms of  the institutionalization of  different religions, for instance the presence of  
different denominations, state sponsorship of  certain denominations and the presence of  
religions in the social security system. Therefore, future research could improve upon this study 
by examining other dimensions of  the religious environments, beyond the level of  religiosity of  
its inhabitants.
Examine social integration
This dissertation fits in a long tradition of  applying social integration theory to the influence of  
values, ideas and beliefs of  one group on individuals or other groups. Taking off  from Durkheim’s 
work (1897), social integration theory has been applied to for instance the study of  suicide (Stack 
2000; Van Tubergen, te Grotenhuis and Ultee 2005), delinquency (Crutchfield, Geerken and 
Gove 2006), health (Seeman 1996; Ross, Reynolds and Geis 2000) and religion (Wuthnow and 
Christiano 1979; Welch and Baltzell 1984; Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001; Van Tubergen 
2006). These studies stress the benefits of  social integration and cohesion for social groups and 
individuals. Social integration is associated with a better physical and mental health, with lower 
rates of  delinquency and as a binding factor reducing the risk of  suicide for individuals. For 
religion, social integration has most often been studied as a means through which religious 
groups influence individuals or other groups. This application has been adopted by scholars of  
migrant religiosity, who have studied how the religious lives of  ethnic minority students are 
influenced by the religiosity of  the ethnic majority, through social integration (Van Tubergen 
2006). This is also the approach we followed in this dissertation. As with any research, however, 
there are some limitations to this approach upon which future research could improve.
First, we were unable to directly examine the effect of  social integration. We identified the 
influence of  the host society on the religiosity of  ethnic minorities, and identified subgroups 
which can be expected to have more frequent interactions with ethnic majority members. 
Due to data limitations, however, we were unable to measure intergroup interactions, hence 
to control for the actual level of  social integration and the effect that has on ethnic minority 
religiosity. Although this is common in the sociological literature on religiosity, future research 
could improve upon this tradition by measuring the direct effect of  social interactions for 
individuals religious lives. Our results in Chapter 7 show that having more ethnic majority friends 
is associated with higher levels of  religious commitment among adolescents. The question 
is whether this influence extends beyond adolescence and the school context. There is a long 
tradition of  research into the benefits of  social capital within religious institutions, especially 
among ethnic minorities (Hirschman 2004). To establish the same tradition at the other side 
of  the spectrum, social capital as a determinant of  religiosity and not as a consequence, the 
association between social interactions and religiosity deserves a careful assessment.
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Second, this careful assessment should not be limited to one direction, in this case from 
the ethnic majority to the ethnic minority. As already indicated, the measurement of  distance 
between ethnic majority and ethnic minorities has in public discourse and academic research 
been approached too one-sidedly (Schinkel 2013). Therefore, the amount of  inter-ethnic contact 
has often been problematized and studied as an aspect of  ethnic minorities, and less so as an 
aspect of  the ethnic majority, especially in Europe. The literature into inter-ethnic marriages is an 
interesting illustration: most studies in Europe examine the influences on inter-ethnic marriages 
among a sample of  ethnic minorities, thus ignoring the influences on the propensity of  the ethnic 
majority to intermarry (Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2006). This applies also to the literature on 
social integration and religion among ethnic minorities in Europe: virtually all studies examine 
how social integration into ethnic majority groups influences ethnic minority religiosity and not 
the other way round. Our results in Chapter 7 show that at least among adolescents in school 
contexts, there is an influence of  ethnic minority religion on certain ethnic majority groups. 
Therefore, future research should also examine how ethnic minorities influence ethnic majority 
religiosity.
Examine more generations
Apart from studying other contexts to assess whether the evolution we have outlined holds in 
different world regions as well, the question also is whether the processes we identified continue 
beyond the second generation. Second generation migrants differ in one important aspect from 
their first generation counterparts: their place of  birth. First generation migrants are born in the 
home country, thus socialized in the religious environment of  that country. Second generation 
migrants, on the other hand, are born and socialized in the destination country of  their parents. 
They are confronted with the religious environment of  the place in which they live and the 
religious lives of  their parents, which might be out of  touch with the environment. Therefore, 
we found the study of  differences in religiosity between the first and the second generation 
particularly interesting. This specific context wanes across generations however. The question 
therefore is: how do the intergenerational differences proceed beyond the second generation? 
Although we were unable to examine this question in all empirical Chapters due to data 
limitations, Chapter 7 shows that the religious commitment of  third generation adolescents can 
be compared to that of  the ethnic majority.
Therefore, future research beyond the second generation should take into account different 
trends among different ethnic and religious minority groups and for different indicators. We 
have seen that religiosity can evolve in a specific way from the first to the second generation. 
From Chapter 6, we remember that ethnic communities transfer religious behavior more 
successfully than religious commitment and that religious minority groups are more successful 
as well. This implies that for later generations, the religious climate within ethnic communities 
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might differ between groups and for different characteristics. In some religious minority groups, 
religiosity might be relatively vital, given the successful transmission to the second generation, 
while it might be less so in ethnic minority groups that are not religious minorities. On the other 
hand, religious behavior such as praying might evolve into a cultural practice in some groups, 
less backed up by religious commitment. Therefore, the differentiation we outlined earlier is 
especially important for future research into later migrant generations.
Examine time-sensitive evolutions
The analyses presented in this dissertation are relatively static. Except for Chapter 4, where we 
took into account the insecurities experienced during childhood in the country of  origin, we 
assumed that religion is a static phenomenon, at the individual, the cohort and the period level. 
Therefore, future research would do well to integrate time as an important characteristic in the 
analysis of  religiosity among ethnic minorities.
At the individual level, we know from previous research that age is an important factor in 
religious lives (Argue, Johnson and White 1999). Although the relationship between age and 
religiosity is often explained in terms of  an increase in religiosity in later life due to an increase in 
existential fears because individuals reach their end of  life, the picture is more complex. Different 
religious and ethnic groups tend to have different patterns of  religiosity throughout the life-
course (Argue, Johnson and White 1999; Peacock and Poloma 1998). Moreover, demographic 
transitions and family compositions influence religiosity over the life course as well (Ingersoll-
Dayton, Krause and Morgan 2002). Our finding that traditional household settings influence 
the transfer of  religiosity to later generations shows that the life course and family dynamics 
indeed influence ethnic minorities’ religious lives. This means for instance that extending the 
research into ethnic minority religiosity to adolescents is an important endeavor, given the 
specific role of  adolescence in the formation of  religiosity (King and Boyatzis 2004). At the 
same time, it illustrates that our findings among adolescents are not necessarily generalizable to 
other life phases. Therefore, future research should more fully grasp how religion among ethnic 
minorities is shaped throughout the life course. This kind of  research could for instance be 
pursued by gathering longitudinal data, which enables scholars to fully understand the impact 
of  demographic transitions and life-course trajectories for religiosity. Moreover, longitudinal 
data have the advantage of  giving more insight into the causality of  the associations we have 
identified in this dissertation.
Above the individual level, time might also be at play at different levels. Although it has been 
demonstrated that religiosity fluctuates constantly throughout the world (Norris and Inglehart 
2004), we have assumed that religiosity across ethnic groups and countries is stable over time. 
The evolution over the last few decades in religiosity among European populations (Davie 1990, 
2003) shows that even at higher levels, time is an important concept in analyses of  religiosity. 
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Given that we identified processes of  conforming to religiosity in the host society, evolutions 
in religiosity over time might be an important factor in this process. Previous research has for 
instance demonstrated that first and second generation migrants tend to conform to a declining 
trend of  homonegativity in the host society (Van der Bracht and Van de Putte 2014). This means 
that when ideas, values and beliefs change over time in the host society, migrants might conform 
to this trend as well. Moreover, ethnic minorities also originate from a place where religiosity is 
susceptible to time trends. This might also be replicated in ethnic communities, where religiosity 
might be changing due to conformism to time trends in the host society, changing demographic 
compositions or other trends. Although longitudinal data can overcome this gap in the research 
literature as well, the existing data of  the ESS can be used in a way to account for time trends at 
both the cohort- and period-level (Van der Bracht and Van de Putte 2014).
Implications
So what is the take-home message of  this dissertation for sociologists and public policy? From a 
scientific perspective, we learned that the literature on migrant religiosity should be embedded 
more in the general literature on religiosity and ethnic minorities. The focus on Muslim migrants 
in Europe has not also narrowed the scope of  the research, it has also led scholars away from 
the general literature from the two traditions that are best suited for answering the questions 
why individuals are religious and how migration and integration affects migrants. Religion is 
one among many characteristics that undergo a certain repositioning after arrival in the new 
host society, especially across generations. Therefore, we encourage scholars to focus more 
on intergenerational processes and how religion evolves across generations in the host society. 
Furthermore, most research into interactions between ethnic minority and ethnic majority 
religiosity has only examined the direction from majority to minority. We have shown that 
ethnic majority religiosity can be shaped by ethnic minority religiosity as well, at least in small-
scale settings. We therefore encourage sociologists of  religion to examine how ethnic minority 
religiosity has shaped European countries’ religiosity.
We started this dissertation with referring to the public concerns surrounding the radicalization 
of  Muslim minorities in the Western World. Although we did not focus on Muslims, we tackled 
some points which are of  interest to policy makers in regards to this debate. Overall, our findings 
show that ethnic minority religiosity across generations aligns to that of  the country in which they 
live. Therefore, if  our findings are replicated for specific minority groups, such as Muslims, it can 
be expected that religiosity among Muslims will decline over subsequent generations. At the same 
time, we also identified some factors which might cause Muslims to deviate from this pattern, as 
we have already illustrated in the case of  Muslims in the Netherlands. First of  all, as a minority 
group in Europe, Muslims might stress the transfer of  religiosity within the ethnic community. 
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Moreover, due to endogamy and the tendency to marry a partner from the origin country (Beck-
Gernsheim 2007; Voas and Fleischmann 2012; Van Kerckem et al. 2013), Muslim groups also 
have the tendency to form traditional families, another aspect which promotes the transfer of  
religiosity. The main factor of  interest for public policy is probably the effect of  segregation. We 
have shown that the intergenerational decline of  religiosity among ethnic minority adolescents 
can slow down in the case of  ethnic and religious segregation. This also builds on previous 
research on the effect of  segregation for adult Muslim groups (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). 
Therefore, segregation might be a factor which contributes to renewed religious fervor among 
Muslim youths in the West, especially in the school context. Discrimination is another factor 
which might slow down the process of  religious conforming to the host society among Muslims 
and other minority groups (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Especially later generations often 
feel unaccepted in Europe and therefore try to find solace in a religious identity, stripped from 
cultural influences. Previous research has indicated that especially these groups among later 
generation migrants in Europe are susceptible to fundamentalist interpretations of  Islam (Roy 
2004; Warner, Martel and Dugan 2012). Therefore, the processes we identified as influencing 
ethnic minority religion in general also have a specific consequence for specific groups. Public 
policy might therefore be interested in the processes described in this dissertation since they 
might specifically contribute to radicalisation of  some subgroups of  larger ethnic and religious 
minority groups.
Although most democratic states do not intervene with the religiosity of  its inhabitants, 
public policy in the West has recently focused on how the radicalization of  Muslim minorities 
can be stopped. One of  the ways of  reducing the risks of  radicalization might be focusing upon 
reducing boundaries between ethnic minorities and the host society. These boundaries might on 
the one hand be symbolic ethnic boundaries, creating strong in-group cohesion and out-group 
prejudice, which might lead to a reduction in contact between two groups. In this case, public 
policy could focus on reducing prejudice and discrimination towards ethnic minority groups. 
At the same time, policy should also devote attention to reducing structural boundaries, again 
through reducing prejudice and discrimination, but also through reducing segregation, both in 
small-scale settings such as schools, as in larger settings, such as residential segregation. Our results 
show that interactions between individuals promote the dissemination of  religious ideas, values 
and beliefs. Therefore, a policy focusing on reducing symbolic and structural ethnic boundaries 
will probably have two consequences for religiosity among ethnic minorities in Europe. First, 
religiosity will be more similar between ethnic minority and ethnic majority religiosity. As a 
perceived discrepancy in religiosity between ethnic minority and majority religiosity might 
also increase perceptions of  ethnic boundaries, this will result in reduced perceptions of  ethnic 
boundaries, thus reinforcing the trend towards reducing boundaries. Second, given the association 
between the processes under study and the radicalization of  specific subgroups, these policies 
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are also likely to reduce the risk of  radicalization, especially among later generation ethnic 
minorities. Both effects are dependent upon each other, as a reduction in boundaries will lead 
to higher rates of  perceived acceptance in the host society, while less public concerns about 
the religious fervor among ethnic minority groups might lead to reduced ethnic boundaries. 
Although this dissertation was not an analysis of  radicalization and our policy implications are 
not directed to radicalization specifically, we believe that our results might contribute to the 
debate on religiosity among first and second generation migrants in Europe.
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